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THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE WITH
ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING
WERNER PFENNIGSTORF*
I
INTRODUCTION
A discussion of the American rule on the allocation of attorney fees would not
be complete without consideration of potential alternatives. Fortunately, Ameri-
cans do not have to rely on hypothetical models alone but have a whole world
around them where they can study different systems of cost and fee allocation in
actual operation. Indeed, one of the aspects that make the American rule such a
worthwhile subject of study is that on an international level it represents the excep-
tion rather than the rule.
Americans, of course, have been aware of the fact that different rules prevail in
other countries, especially that in England "the costs follow the event."' So far,
however, with the exception of England, 2 there has been no thorough analysis and
evaluation of those foreign rules and their application.3 This article is intended to
fill the gap at least partially. Since it was conceived, designed, researched, and
written as part of a multidimensional, multidisciplinary symposium devoted to the
American rule, it was written primarily for an American audience. Thus, it pre-
supposes familiarity with the American rule and complete lack of familiarity with
any of the European systems. In addition, the objectives of the symposium are
reflected in the scope and the limits of this report. Specifically, since the American
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1. These words are used in the pertinent English court rules, see inJfa note 54. The term "costs" in
these rules and in this article is used broadly to include all the costs associated with a particular case,
whether in the form of court fees, lawyer fees, or expenses of any kind.
2. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929).
3. For a proposal of studies of the rules of other countries, along with a scathing indictment of the
American Rule, see Ehrenzweig, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed?, 26 CAL. ST. B.J. 107 (1951); Ehrenzweig,
Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792 (1966). Following this challenge, the
Committee on Comparative Procedure and Practice of the Section of International and Comparative Law
of the American Bar Association sponsored a series of short reports covering four countries, which were
published in the 1962 Proceedings of the Section of International and Comparative Law: Baeck, Impositin
of Fees of Attorney of Prevailing Party Upon the Losing Party Under the Laws of Austria, 1962 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L &
COMP. L. 119; Baeck, Imposition of Legal Fees and Disbursements of Prevailing Party Upon the Losing Part--Under
the Laws of Switzerland 1962 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L & COMP. L. 124 [hereinafter cited as Baeck, Imposition of
Legal Fees and Disbursements ]; Dietz, Payment of Court Costs by the Losing Party Under the Laws of Hungary, 1962
A.B.A. SEC. INT'L & COMp. L. 131; Freed, Payment of Court Costs by the Losing Party in France, 1962 A.B.A.
SEC. INT'L & COMP. L. 126; Schima, The Treatment of Costs and Fees ofProcedure in the Austrian Law, 1962
A.B.A. SEC. INT'L & COMI'. L. 121; For a discussion contrasting American and European cost reimburse-
ment rules, see R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW CASES, TEXT, MATERALS 343-44, 665-68 (4th ed.
1980). So far as the author has been able to determine, this list fairly exhausts the American literature on
the comparative aspects of this subject.
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rule is concerned only with attorney fees and out-of-court expenses (rather than
court costs), the article also places its focus there.
Also in keeping with the scope and objectives of the symposium, this article
concentrates on the costs of civil litigation only. This means, most importantly,
that the distribution of the cost burden in criminal cases is not considered. The
unique nature of criminal procedure, where the participation of the individual is
always involuntary, creates its own set of public policies, which, while certainly
worthy of study, have almost nothing in common with the concerns that dominate
this symposium.
Other limits on the scope of this article stem from the need to distinguish spe-
cial types of civil cases. While Americans may be satisfied to regard as "civil litiga-
tion" everything that is left after the elimination of criminal proceedings, the same
is not true in other countries. There is a bewildering variety of special courts,
special jurisdictions, and special procedural rules: for various types of administra-
tive law disputes, especially for those relating to social security and taxation; for
labor law matters; for family matters; for various types of commercial matters; for
maritime matters; for patent, copyright, and other industrial property matters;
and, most recently, for various types of consumer transactions. That those special
systems also include variations from the general rule on cost allocation should not
come as a surprise to Americans, who have seen the emergence of exceptions to the
American rule for special types of cases resulting from the special public policies
influencing particular areas of the law. This article, however, makes no attempt
either to provide exhaustive information on each and every special court in each of
the countries discussed or to establish and consistently apply a uniform definition
of "civil litigation" in the narrow sense. Principal attention is given to the rules
established by the respective codes of civil procedure for "standard" cases com-
prising, at the core, contract, tort, and property disputes among individuals; refer-
ence is made, however, to modifications of the general rule with respect to special
jurisdictions, matters, or procedures, especially when those deviations indicate dif-
ferences in public policies or efforts to respond to the special equities of certain
situations.
The pattern of rules and exceptions that thus emerges does not, of course,
reflect any pattern of predominance in the actual numbers of cases handled by the
courts. It seems, on the contrary, that much of the recent increase in the volume of
litigation, in Europe at least, has been in the proliferating special jurisdictions,
while the caseload of courts dealing with traditional types of civil litigation has
remained relatively stable. 4 This article is not the place for an extensive compara-
tive quantitative analysis of litigation volume, but there should be no need to
emphasize that before any change in existing rules can be recommended, solid
factual information is needed not only on the overall volume of cases in each juris-
diction but also on the natures and causes of the disputes, the types of parties
4. In a colloquium conducted recently by the German Bar Association on the problem of caseloads, it
was reported that the caseloads of the courts of general jurisdiction for civil matters had actually declined
while alarming increases had taken place in the administrative courts, the tax courts, and the Federal
Constitutional Court. Redeker, Bewirischaflung der Rech/sgewiihrung., 31 ANWALTSBLAT 417 (1981).
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involved, and other factors that could be material in influencing litigation
behavior.
Further, this particular audience is presumably interested in the practical
effects of the rules as much as or more than in the abstract principles announced.
This interest calls not only for a discussion of court rules and case law dealing with
the interpretation and application of the general rule but also requires some basic
background information on the manner in which the litigation services of a lawyer
are needed, provided, and compensated in each country. Indeed, the principles
governing the remuneration of lawyers for their services and the principles gov-
erning the allocation of costs among the parties are intricately interwoven, as is
most persuasively demonstrated by the institution of contingent fees.
On the other hand, the objectives of the symposium do not require an exhaus-
tive treatment covering all legal systems. A representative sample is enough to
demonstrate the variety of situations, public policies, practical approaches, and
problems existing outside the United States. This report looks at twelve European
countries. Variety of approaches has been the principal factor in their selection.
Other factors have been richness and accessibility of published material, language
limitations, and research economics generally. Information is provided for the fol-
lowing countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland (Cantons of
Geneva and Zurich), and the United Kingdom (England and Wales).
Current discussion about the American rule seems to be concerned primarily
with its effect on the behavior of prospective litigants. Specifically, it asks whether
the rule is sufficiently effective in encouraging the "right" types of litigation and in
discouraging undesirable types of litigation or litigation-related behavior (for
example, delaying tactics or refusal to discharge legal obligations voluntarily). For
a meaningful comparison, therefore, it seems useful to know how important a role
concerns of this kind play in other legal systems. This report seeks to identify the
principles that have traditionally governed the allocation of litigation costs as well
as emerging concepts that provide a basis for questioning, modifying, or displacing
the traditional notions.
The most powerful force to exert its influence in recent years has been the
demand for equal access to justice. Indeed, it needs to be emphasized in these
introductory paragraphs that the concern about equal access to justice has domi-
nated the contemporary European literature to the extent that litigation costs are
seen primarily as an impediment to equal access. Consequently, the principal stan-
dard by which cost allocation rules and proposals for their reform are evaluated is
the extent to which they promote or impede equal access to the courts. 5 Thus,
while the current discussion provides many insights into the changing public
policy of cost allocation and offers a number of suggestions for a differentiated
approach for different types of cases, a certain amount of caution is needed in view
5. To say more about access to justice in this paper is neither possible nor necessary. The subject has
been covered exhaustively by the first three volumes of ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1978-79). The national
reports compiled in the two books of the first volume (A WorldSurvey) are especially helpful. Most of them
contain some information on litigation costs and their allocation.
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of this explicit or implicit bias. Its benefit to the discussion in the United States is
also limited by the fact that under the pressure for equal access to justice, an adop-
tion of the principle of the American rule is rarely, if ever, considered as an alter-
native to the traditional European rules, except for certain special situations. That
in itself can be taken as an indication of the continued strength of the European
rules.
In contrast to the United States, where it has been difficult even to find a clear
statement of the reasons why the courts have chosen to leave attorney fees and
other expenses at the charge of each party, and where there has been little if any
academic discussion of cost allocation, Europe has produced a body of legal litera-
ture on costs which is rich and almost overwhelming. The subjects of cost alloca-
tion, cost assessment, and cost procedure are important disciplines, to which
legislatures, courts, and academic authors have devoted considerable thought. 6
This article cannot do justice to the volume, complexity, and high level of scholar-
ship of this discussion, especially considering that it extends over many centuries
and many jurisdictions. It is only possible to give a rather rough and superficial
account of the theoretical discussion. On the other hand, this article tries to
present as many of the variations among the actual provisions as possible, in order
to give American readers an impression of the wide range of possible approaches to
the problem. The position of the author throughout is that of objective reporter
and analyst rather than that of evaluator or advocate.
The article starts with a historical introduction, which seems necessary to
explain the existing European rules and which shows a surprising parallelism
between the concerns that dominate this symposium and concerns that were
present at the earliest stage of the development of civil procedure. The second
section of the article summarizes the existing rules in the twelve European coun-
tries listed above. The next sections deal with public policy, criticism, and reform
proposals. The final section reports on some empirical data relating to the effects
of costs on litigation behavior.
II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
With the exception of England and the Scandinavian countries, the countries
of Europe can trace most of the principles governing civil procedure back to
Roman law. It makes sense, therefore, to start this report by asking how the
problem of allocating litigation costs was handled under Roman law in the various
stages of its development. For obvious reasons, this cannot be more than a
summary.
In the earliest stages, when civil procedure evolved as an organized, regulated,
and objective form of enforcement and dispute settlement, first under the sponsor-
6. For a recent bibliography of major European monographs ranging from the eighteenth century to
the 1960's, see Vecchione,. Spese Gzwdhz zai (Dinuto processuale civile) in 17 NovIssiMo DIGESTO ITALIANO
1120-43 (1970). Vecchione's article itself presents an excellent summary of the subject, including a histor-
ical and comparative discussion of the theoretical basis of cost allocation rules.
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ship of the high priests of Rome and then under that of the government, there
were no costs in the contemporary sense. Specifically, there were no attorneys
charging fees. Even in the classical period of Roman law during its first two centu-
ries, when the famous Roman jurists wrote the commentaries and opinions that
were to dominate legal thinking through our times, legal procedure and legal
advice were free.7 The administration of justice still carried the dignity and the
sacral aura of its religious origins.
Precisely because of these religious connotations, however, recourse to formal
procedures was something not to be undertaken lightly and without good cause,
and even the earliest forms of procedure had devices to ensure that. In the legis
actio sacramentum, each party had to make a deposit (a sacramentum) into the temple
at the time of the institution of the action; when a decision was rendered, the
prevailing party had his deposit refunded, while that of the loser was forfeited to
the temple." This type of procedure was already in use prior to the compilation of
the Twelve Tables (around 450 B.C.); the Twelve Tables fixed the amount of the
deposit at two levels corresponding to different amounts in controversy. 9
During the early part of the classical period, there were a number of actions
that provided for a doubling of the payment to be made to the plaintiff in the
event that the defendant, rather than immediately acknowledging his obligation,
denied the claim and thereupon by judgment was implicitly declared to have been
lying. The cases for which this consequence (hs crescens in duplum) was provided
were indeed of a kind suggesting bad faith especially in the case of the actio iudicati
which essentially constituted the enforcement of a previous judgment. The dupli-
cation was regarded as a penalty for litigating in bad faith (hoena temere ligan-
tium).' 0 It has been noted that most of these actions amounted to a review of a
decision already made.'
By the time of Justinian and the highly developed administrative style of the
Byzantine Empire, only two of the actions for double payment were still in use.
12
Lawyers, however, had started to charge fees, 13 and despite some early efforts to
outlaw the practice, 14 a system of fees had developed to pay for the services of the
officials that performed a variety of ancillary functions in an increasingly cumber-
some judicial bureaucracy. 15 As costs became a reality of life in litigation, with
ever more detailed regulations determining their incidence and amounts, a prac-
7. See, e.g., L. WENGER, INSTITUTES OF THE ROMAN LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 330-31 (rev. ed.
1940).
8. See, e.g., Engelmann, The Roman Procedure, in A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 239,
271 (R. Millar ed. & trans. 1927).
9. For details, see M. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, DER ROMISCHE CIVILPROZESS, ERSTER BAND:
LEGIS ACTIONES 121 (1864).
10. See L. WENGER, supra note 7, at 183-84.
11. Rudorff, Ueber die Lithcrescenz, 14 ZEITSCHRIiT-r FOR GESCHICHTLICHE RECHTSWISSENSCHAF"T 287
(1848).
12. Engelmann, supra note 8, at 402.
13. By the time of Diocletian (c. A.D. 300), it had become necessary to regulate them. See L.
WENGER, supra note 7, at 322.
14. See M. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, DER ROMISCHE CIVILPROZESS, DRITrER BAND: COCNI-
TIONES 200 (1866).
15. M. VON BETHMANN- HOLLWEG, supra note 14, at 200-04; L. WENGER, Supra note 7, at 332.
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tice developed to require the losing party to reimburse the winner for his costs in
cases of frivolous litigation and in cases of bad faith denial that formerly would
have been punished by double recovery. 16
Eventually, reimbursement of the prevailing party's costs became the rule for
all cases and not just those involving bad faith. The East Roman emperor Zenon
can be credited with announcing for the first time, in 486 A.D., 7 the rule that the
mere fact of losing was sufficient ground to impose on the loser the obligation to
pay the winner's costs.
Fifty years later, the rule became part of the Code of Justinian. It was also
adopted by the regional compilations for the western part of the Empire,' 8 then
under the control of Germanic tribes but with the old administrative structure still
largely in place. Justinian specifically required judges to decide on the costs in
every case on which a final decision was made.' 9 This was important because the
prevailing party had no other way to recover his costs-neither by appeal nor by
separate action. Forgetful judges were declared personally liable for the costs. 20
The controlling presumption was that the losing party had done wrong by
insisting on its legal position, which, as the court's decision conclusively showed,
was not justified. 2' Accordingly, the judge was permitted to allow an exception
when there were sufficient doubts to conclude that the losing party was in fact not
guilty of bad faith. 22 Thus, in effect, the Justinian rule reversed the relation of rule
and exception. 23
In this form, the rule was adopted by the ecclesiastical courts of the Roman
Catholic Church and eventually by the courts of the emerging European nations.
24
Further development at the national level, through court practice, literature, and
legislation, produced some variation, especially with respect to the role and extent
of judicial discretion and other exceptions. For example, the rules of the court of
the German Empire, laid down in 1613, provided for exceptions on "satisfactory
grounds."'25 During the nineteenth century, however, codifications enacted by the
various German states generally left little room for discretion. 26 The French Ordi-
16. L. WENGER, supra note 7, at 333-34.
17. The decree is to be found in the Code of Justinian. CODE JUST. 7.51.5; see also L. WENGER, supra
note 7, at 334.
18. For details and references, see M. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, supra note 14, at 232; L. WENGER,
supra note 7, at 334;
19. CODE JUST. 3.2.13.6 (a decree promulgated by Justinian in A.D. 530). It contains the often-cited
words, "v'tcum victor" condemnandum" (the defeated is to be condemned [to pay] the victor).
20. This sanction appears already in Zenon's decree, CODE JUST. 7.51.5. See also M. VON BETHMANN-
HOLLWEG, supra note 14, at 232-33.
21. This has found expression in the text of the Institutes of Justinian. INST. JUST. 4.16 ("depoena temere
htgantium ").
22. This qualification also is expressed already in Zenon's decree. CODE JUST. 7.51.5; see also M. VON
BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, supra note 14, at 232; W. ENDEMANN, DAS DEUTSCHE ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 506
(1868 & reprint 1969).
23. The sources are not altogether clear, and there is some disagreement among scholars on the extent
to which the imposition of the costs was subject to conditions or discretion. See Vecchione, supra note 6, at
1122.
24. W. ENDEMANN, supra note 22, at 507.
25. Id. at 508.
26. See, for example, the following codes reprinted in NEUDRUCKE ZIVILPROZESSUALER KODIFIKA-
TIONEN UND ENTWURFE DES 19. JAHRHUNDERTS: MATERIALIEN ZUR ENThICKLUNGSGESCHICHTE DER
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nance of 1667 permitted no exception at all; this did not, however, deter the courts
from splitting costs among the parties in appropriate cases simply by omitting ref-
erence to costs in their judgments, in open defiance of the statutory requirement
that every judgment charge costs to the losing party.2 7
For England, the Roman law connection is less obvious, although it cannot be
ignored.28 The English rules on costs developed in Law through piecemeal legisla-
tion and in Equity through the exercise of the Chancellor's discretion. Imposition
of costs came into being as a special item of damages, in cases where damages were
awarded. Apart from indemnification, the most important aim seems to have
been to discourage frivolous or vexatious lawsuits. 29
On the Continent, although the rule as such was never challenged, there was
disagreement in the academic literature about its nature and place in legal theory.
Some insisted that it was a penalty while others, emphasizing its compensatory
function, regarded it as a form of damages. A third theory, pointing out that the
pure and simple fact of losing a lawsuit was not enough to support either a penalty
or a damage claim under generally accepted theory, viewed the cost consequences
as a natural, generally known, and accepted incident of engaging in litigation. 30
While it was also accepted that the prospect of becoming liable for the opponent's
expenses acted as a deterrent against frivolous or hopeless claims or denials, one
can detect misgivings concerning the potential deterrence of sound and legitimate
claims. 3 1
The most commonly accepted circumstances that could justify a deviation
from the rule, especially a proportional division of the costs among the parties,
were obscurity of facts, justified ignorance of material facts, mutual fault, exagger-
ated claims, and conflicting judgments at various levels of courts. 32 Doubt or con-
troversy concerning a question of law was not generally considered a sufficient
reason for a partial shifting of the cost burden, nor could the loser obtain relief on
the ground that the deciding judge had previously and repeatedly expressed a
different opinion. 33
The principles and attitudes on which European cost allocation rules are based
ZPO (Dahlmanns ed. 1971-1975): Baden (vol. 3) § 169; Bavaria (vol. 4) art. 106; Hanover (vol. 1) Code of
1847 § 42, Code of 1850 § 46.
27. Stein, From the 1500s to the Revolution: Procedure Under the Absolute Monarchy, in A HISTORY OF CONTI-
NENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 708, 726 (R. Millar ed. & trans. 1927).
28. For a discussion of the influence of canon law on procedural practice, see I F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 134 (2d ed. 1898 & reprint 1923).
29. For details, see Goodhart, supra note 2, at 851-54. Scotland at first followed the Continental pat-
tern, allowing the loser to escape the cost burden by showing that he had reasonable cause for the litiga-
tion; in the eighteenth century, however, it adopted the English position of always imposing costs on the
loser except when the winner had engaged in improper conduct. 2 A. E. MACKAY, THE PRACTICE OF THE
COURT OF SESSION 528-29 (1879).
30. For a summary of the law of the various German states in the eighteenth century, see Ehrig,
Kostenerstattung-Erfolgsprimre oder Prozessstrafe?', 1971 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR RECHTSPOLITIK 252. For an over-
view of the discussion in the middle of the nineteenth century, see W. ENDEMANN, supra note 22, at 507-08.
See generally Vecchione, supra note 6, at 1122-30.
31. W. ENDEMANN, supra note 22, at 508.
32. Id at 508-09.
33. Id at 509 n.23. Endemann concludes his summary with the observation that despite all attempts
at rationalization, the division of costs among the parties was not much more than a matter of sentiment.
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deserve more thorough analysis, of course. The proper place for that analysis, how-
ever, seems to be after an examination of existing rules themselves. 34
III
SUBSTANCE AND SCOPE OF THE RULES
A. Overview
This section describes the existing law of twelve European countries in a form
that is designed to facilitate comparison from an American perspective. The first
aspect to be discussed is the content and scope of the general rule as it is estab-
lished by statute and applied by the courts in each country, noting the effect of
statutory exceptions or modifications and the range of discretion left to the courts.
The second aspect is the definition, limitation, and determination of the costs
affected by the rule. The third aspect involves special rules established for special
jurisdictions, matters, or situations. The section concludes with a brief discussion
of the interrelation of attorney fee shifting and European legal aid systems.
The relevant provisions of the laws or codes of the jurisdictions discussed here35
are provided in the Appendix in English translation. For the sake of brevity, the
notes refer to those provisions only by name of the respective jurisdiction and sec-
tion or article number.
There is no single concise rule that could be identified as the "European Rule."
The rules of the various European countries concerning costs are neither uniform,
nor simple, nor rigid. If any general statement can be made, it is that contrary to
American tradition, most European countries (1) regard the objective fact of
defeat as sufficient ground for imposing the costs on the losing party, without
requiring any evidence of fault or bad faith, and (2) include in the costs to be
reimbursed to the winner by the loser not only court fees and related costs but also
the attorney fees and other expenses incurred by the winner. This general state-
34. To add perspective to the historical overview, it might be useful to remember that Roman law
constitutes only one of the sources of present European law, the other major source being the traditions and
customs of the various ethnic groups or tribes from which the European nations developed. Germanic
tribal laws never reached the stage of development where costs and cost reimbursement would have
received special attention; before coming under the influence of Roman law concepts, they did not even
distinguish clearly between civil and criminal procedures. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note
28, at 572-73. This lack of sophistication does not mean that litigation was not expensive. Id at 97. And
in exacting an unequivocal and absolute commitment from litigants to the truthfulness and sincerity of
their causes, the tribal laws were even more severe than ancient Roman law. In a system where difficult
questions of fact were eventually resolved by battle between the opposing parties, the penalty for litigating
in bad faith, or sometimes just for litigating unsuccessfully, was very harsh indeed. Even when milder
forms of ordeal were used (such as carrying a red-hot iron or picking a ring out of a cauldron of boiling
water), the losers often suffered permanent physical harm. See, e.g., Engelmann, The Medieval German Proce-
dure, in A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 85, 154-55 (R. Millar ed. & trans. 1927); 2 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 598-99. Compared to these consequences, the monetary sanc-
tions imposed by Roman law and modern European codes appear in a different and more favorable light.
35. Among the twelve countries studied, there are two in which different rules apply in constituent
parts or smaller jurisdictions. Thus, each of the 25 cantons of Switzerland has its own court system and
code of civil procedure. The codes of Geneva and Zurich have been selected as examples. In the United
Kingdom, there are separate but almost identical rules for England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern
Ireland. Only the rules applicable to England and Wales are furnished in the Appendix and cited in the
text.
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ment, however, needs to be qualified by reference to a complex system of defini-
tions, limitations, exceptions, and grants of discretion in each of the jurisdictions.
Even the general rule just described does not apply in every country. A
notable exception is Spain, whose code of civil procedure, enacted in 1881, does
not mention the subject of costs at all in the context of ordinary judgments and
thus neither requires courts generally to make a decision on the costs nor has a
general rule charging the costs to the losing party.3 6 On the other hand, there are
many special provisions scattered throughout the code that provide for costs in
specific types of matters or cases to be charged to the losing party. 37 With this
approach, the code continues a tradition of Spanish law under which, absent a
special provision to the contrary, the losing party could be ordered to pay costs
only if found guilty of temerity or bad faith. 38 This position, however, has increas-
ingly been challenged on the ground that it makes it too difficult and too inconve-
nient for the courts to charge costs to the losing party. 39 Instead, the prevailing
view in the literature seems to be that the established doctrine should be replaced
by the principle of "objective defeat. ' '40
Significantly, the Municipal Court Act of 1944 adopted the objective principle
as the general rule for all cases in the jurisdiction of the municipal courts. 4 1 And in
January 1983, the General Commission for Codification (a legislative reform com-
mission operating under the auspices of the Department of Justice) adopted a pre-
liminary draft for amendments to the code of civil procedure containing a
provision expressly establishing the objective principle. 42
B. Imposition of Costs on Losing Party
1. Duty of Court. With the exception of Spain, just mentioned, and England,
where the court is given discretion whether to rule on costs, 4 3 the codes specifically
36. For an extensive treatment, see Miguel y Alonso, Los costosy las costas en eiproceso civi7 espa o/, 1969
REVISTA DE DERECHO PROCESAL IBEROAMERICANA 901, and for a summary: Murray A Survey of Civil
Procedure in Spain and Some Comparisons with Civil Procedure in the United States, 37 TULANE L. REV. 399, 450-52
(1963).
37. Spain (a), Author's Statutory Appendix [hereinafter cited as App.] 117; see also F. RAMOS
MENDEZ, DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 648 (1980).
38. See, e.g., Tribunal Supremo, May 21, 1963, Aranzadi 2745.
39. Miguel y Alonso, supra note 36; Miguel y Alonso, Access toJustice in Spanih Law, in I ACCESS TO
JUSTICE 845, 868-69 (1978). Spanish judicial statistics, like those of other countries, do not allow reliable
conclusions concerning the number of cases in which costs are imposed on one of the parties, and on what
grounds.
40. See works of Miguel y Alonso, cited supra note 38; see also F. RAMOS MENDEZ, supra note 37, at
648. "Objective defeat" indicates the absence of subjective elements such as fault, negligence, or bad faith;
the term thus parallels that of "objective liability," which is roughly analogous to strict liability in Amer-
ican usage.
41. Spain (B), App. 119.
42. Letter from Carlos de Miguel y Alonso to Werner Pfennigstorf (Feb. 16, 1983). The text of the
proposed new provision is:
In proceedings for judgment, the costs of the trial court stage are imposed on the party whose claims
have been completely rejected, except insofar as the judge considers the presence of exceptional cir-
cumstances justifying that they be not imposed. If the success or rejection was partial, each party shall
pay the costs caused by it, and one-half of the common costs.
A similar provision is planned to be included (as article 449) in a new code of civil procedure, on which the
commission is still working. Id.
43. England (a) § 51(1), App. 92. It will be seen that in practice this discretion is rather limited.
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prescribe that the courts shall impose costs on the defeated party.4 4 Many of the
codes specifically provide that this decision is to be made by the court on its own
motion if the prevailing party has failed to submit a petition for the ruling.45
The rule is generally applied whether the defeated party is the plaintiff or the
defendant, although rarely is this spelled out in the code.46 Thus, in contemporary
American parlance, the European codes prescribe "two-way fee shifting."
"Defeat" is usually understood to mean complete defeat in all major aspects of
the case; it is, therefore, not an exception to the rule, but only a clarification, where
a code provides that if a party prevails in some respects but loses in other respects,
the costs are to be divided proportionately. 47
One of the more important cases of a partial victory is a judgment giving a
plaintiff less than the precise amount requested. It is generally recognized that,
with respect to the difference between the amount claimed and the amount
awarded, the plaintiff has lost and must bear a proportionate part of the total
costs. 48 Some codes specifically provide that costs need not be divided if the differ-
ence was minor and did not cause any additional costs. 4 9 It is easy to see how this
particular rule discourages plaintiffs from making unrealistically large damage
claims. There are, of course, instances when it is impossible to calculate a damage
claim with absolute precision, but the European codes offer a sufficient variety of
procedural devices to prevent hardship in such cases.5 0
It is a confirmation of, rather than an exception to, the rule where the codes
provide that in the event of a settlement in court, costs are split between the parties
unless, of course, the terms of the settlement provide otherwise. 5 1
The English rules on this point are different and deserve special note. Ordina-
rily, a plaintiff is entitled to his full costs even if the court awards him less than the
amount claimed, except where some personal misconduct was involved in pur-
44. Austria § 41, App. 85; Belgium art. 1017, App. 89; Denmark § 312(1), App. 90; France art. 696,
App. 102; Geneva art. 122(1), App. 104; Germany § 91(1), App. 106; Italy art. 91, App. 110; Netherlands
art. 56, App. 112; Norway § 172, App. 114; Spain (b), App. 119; Sweden ch. 18, § 1, App. 119; Zurich § 64,
App. 123.
45. Austria § 52(3), App. 88; Belgium art. 1017, App. 89; Netherlands art. 56(4). App. 122. The
opposite rule (costs only on request) prevails elsewhere. See Norway § 179, App. 116; Sweden ch. 18 § 14,
App. 122; see also Baeck, Impostlion of Legal Fees and Disbursements, supra note 3. Some of the codes that
require no petition do nevertheless require submission of a statement of expenses to avoid forfeiture of the
right to reimbursement. See, e.g., Austria § 54(1), App. 88.
46. Most of the codes refer generally to the winning or losing party. Denmark § 313, App. 91, provides
specifically that an action that is dismissed entirely is deemed to be lost by the plaintiff for purposes of cost
reimbursement.
47. See, e.g., Austria § 43, App. 86; Norway § 174, App. 115. Some codes authorize the court to appor-
tion costs in such cases. Italy art. 92, App. 11; Netherlands art. 56(1), App. 112.
48. See, e.g., Austria § 43(1), App. 86; Denmark § 316(1), App. 91; Germany § 92(1), App. 107; Zurich
§ 64, App. 123.
49. Austria § 43(2), App. 86; Denmark § 316(2), App. 91; Germany § 92(2), App. 107; Norway § 174,
App. 115.
50. They include, among other things, petitions for an indeterminant amount or an amount left to be
determined by the court, and split actions aimed at establishing in a first stage the basis of liability and
determining in a second stage the amount of damages with separate valuation. See also Zurich § 64, App.
123.
51. Austria § 47(1), App. 87; Germany § 98, App. 109; Italy art. 92, App. I11.
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suing the excess claim. 52 The defendant may, however, shift the cost risk partially
to the plaintiff by "paying into court" an amount essentially constituting his settle-
ment offer, which the plaintiff may either accept or reject. If the plaintiff accepts,
the case is terminated, and the plaintiff is entitled to his costs. If he holds out for a
higher award from the court and is successful, he is also entitled to his costs for the
full amount of the judgment, but if the judgment is only equal to or lower than the
amount paid into court, the plaintiff, even though essentially successful, must
reimburse defendant for costs incurred after the time of the payment into court.5 3
The aim is to encourage settlement.
54
2. Judictal Discretion. Although the role and scope of judicial discretion seem at
first glance to be where the European codes differ most from one another, appear-
ances can be deceiving. For instance, the codes of Austria, Germany, and the
Netherlands appear to be the most rigid ones, instructing the court to impose costs
on the defeated party, with no option to deviate. 55 The English rule, in contrast,
appears to be the most liberal one, expressly giving the court full discretion not
only "to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid" but even
whether to rule on costs at all.5 6 A closer look reveals, however, that an English
court's discretion is limited by the rules of procedure (to which the Supreme Court
Act expressly refers) and by case law. The rules of procedure specify, in accord-
ance with longstanding tradition, that the courts "shall . . . order the costs to
follow the event," unless the circumstances of the case justify a different alloca-
tion. 57 And the cases leave no doubt that the discretion is to be exercised "judi-
ciously"5 8 and that "where a plaintiff comes to enforce a legal right, and there has
been no misconduct on his part, . . . the court has no discretion, and cannot take
52. See, e.g., Pearman v. Baroness Burdett-Coutts, 3 T.L.R. 719, 720 (1887) (plaintiff denied costs after
claiming £600 and recovering only £50); Huxley v. West London Extension Ry., 17 Q.B.D. 373, 374
(1886) (token recovery after "extravagant" claims). In both cases, the court made a point of stating that a
"good cause" was needed to deny costs to the successful plaintiff, that the difference between amount
claimed and amount recovered did not by itself constitute a good cause, and that in the cases decided a
good cause was provided by the fact that the plaintiffs had supported their exaggerated claims with allega-
tions of facts known to be untrue. The courts have not gone so far as to order the plaintiff to pay the
defendant's costs in these cases.
The cases involving overstated claims must be distinguished from cases involving several issues. If in
such cases each party wins some issues and loses others, the.costs are to be apportioned according to the
outcome on each individual issue. See D. CASSON & I. DENNIS, ODGERS' PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING AND
PRACTICE IN CIVIL ACTIONS IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE 378-79 (22d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
ODGERS].
53. For details, see ODGERS, supra note 52, at 379.
54. For a detailed discussion of this rule and its effects on the decisions to be made by the parties, see
Zander, Is the Enghh Payment-itto- Court Rule Worth Copytng., 40 RABELS ZEITSCHRIF-r FOR AUSLANDISCHES
UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 750 (1976).
55. Austria § 41(1), App. 85; Germany § 91(1), App. 106; Netherlands art. 56(1), App. 112 (qualified
with respect to unnecessary expenses).
56. England (a) § 51(1), App. 92. An almost identical provision applies to Northern Ireland. Judica-
ture (Northern Ireland) Act, 1978 ch. 23, § 59. In Scotland, the same principle is firmly established by case
law. See D. WALKER, THE SCOTTISH LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SCOTS LAW
296-97 (4th rev. ed. 1976).
57. England (b) 0. 62 r. 3(2), App. 93.
58. See, e.g., Donala Campbell & Co. v. Pollack, 1927 A.C. 732, 811-12.
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away the plaintiffs right to the costs." 59 Nor may the court impose costs on a third
person who is not a party.60
Thus, the English rules of procedure recognize a rather limited number of
exceptions to the rule that costs follow the event. The range of exceptions is actu-
ally narrower in England than under the rigid statutory rules of Austria or Ger-
many, as will be seen when the various exceptions are discussed in detail.
French courts, as noted,6' have always claimed discretion to deviate from the
strict "loser-pays-all" rule under special circumstances, even in defiance of statu-
tory prohibition; and an amendment to the code in 1958 finally recognized this.6 2
The present version of the code still requires the losing party to be ordered to pay
the costs but qualifies this by the proviso, "unless the court, by decision accompa-
nied by reasons, orders otherwise." The code provides no guidance for the exercise
of this discretion, but it is understood that no change in substance was intended
and that the courts were expected to continue to apply the standards developed
over the years. The requirement that reasons be given allows the exercise of discre-
tion to be reviewed, as it had been before. 63
The Italian code also gives the court wide discretion, permitting it to aportion
costs among the parties in the presence of good reasons (giusti mol'V1). 6 4 Similar
rules can be found in many cantons of Switzerland. For instance, the code of
Zurich, most recently revised in 1976, provides that "as a rule" costs are to be
charged to the losing party and to be divided proportionately if neither party suc-
ceeds completely and then specifies two cases in which the court may "especially"
deviate from that rule.65
Among the Scandinavian countries, Denmark is most generous in allowing the
court to deviate from the general rule under "special circumstances"; 66 the codes of
Norway and Sweden are more precise in defining the court's discretion. Norway
allows costs to be split among the parties when there was sufficient doubt in the
case to justify the losing party's decision to litigate. 67 A similar formula was used
in the old Swedish code of 1743;68 it was, however, replaced in the new code of
1948 by a provision that orders or allows costs to be split when either the pre-
59. Cooper v. Whittingham, 15 Ch. D. 501 (1880). For more references, see ODGERS, supra note 52, at
370-71; Goodhart, supra note 2, at 861-62.
60. Forbes-Smith v. Forbes-Smith, 1901 P. 258, 271.
61. See supra note 26.
62. 1958 Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran<aise [J.O.] 11608, art. 3, 1959 Recueil Dalloz Legsla-
lion [D.L.] 45. (amending art. 130 of the (old) Code de proc6dure civile). The complete revision of 1971,
which produced the new Code de procedure civile, changed the numbering (to art. 696) and the language,
but not the substance of the provision.
63. See, for example, the article on Frais et d6pens in 2 RIPERTOIRE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE 387-
88 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as R PERTOIRE].
64. See Italy art. 92, App. 11.
65. Zurich § 64, App. 123. Article 111(3) of the code of Fribourg (1953) authorizes the court to deviate
for "clearly established reasons of equity." See a/so W. HABSCHEID, DROIT JUDICIAIRE PRIVE SUISSE 296
(2d ed. 1981); Baeck, Imposition of Legal Fees and Disbursements, supra note 3.
66. Denmark § 312(1), App. 90; see also H. MUNCH-PETERSEN, DER ZIVILPROZEss DANEMARKS 135-
36 (1932 & reprint 1970).
67. Norway § 172, App. 114.
68. See R. GINSBURG & A. BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN 367-68 (1965); R. WREDE, DAS
ZIVILPROZESSRECHT SCHWEDENS UND FINNLANDS 363 (1924 & reprint 1970);
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vailing party engaged in litigation without provocation or otherwise unnecessarily
or the losing party was justifiably ignorant of material facts. 69
3. Qualificatzons and Exceptions. While it is generally recognized that the objective
fact of defeat is a sufficient ground for imposing costs on the losing party, it is
equally well recognized that this rule needs to be qualified and exceptions to be
made for certain situations. It is in the definition and application of these qualifi-
cations and exceptions where one can observe the conflicting policies of cost alloca-
tion in all their complexity, as well as the variety of possible responses, reflecting
the diverse cultural and legal traditions of the various European countries. Some
of the exceptions are established by statute, others have been developed by the
courts. Some retain the classic notion of presumed bad faith, absolving the loser
from the cost burden if he can rebut the presumption. Others reflect policy consid-
erations far removed from those that govern the general rule.
For a full understanding of the working of European rules one would have to
know not only that exceptions are recognized and how they are defined but also to
what extent they are actually applied, and specifically in what percentage of the
cases actually decided the cost decision follows the exception rather than the rule.
Observation of the cases might reveal that the exceptions have for practical pur-
poses replaced the rule.
Unfortunately, the standard court statistics do not collect data on which such
an analysis could be based. Practitioners working in the various systems are reluc-
tant even to venture estimates. The general impression that one gets from reading
the statutes, cases, and literature, however, is that the exceptions are indeed excep-
tions and that most cases are decided according to the rule.
The following is a summary of the most common types of exceptions.
a. Unprovoked action. If a defendant who has not provoked the plaintiff's
resort to legal action recognizes the plaintiffs claim immediately, demonstrating
thereby that the action was unnecessary, he is usually not only freed of the obliga-
tion to pay the plaintiffs costs 70 but the plaintiff, although technically the winner,
may be ordered to pay the defendant's expenses. 7 1
b. Excusable ignorance of material facts. If the plaintiff prevails on the basis of
facts that the defendant did not know and could not have been expected to know
prior to the commencement of the action, the Swedish code permits costs to be
split among the parties. 72
c. Substantial mutual doubts about facts. Such doubts may justify either party's
litigating in good faith and thus also justify a decision to split the costs between
69. Sweden ch. 18, § 3, App. 120; see also R. GINSBURG & A. BRUZELIUS, supra note 68, at 367-68.
The change has been criticized for placing too narrow limits on the court's discretion. Id. at 368 n.4.
70. E.g., Sweden ch. 18, § 3, App. 120.
71. Austria § 45, App. 86; Denmark § 312(5), App. 91; Germany § 93, App. 107; Norway § 173, App.
115.
72. Sweden ch. 18, § 3, App. 120.
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winner and loser.7 3 A special case that is occasionally mentioned in this context is
that of disagreement about the interpretation of a contract made between the two
parties.74
d. Doubts about the law. Courts and legislatures have been much more reluc-
tant to recognize doubts about the law as a basis for deviation from the general
rule. Only the Norwegian code seems to permit a splitting of costs generally in the
event of legal doubts. 75 In other countries, commentators have expressly pointed
out that legal doubts do not qualify as an exception.7 6 In the special and rather
persuasive case of a decisive change in legislation or case law intervening while the
case is pending, Italian courts have recognizedgiustimotivi as an exception. 77 Aus-
trian and German courts are divided on the question whether a departure from
the rule is justified when the outcome of the case is changed by legislation occur-
ring after the trial but before the judgment or even after the first appeal
judgment. 78
e. Appeals. A special challenge to the rule that the costs must follow the
event is presented by decisions of higher courts on appeal. It seems fair that if its
appeal is rejected, the defeated party should be charged with all costs of trial and
appeal. If, on the other hand, the appeal is successful, and the decision of the
lower court is reversed, the party that prevailed at the lower level and only lost on
appeal can argue that at least one court did agree with its position, which therefore
cannot be all wrong. The argument becomes even more persuasive when a case is
appealed further and then perhaps remanded for new trial. Yet, the general rule is
that all costs incurred at all levels follow the eventual outcome of the case. 79
There is one important exception: If an appellate decision is based on new
facts that could have been presented in the lower court (and presumably would
have made the appeal unnecessary), costs of the appeal can be charged against the
prevailing party.8 0 Further, when the code gives the court discretion to divide
73. For Denmark, see H. MUNCH-PETERSEN, supra note 66, at 135. A similar provision existed in
Sweden prior to 1948. See R. GINSBURG & A. BRUZELIUS, supra note 68, at 367-68; R. WREDE, supra note
68, at 363. The Italian courts have recognized the difficulty of the matter as good cause for a division of
costs. See M. CAPPELLETTI & J. PERILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY 248 n.59 (1965).
74. For Italy, see V. ANDRIOLI, RASSEGNA DI GIURISPRUDENZA SUL CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIvILE,
LIBRO PRIMo 374 (1954); for Denmark, see H. MUNCH-PETERSEN, supra note 66, at 135.
75. Norway § 172, App. 114. A similar provision of the pre-1948 Swedish code had been interpreted
as applicable to legal as well as factual obscurity. See R. GINSBURG & A. BRUZELIUS, supra note 68, at 267-
68.
76. See, e.g., H. MUNCH-PETERSEN, supra note 66, at 135. See generally W. ENDEMANN, supra note 22,
at 509.
77. For references, see V. ANDRIOLI, supra note 74.
78. Compare 5 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES OSTERR. OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVIL- UND JUS-
TIZVERWALTUNGSSACHEN 128 (1923) and Landgericht Wien, 1934 Zentralblatt f.d. jur. Praxis No. 369 with
101 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 162 (1920) and Bundesgerichtshof 37 Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen 233 (1962). The German court has also refused to allow
an exception from the rule when a statute on which the trial court and court of appeals have based their
decisions is subsequently declared unconstitutional. Bundesgerichtshof (Ib Zivilsenat), Oct. 9, 1964, 1965
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 296.
79. For express provisions to this effect, see Austria § 50, App. 87; Denmark § 318, App. 91; Germany
§ 97(1), App. 109; Sweden ch. 18, § 15, App. 122.
80. Germany § 97(2), App. 109. For England, see ODGERS, supra note 52, at 382.
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costs in deviation from the rule, that discretion applies also to the appellate court.
Also, appeals on side issues that do not affect the principal cause are usually
treated separately with respect to costs.8'
f. Vexatious actions. A peculiar type of case appears in English case law. A
court, though unable on legal grounds to dismiss an action, finds it to be oppres-
sive or vexatious and therefore, in addition to awarding only minimal or token
damages, it punishes the plaintiff by denying him reimbursement for his costs. 8 2
g. Unnecessary procedures. An important qualification of the general rule on
costs (rather than an exception in the strict sense) is that the prevailing party is
entitled to reimbursement only for those costs that were necessary to obtain a
favorable decision.8 3 The effects of this qualification are manifested in two ways:
first, in the form of limitations on the types and amounts of reimbursable expenses,
which will be discussed later,84 and second, in the form of rules denying a winner
reimbursement for any expenses related to procedures that where not strictly
needed. In this latter sense, limiting application of the fee shifting rule to neces-
sary costs has made the cost decision a preferred tool for the promotion of proce-
dural economy and for the enforcement of the duty of good faith, openness, and
cooperation in litigation.8 5
Consequently, if a party causes costs by unnecessary or uneconomical proce-
dural acts or motions, it is not only barred from demanding reimbursement for its
own costs but also must reimburse the other party, regardless of the outcome.8 6
Specifically mentioned is conduct that causes delay, postponement, or adjourn-
ment of hearings or trials,87 and delayed presentation of material facts or argu-
ments, which, if timely presented, would have led to more expeditious disposition
of the case.88 A typical case in this class would be that of a defendant who upon
failing to appear at the first hearing loses by default judgment but later presents a
good defense and thereupon wins reinstatement and dismissal. He would have to
bear the costs attributable to the default proceedings. The English rule on pay-
81. Denmark § 320(1), App. 92; Germany § 96, App. 109; Sweden ch. 18, § 15, App. 122.
82. For details and references, see ODGERS, supra note 52, at 371.
83. The element of necessity is expressly stated in Austria § 41 (1), App. 85; Denmark § 312(2), App.
91; England (b) 0. 62 r. 28(2), App. 97; Geneva art. 122(2), App. 104; Germany § 91(1), App. 106; Zurich
§ 66, App. 123. Other countries use other methods to control the amount of reimbursable costs. See znfra
text accompanying note 112.
84. See in/fa pp. 55-59.
85. The duty is generally recognized but rarely expressly established by statute. An express statement
can be found in the Italian code, CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, art. 88:
The parties and their attorneys have the duty to comport themselves in court with honesty and
probity.
Regio decreto of Oct. 28, 1940, No. 1443.
86. Austria §§ 44, 48, App. 86-87; Germany § 95, App. 109; Italy art. 92, App. 111; Netherlands art.
56(1), App. 112; Norway § 177, App. 116; Sweden ch. 18, § 6, App. 120; Zurich § 66, App. 123. In
Belgium, this consequence is not spelled out in the code but is recognized by the courts. See A. FETrWEIS,
A. KOHL & G. DE LEVAL, DROIT JUDICIAIRE PRIV 428 (4th ed. 1976).
87. Austria § 48(1), App. 87; Denmark § 319, App. 92; Germany § 95, App. 109; Norway § 177, App.
116; Sweden ch. 18 § 6, App. 120.
88. Austria § 55, App. 89.
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ments into court also belongs in this context.8 9
As enforcement tools, these rules have a distinctive punitive character. This
appears clearly in the Italian provision authorizing the court to impose on the
offending party cost items that ordinarily would not be reimbursable,90 and by the
provision of the Norwegian code, which allows courts to punish parties who have
"conducted the case against better judgment" by imposing on them all the
opposing party's costs, whether necessary or not.9 1
Punishment is also the dominant motive in the Austrian provision allowing the
court to impose on a party guilty of belated presentation of material facts or argu-
ments not just the costs occasioned by the delay, but the total litigation costs. 92
This is a punishment that benefits the opponent, who ordinarily would have had
to bear at least part of the costs. German law distinguishes more clearly between
indemnification and punishment for procedural misconduct. It authorizes the
court to order parties guilty of dilatory conduct to pay to the court a special penalty,
expressed in statutory court fee units. This penalty is completely independent of
the allocation of costs and, significantly, the provision authorizing it is not among
the cost allocation rules of the code of civil procedure but rather is in the act
regulating the types, incidence, determination, and collection of court fees.93
Where imposition of costs becomes a pure penalty for misconduct it need no
longer be limited to the parties themselves. Indeed, several codes provide that
costs caused by unnecessary procedures can be imposed on the attorneys or repre-
sentatives who negligently initiated the procedures. 94
The Austrian provision deserves special mention because it singles out, as spe-
cific examples of attorney misconduct, the inclusion of nonmaterial facts or sur-
plusage in the briefs. 95 The punishment for such misconduct, however, is to be
imposed only in the event of gross negligence. Similarly, guardians, administrators,
and persons with similar responsibilities may also be ordered to bear costs person-
ally.96 The Zurich code refers to witnesses and to third persons generally. 97
89. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
90. Italy art. 92, App. 111 (referring specifically to art. 88); see supra note 85.
91. Norway § 176(1), App. 115.
92. Austria § 44, App. 86.
93. This provision, appropriately, appears not in the code of civil procedure but in the act dealing
with court fees:
(1) If in cases other than that of § 335 of the code of civil procedure, through the fault of the plaintiff,
the defendant, or a representative, it becomes necessary to adjourn a trial or to set a new date for a
trial, or if the disposition of the case has been delayed by late presentation of means of offense or
defense or of evidence or objections to evidence that could have been presented earlier, the court may
on its own motion impose on the plaintiff or on the defendant a special fee in the amount of one fee
unit. The fee may be reduced to one-quarter. What is provided for the plaintiff, the defendant, and
the representative shall also apply to intervenors, to third parties participating in the trial, the Chief
Federal Attorney, the attorney representing the public interest, and the representatives of these
persons.
Gerichtskostengesetz § 34, 1975 Bundesgesetzblatt[BGBI] I 3047 (translation by Werner Pfennigstor).
94. Austria § 49, App. 87; Denmark § 321, App. 92; France art. 697, App. 102; Netherlands art. 58,
App. 113.
95. Austria § 49(2), App. 87.
96. Geneva art. 127, App. 104; Italy art. 94, App. 111.
97. Zurich § 66, App. 123.
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As a logical extension of these principles, some codes provide for costs to be
charged to the courts themselves if caused by inappropriate handling of the case. 98
It should be noted in this context that the procedural cost rules and penalties
are not the only sanctions for misconduct. Dishonest or deceitful conduct before or
during litigation may also result in liability for damages under substantive law.
Some codes specifically refer to this possibility.99
h. Actions among relatives. A rule that cannot be explained as evidence of sur-
viving penal or tort elements is the division of costs regardless of the outcome
among parties who are related to each other by blood or marriage. 100 The Belgian
and Dutch codes contain express provisions to this effect;' 0° the new French code
retains the principle implicitly, having replaced an express provision with one
giving the court general discretion.10 2 The rationale here seems to be to let the
court give due consideration to the special economic and social ties and dependen-
cies that often exist among relatives.
i. Matters not subject to party disposition. A final and very noteworthy exception
applies to matters in which the law requires a formal decision by the court and will
not recognize private agreements or settlements among the affected parties. Prin-
cipal in this class are decisions concerning family status, and among them the most
prominent are divorces, specifically those of the uncontested or no-fault types. In
these cases, when the law for reasons of public policy imposes a quasi-litigation
procedure as a condition for achieving results that do not involve a real dispute,
one may ask whether the cost burden associated with that procedure is justified at
all; and it seems all the more unfair to place the burden entirely on one of the
parties who happens technically to be the loser. Specifically in the case of no-fault
divorces, it would add injury to insult if a spouse who is allowed to seek dissolution
of a marriage without having to prove any fault or wrongdoing on the part of the
other spouse, could then, after having achieved his purpose, also demand reim-
bursement of his legal expenses. Consequently, several of the European codes have
been amended in recent years to permit costs in such cases to be charged entirely
to the plaintiff or to be divided between the parties at the discretion of the court.10 3
Sweden has a general provision to that effect applicable to all cases when a court
decision is required and when the result is not at the disposition of the parties. 10 4
True to the underlying philosophy of this rule, the courts have charged all costs to
98. Austria § 51(2), App. 87; Denmark § 322, App. 92; France art. 698, App. 102; Zurich § 66, App.
123.
99. Italy art. 96, App. 111; Norway § 177, App. 116.
100. See generally W. ENDEMANN, supra note 22, at 509.
101. Belgium art. 1017, App. 89; Netherlands art. 56(1), App. 112.
102. Article 131 of the old French code was identical to the second paragraph of Belgium art. 1017,
App. 89. This special provision was no longer needed after the enactment of article 696 of the new code.
103. Austria § 45a(l), App. 86; Germany § 93a, App. 107. For Belgium, see art. 1286(b) of the Code
Judictaire, added by law of July 1, 1974, Moniteur Beige, Aug. 17, 1974, art. 11. England has a simplified
procedure for uncontested divorces that does not require representation by lawyers. See Jacob, Access to
Justice in England in 1 ACCESS TO JUSTICE, 417, 454 (1978).
104. Sweden ch. 18 § 2, App. 120. These cases are known as indispositlv cases. For an explanation of
the concept, see R. GINSBURG & A. BRUZELIUS, supra note 68, at 139.
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the loser in cases that, although technically within this indispositiv class, are more
akin to regular adversary matters, notably paternity suits and divorce suits based
on adultery. 105
4. Residual Cost Decision. If the principal issue is resolved or ceases to exist without
reaching the stage of judgment or final settlement, the issue of costs usually sur-
vives alone, and the court has to make the allocation on the basis of a hypothetical
decision considering the state of the facts and arguments at the time the case was
discontinued. 106
5. Appellate Review. In most jurisdictions, the court's decision concerning the allo-
cation of costs is subject to review as a part of the judgment. In France, the new
provision allowing the court to deviate from the statutory rule but requiring a
statement of the reasons therefor has been interpreted as having precisely the pur-
pose of permitting review. In contrast, the court's decision to follow the rule by
imposing costs on the losing party is thought to need no statement of reasons
except where the issue was raised and argued by the parties. 107
Separate appeal of the cost decision without also appealing the decision of the
principal issue is restricted in some jurisdictions. It is expressly precluded in Ger-
many and Norway. 108 The Austrian code precludes it when the decision has been
made by a court of appeals.'0 9 When separate appeal is available in Austria and
Germany, it is the limited appeal, subject to short time limits and decided without
hearing, available for orders of the court. 11
C. Determination of Reimbursable Costs
1. Procedure. There are two basic approaches: In some jurisdictions, the court, in
the judgment, decides on the allocation of the costs in general terms, specifying
which party has to bear the total costs or which fraction of the total cost has to be
borne by one or the other party. In these cases the precise amount of the costs to
be reimbursed by one party to the other is determined later by court officials. This
group includes England, Germany, and Italy."'
In the second group of jurisdictions, the court itself specifies the reimbursable
amount in the judgment. 112 This requires that the parties submit their statements
105. R. GINSBURG & A. BRUZELIUS, supra note 68, at 371 n.25.
106. Denmark § 312(4), App. 91; Germany § 91a, App. 106; see also Norway § 175, App. 115; Zurich
§ 65, App. 123.
107. 2 RiPERTOIRE, supra note 63, 1 366.
108. Germany § 99(1), App. 110; Norway § 181, App. 117 (the second paragraph of § 181 provides an
exception when a violation of the law is alleged). Germany § 99(2) provides an exception when the prin-
cipal issue has been decided on the basis of a formal acknowledgement, precluding appeal. Another excep-
tion in Germany is that of section 91a, App. 106, applicable when the principal issue has ceased to exist.
109. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] § 528(1), 1895 Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] Nr. 113.
110. Austria § 55, App. 89; § 91(2), App. 106; Germany § 99(2), App. 110. The restricted nature of
the "limited appeal" (sofortlie Beschwerde) of the German code is not spelled out in the cost provisions but in
the provisions dealing generally with appeals from procedural orders. Zivilprozessordnung § 577, 1950
BGBI S. 533.
111. England (b) 0. 62 rr. 26-32, App. 97-101; Germany § 103(2), App. 110; Italy art. 91, App. 110.
112. Austria § 53, App. 88; Denmark § 312(2), App. 91; Netherlands art. 56(3), App. 112; Norway
§ 179, App. 116; Sweden ch. 18, § 14, App. 122; Zurich § 69, App. 124.
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of expenses a reasonable time before the judgment is announced. While some
codes provide for later adjustments," 3 others expressly provide that the assessment
by the court is final and not subject to review or adjustment." 4
The French code differentiates between court costs which are assessed by the
court in the judgment" 5 and other expenses incurred by the victorious party
which are assessed by the office of the court."16 In Belgium the parties have the
option of submitting a statement before the conclusion of the case, in which case
the court specifies the amount to be reimbursed in the judgment, or of submitting
a petition and a statement after judgment is rendered and having a judge decide
on the amount at that time." 7
2. Definition and Limitaton of Reimbursable Costs. For any system that imposes on
one party the obligation to reimburse the other party for litigation expenses,
whatever the underlying theory or policy, it is an essential requirement of fairness
that the costs to be reimbursed be in some way defined and limited. Another
reason to control and limit reimbursable costs is the strong commitment of Euro-
pean procedural systems to economy.
There are three principal ways in which reimbursable costs are defined: first,
by the general rule that costs and expenses are to be reimbursed only if and to the
extent that they were necessary; 1 8 second, by enumeration of specific cost items as
either reimbursable or not reimbursable; and third, by directly regulating the
amounts of certain cost items. Most of the European jurisdictions use a combina-
tion of these methods. The details are specified in part in the codes themselves, in
part in statutory, official, or semiofficial tariffs or schedules, and in part in case
law. They are too varied and too complex to be described fully in this article and
the description would not provide much insight. The following overview is limited
to some essential points, with emphasis on attorney fees.
The losing party's duty to pay all fees charged by the court or by various court
officials is recognized fairly uniformly, but in nature and amount these charges
differ from country to country. France abolished court costs almost entirely in
December 1977; 1 19 at the other extreme, Spain, Italy, and Austria have still very
complex systems of duties, fees, and emoluments of various kinds.120 Germany has
a statutory fee schedule similar in design to the schedules governing attorney
fees. 121
Most of the countries also provide for reimbursement of attorney fees, although
113. Austria § 54(2), App. 88.
114. Denmark § 312(2), App. 91.
115. France art. 710, App. 103.
116. France arts. 704-708, App. 102-03.
117. Belgium art. 1021, App. 89-90.
118. See supra note 83.
119. Decret No. 77-1468, of Dec. 30, 1977, 1977 J.O. 6359, 1978 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Lkgzslation
[D.S.L.] 49.
120. For Spain, see references cited supra note 39. For Italy, see Rubino-Sammatano, Through the
Mysteries of Fees n Italy, INT'L BAR J., Nov. 1970, at 8. For Austria, see Fasching, Access toJustice in Austrta,
in I ACCESS TO JUSTICE, 205, 207-11 (1978).
121. The rules governing court costs are in the Gerichtskostengesetz, 1975 BGBI I 3047. For attorney
fees, see ifra note 122.
Page 37: Winter 1984]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
to different extents. In Austria and Germany, where attorney fees are fixed by
statutory schedule, 122 the amount resulting from the application of the schedule is
considered a necessary expense and is routinely allowed.123 In Switzerland, official
fee schedules are common, but courts have traditionally specified the reimbursable
expenses at lower amounts.124 It appears that only one of the Swiss cantonal proce-
dural codes, that of Geneva, expressly provides for only partial reimbursement of
attorney fees. 125 In a recent case arising under the Zurich code, the Federal
(Supreme) Court of Switzerland declared a judgment of the Zurich Court of
Appeals, which had assessed the reimbursable attorney fees at an amount below
the minimum allowed under the official statute, to be in violation of the federal
constitution and void.12 6
France and Belgium present a special situation, due to the fact that both coun-
tries traditionally had two major types of legal professionals to assist parties in
litigation. 127 Basically, avouis were required for the preparation and filing of docu-
ments in court; avocals acted as advisors on issues of substantive law and as counsel
in oral arguments. Avouis were compensated by fees, which were fixed by schedule
and recoverable as part of the court costs; avocals received honoraria, which were
unregulated and nonreimbursable. In practice, though, the division between the
two professions had become more and more obscure over the years, and its justifi-
cation was increasingly questioned. Eventually, the two professions were merged
by legislation that abolished the designation avouk and transferred the functions of
the former avouis to the new unified profession of avocal. 128 This created the
problem of how to regulate the remuneration of the new avocats, especially with
respect to reimbursement by the losing party. While it was recognized that tradi-
tional notions of justice and the interests of the prevailing party argued in favor of
full reimbursement of attorney costs, whether in the nature of fees or honoraria, as
was the rule in other major European countries, it was perceived as equally impor-
tant to protect the independence of the legal profession against the threat of regi-
mentation, which, it was feared, would be a consequence of full reimbursement.1
29
122. For Austria, see Schima,supra note 3; for Germany, see Suhr, Legal Fees in Germany, INT'L BAR J.,
May 1979, at 18, and R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 351-52.
123. Attorneys and clients may, by express written agreement, set fees at larger amounts than speci-
fied in the schedule; in that case, the amount by which the fee exceeds the schedule would not be
reimbursable.
124. Attorneys have long complained about this practice. See 1 F. MEILI, DER Zi\IL- UND STRAF-
PROZESS DES KANTONS ZURICH UND DES BUNDES 105 (1882).
125. Geneva art. 12 9 (g), App. 105; see also Baeck, Imposition of Legal Fees and Disbursements, supra note 3,
at 125; Habscheid, supra note 65, at 297-98.
126. Bundesgericht, Apr. 25, 1978, 77 SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 46 (1981).
127. For France, see generally P. HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 82-89 (1967).
128. In Belgium, this was accomplished in the context of the introduction of the new Codejudicaire of
1967. For France, see 1972 J.O. 5, 1972 D.S.L. 39. The merger in France was not complete but left the
position and monopoly of avouis at the appellate courts unaffected.
129. The matter was, of course, discussed extensively, thoroughly, and emotionally. It is impossible to
give details. See L'AssoCIATION NATIONALE DES AVOCATS, Au SERVICE DE LA JUSTICE: LA PROFESSION
JURIDIQUE DE DEMAIN 628-47 (1967); Le Maire, L'mndemnitk de prockdure et de debours (pts. I & 2), 1969
JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 562, 580; Tang Thi Thanh Trai Le, The French Legal Profession. A Prisoner of Its
Glorious Past?, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 63, 74-85 (1982).
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The result of this conflict of policies has been a continuation of a dual system for
lawyer remuneration.
The new Belgian code handles the problem by including in the list of reimburs-
able cost items a provision for compensation for certain attorney services, to be
determined in accordance with a schedule promulgated by regulation. 30
Everyone agrees that the scheduled compensation is not meant to be exhaustive
and that the avocats are free to charge additional (nonreimbursable) honoraria. 13,
In France, the existing schedules for avoui fees were simply made applicable to
avocats providing the same services.' 32 French lawyers have complained, however,
that the schedules have become outdated and that the fees are inadequate, forcing
the lawyers to increase their honoraria and to use an increasing part of those
(nonreimbursable) honoraria to cover services and costs that according to the
intentions of the legislature should be covered by reimbursable fees. 133
The new French code, while retaining the principle of nonreimbursement for
honoraria, allows courts to make an exception whenever they find it inequitable to
let one of the parties bear certain expenses not included in the list of reimbursable
Costs. 13 4 The provision is not limited to the honoraria of avocats but applies to
expenses of all kinds, including such items as travel and lodging expenses and the
cost of procuring evidence. 135 Under previous law, such expenses had been recov-
erable when the losing party was at fault.' 36 The broad language of the new provi-
sion allows a much more generous reimbursement practice. While there has not
been enough time yet for the courts to develop a consistent practice in interpreting
the rule, some lower court opinions indicate a tendency to apply it not only in the
classic cases of procedural negligence or lack of good faith but also in cases of
economic imbalance between parties, such as suits between employers and
employees. 137
In the Netherlands, a legal and formal division still exists between advocaat and
procureur, although in practice there has been a complete merger. Fees for both
professions are regulated by (separate) schedules promulgated in 1843, which,
however, have been found sufficiently flexible to permit periodic adjustment. The
procedural code recognizes as reimbursable only the fees of theprocureur; the fees of
an advocaat are to be reimbursed only to the extent that the total fees do not exceed
130. Belgium arts. 1018(6), 1022; Arr&t6 Royal of Nov. 30, 1970, Moniteur Beige, Dec. 3, 1970.
131. Le Maire, supra note 129. It would be fair to say that the result in Belgium is a system very
similar to that in the United States.
132. 1972 J.O. 5, art. 10, 1972 D.S.L. 39.
133. They have, therefore, demanded legislation to establish a schedule covering not only the routine
technical services of the former avouis but also a minimum honorarium. See, for example, the discussion in
LE BARREAU DE FRANCE, Mai-Juin-Juillet 1978, and the proposal by Jean-Rene Farthouat in LE BAR-
REAU DE FRANCE, Aofit-Septembre-Octobre 1978, at 6; see also Tang, supra note 129, at 76-77.
134. France art. 700, App. 102. For a detailed analysis, see Loyer-Larher, L'arttc/e 700 du nouveau code de
procidure civi'le el le remboursement desfrais non compris dans les dipens, 1977 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Chronique 205.
See also RtPERTOIRE, supra note 63, $ 450.
135. The original version of 1975 referred specifically to "honoraria and other expenses;" the change
was made by Decret No. 76-714, of July 29, 1976, 1976 J.O. 4644, art. 5, 1976 D.S.L. 348.
136. See Judgment of Nov. 22, 1932, Cour de cassation (Ch. civile), 1933 Recueil Dalloz
Hebdomadaire 2; RI PERTOIRE, supra note 63, 441.
137. See Loyer-Larher, supra note 134, at 207-08, and unpublished opinions cited therein.
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the amounts fixed for procureurs. 138 In present practice, the precise amount to be
reimbursed is determined by the court and specified in the judgment; it is usually
less than the total amount charged by the attorney. 139
In England, which also has a functional division in the legal profession, there
seems never to have been a doubt that reimbursable costs include the fees of both
solicitors and barristers.140 The actual amount of the costs to be reimbursed is
fixed by special officials, the taxing masters. The courts, however, have the power
to select one of several standards by which the taxing master will then evaluate the
various cost items.
For instance, the costs to be reimbursed to the prevailing party by the defeated
party are normally assessed on a "party and party" basis, defined as including only
"necessary and proper" costs. 14  The standards used in measuring the costs to be
paid to a lawyer from a fund ("common fund" costs) or by his own client ("solic-
itor and own client" costs) are more generous, including, in the latter case, all costs
"not unreasonably incurred." 142
In addition, the taxing officials have established fee schedules for standard
matters and services, which, although not binding, provide guidance.1 43 It is unu-
sual for taxing masters to grant the full amount requested.'
44
Attorney fees are recognized as necessary expenses when statutes or court prac-
tices require representation by an attorney, or even in the absence of mandatory
representation, when it is recognized as customary, reasonable, and proper for a
party to employ an attorney. 45 Conversely, where special jurisdictions or proce-
dures have been established for small claims, in which parties are expected to
plead for themselves, the codes often expressly preclude the reimbursement of
attorney fees. 146
In Denmark it was long customary for the courts to fix reimbursable attorney
fees at very modest levels and usually lower than those actually incurred. 14 7 Sim-
ilar complaints have been voiced with respect to Norway 48 but apparently not
138. Netherlands art. 57, App. 112.
139. For details, see L'AssocIATION NATIONALE DES AVOCATS, supra note 129, at 161-62, 354;
Hooftman, Lawyers'Remuneration in the Netherlands, INT'L BAR J., Nov. 1973, at 56-59.
140. Goodhart, supra note 2, at 856-58.
141. England (b) 0.62, r. 28(1), (2), App. 97.
142. England (b) 0. 62, r. 29(1), App. 98. There is still considerable confusion about the appropriate
reasons for selecting one or the other standard and even about the precise meaning of the different stan-
dards. See Cook, Costs-Does the Winner Take A/I?, LAw Soc'y GAZETTE, Apr. 28, 1982, at 1.
143. The schedules are published as appendices to Order 62 of the Supreme Court Rules. I THE
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 1982, at 1084.
144. For a survey of costs actually charged by solicitors and allowed by taxing masters, see Zander,
Costs of Littgaton-A Study in the Queens Bench Divi ion, LAW Soc'y GAZETrE, June 25, 1975, at 679.
145. See, e.g., Austria § 41(2), (3), App. 85; Germany § 91(2), App. 106.
146. For the English county courts, see Jacob, supra note 103, at 452-53; for the Swedish small claims
courts, see Bolding, Access toJustice in Sweden, in I ACCESS TO JUSTICE 889, 894-97 (1978). For German
labor courts, see infra note 156.
147. See, for example, H. MUNCH-PETERSEN, supra note 66, at 136, who notes that the revision of
1919 was intended to bring about, among other things, more reasonable reimbursement rates, but did not
have that immediate effect in practice. At present, it is estimated that court-ordered reimbursement covers
about two-thirds to three-fourths of the fees that the winning party actually has to pay. Letter from
Advokat Mikael Rosenmejer (Copenhagen) to Werner Pfennigstorf (July 8, 1983).
148. 5 H. LANGENDORF, PROZESSFC.HRUNG IM AUSLAND UND MANGELRUGE IM AUSLANDISCHEN
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with respect to Sweden. While the Scandinavian countries seem to provide less
than full compensation for attorney fees, they are more generous than other coun-
tries in reimbursing other expenses of the prevailing party. Notably, the prevailing
party can claim compensation for "time and effort expended" on the case.
t49
Other systems will, at most, recognize the expense of necessary travel (for example,
if the court has ordered the party to appear in person) 150 but will reject any claim
based on loss of time.
In this context it should again be noted that in many cases the prevailing party
may have a separate claim for damages, based on tort or breach of contract, under
which it can recover for loss of time and other items that are not covered by the
procedural cost reimbursement claim. 1
5 1
3. Exclusiwn of Contingent Fees. The foregoing discussion has shown how much the
European codes vary in the ways in which they determine or control attorney fees
for reimbursement purposes. On one point, however, there is substantial agree-
ment: Contingent fee agreements of the type commonly used in the United States
in personal injury liability cases' 52 are either expressly prohibited or considered
unethical. 5 3
It is tempting to look for a connection. The acceptance of contingent fees in
the United States has been explained by a combination of factors: first, the desire
to provide access to the courts to persons who are unable to pay an advance or
fixed fee and for whom in fact the unrealized damage claim constitutes the only
tangible asset; and second, the relaxation and eventual abandonment of rules
against champerty, maintenance, and barratry that had traditionally been inter-
preted to restrict the practice. American practice, in short, seems to have accepted
contingent fees as the preferable alternative to legal aid.' 54 The Europeans, in
contrast, seem to have found legal aid the preferable answer and to be less inclined
RECHT 6.8.3 (loose-leaf edition); DANISH AND NORWEGIAN LAW, A GENERAL SURvEY 205 (Danish Com-
mittee on Comparative Law ed. 1963). Sections 176 and 179 were amended in 1973 and are now thought
to mean that attorneys always receive the full amount of their fees according to the statement submitted by
them to the court, unless the court finds the amount excessive. The latter happens in about ten percent of
all cases. Letter from Judge Trygve Lange-Nielsen (Oslo) to Werner Pfennigstorf (Dec. 18, 1982).
149. Norway § 176, App. 115; Sweden ch. 18, § 8, App. 121.
150. Germany § 91(1), App. 106.
151. See supra note 99.
152. For a description of American-style fees, see F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL
SERVICES: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL ECONOMICS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1964).
153. Kalsbach, Introducttwn/EEfiihrung, 1 LES BARREAUX DANS LE MONDE/DIE RECHTSANWALT-
SCHAFT IN DER WELT 2, 156-59 (1959) (listing all countries in this report, except Sweden). There are, of
course, nuances and qualifications. In Germany the prohibition was established by the courts and the rules
of conduct of the legal profession; it was then for a time expressly stated in the law concerning attorney
fees, but on occasion of a recent revision (in 1957) it was eliminated again from the law to allow the courts
to recognize exceptions. See R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 3, at 653-60. The rules of conduct provide that
agreements making the amount of the fee dependent on the success of the attorney's activity may be
permissible in (unspecified) exceptional cases, provided they do not impair the attorney's independence,
agreements under which the client promises the attorney a percentage of the proceeds of the case are
prohibited without exception. See Grundsitze des anwaltlichen Standesrechts § 52 (1977); F. KUNIGK,
DAS ANWALTSHONORAR 27 (1978).
154. F. MACKINNON, supra note 152, at 209-11.
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to abandon traditional ethical concerns regarding contingent fees.1 55
To what extent the difference in cost allocation rules has contributed to this
development is a question to which empirical answers are difficult to find. It can
be speculated, however, that the conditions for acceptance of contingent fees may
have been somewhat more favorable in the United States because, under the
American rule, a claimant only had to worry about his own costs, and the contin-
gent fee offered an answer, win or lose. A European claimant, in contrast, also has
to worry that if he loses he will have to reimburse the defendant, and for that
contingency the contingent fee arrangement does not have an answer.
Other factors may explain why there has been less pressure to introduce or
tolerate contingent fees: fewer claims, lower amounts, trials without jury, and rec-
ognition of subrogation in favor of social security carriers in personal injury cases.
It is difficult to say to what extent each of these is responsible for the absence of
contingent fees or to what extent each is influenced by the presence or absence of
contingent fee agreements.1 5
6
One could point out that Europeans, in contrast to Americans, developed legal
expense insurance early, which solves the claimant's problems better than the con-
tingent fee, not only by paying his own attorney without diminishing the amount
of damages actually received by the claimant, but also by paying the costs due the
opponent in the event of defeat.1 57
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, while the European jurisdictions are
uniform and adamant in rejecting the concept of contingent fees, in at least some
of them the existing rules concerning the determination of attorney fees produce
results that are in many respects very similar to those of a contingent fee agree-
ment, especially if one looks at the situation of a low-income claimant.
First, the most important criterion for establishing attorney fees in litigated
cases in many of the European countries is the amount in controversy. The
amount of work actually performed is rarely considered. Thus, the fee of an
attorney representing a personal injury claimant in Germany becomes larger as
the amount of the judgment increases. If the award is small, the lawyer's fee is also
small, regardless of the number of hours he has spent on the case.
Second, while an unsuccessful claimant in Germany, for example, is legally
obligated to pay his lawyer's fees (and the costs of the defendant), the lawyer vio-
lates no law and no ethical rules if he refrains from collecting the fees, especially
from a client who is an individual of limited means. German lawyers may require
an advance before accepting a case, but they need not do so.
155. See infra text accompanying note 163.
156. In the limited context of this discussion, the author hopes he will be excused from furnishing full
documentation for all the statements contained in this paragraph.
157. For details, see Pfennigstorf, The European Experience in Legal Expense Insurance, in LEGAL SERVICE
PLANS: APPROACHES TO REGULATION 487 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL SERVICE PLANS]. An Amer-
ican litigant is to some extent protected against litigation costs by liability insurance-if the litigation
concerns a damage claim, if he is the defendant, if he is covered by liability insurance, and if the amount of
the liability insurance is adequate. Liability insurance does not help plaintiffs, and contingent fee arrange-
ments help only those who have damage claims for substantial amounts. Everyone else will have to pay a
retainer fee to obtain representation by a lawyer.
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The result is, from the perspective of the attorney, not much different from that
of an American-style contingent fee agreement. From the perspective of the client,
of course, there is an important difference: If the court decides in his favor, he
receives 100% of the amount of damages awarded by the court, the fees of his
attorney being paid by the defendant. If the court rejects his claim, he faces legal
obligations both to his own attorney and to the victorious defendant.
D. Special Rules for Special Matters or Jurisdictions
The case of the no-fault divorce, mentioned as one of the recognized exceptions
to the general rule on cost reimbursement,15 8 can also serve as a fitting introduc-
tion to this section, which deals with classes of cases or whole areas of law for
which strict application of the traditional rule has been found unsuitable or, stated
positively, for which it has been possible to give general form and application to
some of the considerations of equity that ordinarily find expression only in the
context of isolated individual cases.
1. Mandatory No-Fault Court Proceedings. In the case of a no-fault divorce there is
no basis for a presumption of fault. The defendant in such a case cannot be
charged with having pursued or defended an unfounded legal position; he or she
becomes involved only because the plaintiff pursues an objective that is expressly
permitted by the law and that can be reached only through formal court proceed-
ings. In short, in these proceedings the defendant is not an active participant or
adversary but rather (though not always) an innocent victim. The defendant must
suffer the legal effects of the proceedings, but it would be unfair to burden him or
her also with the costs incurred by the plaintiff. A general exception to the rule for
all cases of this type is therefore justified.
There are other similar situations. The German civil code protects tenants of
apartments against one-sided termination of the rental agreement not only by lim-
iting the grounds on which the landlord can base a termination but also by pre-
scribing elaborate procedures that may result in litigation. In proceedings of this
kind it is especially important to discourage the parties from holding back relevant
facts or arguments. Consequently, as a special implementation of the general prin-
ciple of procedural economy, the code of civil procedure permits imposition of
costs on the prevailing party if timely notice or knowledge of material facts would
have made the proceedings unnecessary. 159
2. Social and Economz'c Imbalance. Landlord-tenant cases are also representative of a
different class of special situations-those in which typically one party's economic
power and social standing give it a natural superiority and advantage over the
other. The need to protect the weaker party in such situations was recognized first
in labor relations, later in social security matters, and most recently in administra-
tive law matters generally, where the individual faces the power of the govern-
ment, especially in the' field of taxation.
158. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
159. Germany § 93b, App. 108.
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In these situations, the cost risk affects the two parties unevenly. Lessening the
risk is one of the many measures that have been taken to even the natural imbal-
ance. Other measures include a general lessening of the incidence of costs, for
instance, by eliminating the requirement of representation by attorneys, by admit-
ting nonlawyers as representatives, by encouraging mediation and settlements, and
by general simplification of procedures. In many countries, special courts with
their own special procedural rules have been established for these matters. 1 60 Even
when they are handled by the general courts under the general rules, adjustments
are sometimes made with respect to cost allocation. Thus, the new Belgian code of
1967 was amended in 1971 to provide that in any litigation between carriers and
beneficiaries of social security or social welfare programs, the carrier is always to be
ordered to bear the costs. 16 1 This means that if the claim of a beneficiary is even-
tually rejected (except frivolous or vexatious claims, which are expressly excluded),
the carrier not only cannot recover its expenses but must, in addition, reimburse
the unsuccessful claimant for his expenses.
Few of the other systems are equally generous. Germany, for instance, has
special court systems, each with its own special procedural rules, for labor matters,
for'social security and welfare matters, for taxation matters, and for matters
involving administrative law generally. The most that these rules do for the indi-
vidual with respect to costs in the event of losing, however, is to require no pay-
ment of court costs and to require no reimbursement of the costs incurred by the
government, carrier, or employer.162 The Italian code no longer exempts workers
from the cost reimbursement burden in labor matters. 63 Workers who unsuccess-
fully pursue social security benefits, however, need not reimburse the social
security carrier except when the claim is unfounded and frivolous.1 64 In Swedish
labor matters the court may relieve the losing party of cost reimbursement if that
party had reasonable grounds for litigating the case.'
65
160. These efforts are, of course, part of the larger movement to give everyone access to justice. See
supra note 5.
161. Belgium art. 1017(2), App. 89 (added by law of June 30, 1971).
162. In the labor courts, neither party can demand reimbursement for attorney fees at the trial court
level-a measure designed to discourage representation by lawyers. Appeal procedures follow the general
rule. Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz § 12a, 1979 BGBI I 853, corrected 1036. In the tax courts, only the successful
taxpayer can claim reimbursement of attorney fees; the government has no such right. Finanz-
gerichtsordnung § 139(2), 1965 BGBI I 1477. In the social security courts, the government or carrier may
never claim reimbursement. With respect to the beneficiary's or participant's legal expenses, the court has
discretion to order reimbursement in full or in part, or to deny it, according to the circumstances. Sozial-
gerichtsgesetz § 193(l), 1975 BGBI I 2535. In the general administrative courts, the rules with respect to
costs are the same as for civil courts. Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung § 154(1), BGBI 1960 I 17. But because
representation by attorneys is not mandatory before the lower administrative courts and the government is
usually representated by civil service lawyers, the losing citizen rarely has to reimburse the government for
attorney fees.
163. See Vigoriti, Access toJustice zn Italy, in 2 AccEss TO JUSTICE, 649, 660 (1979). In 1973, a law
establishing the new procedures for labor matters repealed art. 449 of the Italian code, which had excluded
reimbursement of attorney fees in labor cases involving amounts under 2,000 lire and had given the court
discretion to order or deny reimbursement in cases involving larger amounts.
164. Disposizioni per lattuazione del codice di procedura civile e disposizioni transitorie, Regio
Decreto of Dec. 18, 1941, No. 1368, art. 152.
165. Bolding, supra note 146, at 902. This provision, in fact, restores for labor matters the rule that
had been in effect generally for all cases prior to the revision of 1948.
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3. Sovereign Immunity. While the special rules for labor and social welfare matters
recognize the individual citizen's need for protection in his dealings with the gov-
ernment, there is also a vast range of powers and privileges that have traditionally
been associated with the government as the sovereign, and which have not been
eliminated everywhere concurrently with the advance of citizens' rights. In
France, for example, it is established case law that neither the national govern-
ment nor a regional or local government unit is ever ordered to bear the costs upon
losing in litigation with private parties. 166
4. Diffrentiatz'on in Fee Standards. One noteworthy alternative to direct cost
shifting has been employed in Germany in cases characterized both by large
amounts and by economic imbalance among the parties: infringement of patents,
trademarks, or utility models; violations of fair trade standards; and actions by
minority shareholders contesting the validity of a stockholders' resolution. Since in
Germany the amount of court fees and attorney fees is determined primarily by
the amount at issue, large values always mean large fees, even for poor parties and
even if the case requires only little and simple legal work. To make sure that
parties of limited resources are not excluded from the courts by the risk of prohibi-
tive fees, the German laws authorize the courts, in these special cases, to fix the
value of the case, so far as it is relevant for fee determination, at a lower amount
for one party than for the other. 167 The result of such an order is an indirect
shifting of the cost burden. Initially, the attorney of the rich party becomes enti-
tled to fees measured on the basis of a larger amount (determined according to
what the case is worth to the rich party), while the attorney of the poor party
becomes entitled to fees measured on the basis of a smaller amount (determined
not according to what the case is worth to the poor party but acording to what the
poor party can afford to pay). If the poor party loses, its obligation to pay the
entire court costs and to reimburse the victorious rich party is measured by the
smaller amount, leaving a portion of the rich party's attorney fees unreimbursed.
166. For references, see RIPERTOIRE, supra note 63, 1 369-75. In assessing the effect of this rule, one
has to remember that attorney fees are generally unreimbursable.
167. For patent infringement cases, the rule has been in effect since the enactment of the Patent Act in
1937. It was § 53 of the 1937 Act but it is now § 144(2) of the revised version promulgated December 16,
1980, BGBI 1981 I 1. It reads as follows:
(1) If in a patent dispute one party shows that imposition of litigation costs based on the full value of
the case would seriously endanger its economic situation, the court may, on its request, order that
party's obligation to pay court fees to be measured on the basis of a portion of the value adapted to its
economic situation. As a further effect of the order, the favored party has to pay fees to its attorney on
the basis of the portion of the value. Insofar as litigation costs are imposed on or assumed by the
favored party, it has to reimburse the court fees and attorney fees of the opponent only on the basis of
the portion of the value of the case. Insofar as out-of-court costs are imposed on or assumed by the
opponent, the favored party's attorney may collect from the opponent fees on the basis of the value
applicable to the latter.
The corresponding, almost identical provisions in the other laws were added later in response to public
complaints about large corporations or industry groups using the threat of large fee reimbursement claims
to suppress criticism and legitimate complaints. See tnfra text accompanying note 209. The law of July 21,
1965, 1965 BGBI I 625, added § 23a to the Fair Trade Practices Act (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren
Wettbewerb, of June 7, 1909, 1909 RGBI S. 499), § 31a to the Trade Mark Act (Warenzeichengesetz 1968
BGBI I 29), and § 17a to the Utility Model Act (Gebrauchsmustergesetz), 1968 BGBI I 24). The Stock
Corporation Act was amended by adding § 247(2), 1965 BGBI 1 1089.
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If, on the other hand, the poor party succeeds, the larger amount fixed for the rich
party governs not only the court costs that it has to pay but also the reimburse-
ment due the poor party. There is thus a certain superficial similarity between this
fee differentiation and a contingent fee arrangement except that in the event the
poor party loses, his attorney is entitled to the lower fee rather than being left with
nothing, and that in the event of success, the fee is paid by the defeated opponent
and does not diminish the amount recovered.
E. Cost Allocation and Legal Aid
This article and symposium are not about legal aid, which is a separate and
very complex subject.1 68 Yet, it is obvious that cost allocation rules and legal aid
rules influence each other. When a litigant can expect to recoup his expenses upon
successful completion of the case, it would seem that all that is needed to assure
access to justice is to defer payment of court costs and attorney fees, to screen out
all the cases that do not have a reasonable chance of success, and then to wait for
the court to rule in the poor party's favor and impose all costs on the opponent.
Traditionally, most European legal aid programs were indeed based on this
premise. It was, of course, not possible in all cases to predict accurately the deci-
sion of the court, and there were other cases in which the poor party did not obtain
full reimbursement, especially in settlements where costs were split. Modern legal
aid systems tend to be more generous, especially in giving the benefit of the doubt
to those seeking access to the courts. This more liberal policy increases the number
of cases where parties who are supported by legal aid end up losers and conse-
quently not only get nothing from the opponent but also are obligated under the
general rules to pay court costs, their own attorneys, and the opposing party's
costs, while being unable to do so. It seems reasonable for a legal aid system to
accept the risk that a certain percentage of aid recipients lose their cases and the
amounts expended in supporting their causes; it is an entirely different question
whether the opposing prevailing party can be expected to accept without com-
plaint and without compensation the loss of its reimbursement claim.
It is true, of course, that the law, and especially the rules of civil procedure, do
not guarantee that a party ordered by a court to pay a certain amount actually has
the means to pay it. This is a risk that the parties traditionally have had to assume
themselves, at least when they were plaintiffs. The defendant, however, sometimes
has the right to demand that the plaintiff make a security deposit for litigation
expenses that he would have to reimburse to the defendant in the event of dis-
missal. 169 When such rules are applicable, logic would require either that the legal
aid office put up the security or that the defendant's reimbursement claim be
secured in some other way.
168. For a comparative survey, see especially M. CAPPELLETTI, J. GORDLEY & E. JOHNSON, JR.,
TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1975).
169. Provisions like this are standard for foreign plaintiffs. For Germany, see ZPO § 110, 1950 BGB I
S. 533; for Norway, see Law on Judicial Procedure in Civil Cases (Norwegian Laws, loose-leaf, 1980),
§ 182. A provision in the Italian code, applicable to all plaintiffs (codice di procedura civile, Regio decreto
28 ottobre 1940, NO 1443, art. 98), was declared unconstitutional and void in 1960; Corte Costituzionale,
Nov. 29, 1960, No. 67, 5 GIUR. COST. 1195 (1960).
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The English legal aid law authorizes the court to determine the amount to be
paid by the losing legal aid-assisted party in taking the economic circumstances of
both parties into account; it even authorizes the court to order an additional pay-
ment to the prevailing party out of the legal aid fund if that is necessary to prevent
hardship to that party.' 70 German legal aid rules, revised in 1980, still leave both
the victorious opponent and the unsuccessful legal aid recipient to their own
resources with respect to reimbursement,' 7 1 even though the security requirement
need not be met. 172
If the assisted party is successful, it seems to be recognized everywhere that he
can demand reimbursement for attorney fees in the full amount that the attorney
could have charged an unassisted party, not just the amount provided by legal
aid.' 73 Again, one is reminded of American contingent fees, but the situation is
different both with respect to the attorney, who in the event of defeat receives at
least the legal aid fee, rather than nothing, and with respect to the prevailing
plaintiff, who receives 100% of the judgment amount and does not have to share it
with his attorney.
IV
THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS AND POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS
A. Overview
As a mature institution, evolved over a time span of more than 1500 years, fee
shifting cannot be expected to be simple either in theoretical foundation or in
practical application. Rather, the picture that has emerged from the summary of
existing rules and practices in the preceding sections is one of confusing variety
and complexity; as is to be expected, it reflects the compromises, adjustments, and
differentiations that have become necessary over the years as each legal system, in
its own context of broader cultural traditions, attitudes, and customs, has struggled
to accommodate competing and often incompatible policies.
Complex and contradictory as the theories behind the European rules may be,
they deserve a closer look, both in view of the general purpose of this symposium
and in view of Professor Rowe's recent discussion of potential rationales for fee
shifting in the United States and other common law jurisdictions. 174 Rowe identi-
fies six such rationales: promoting fairness, making a litigant whole for a legal
wrong suffered, punishing a litigant for wrongdoing, encouraging litigation consid-
ered useful for the public (the "private attorney general" concept), rectifying large
disparities of strength of the parties, creating economic inducements for certain
170. Legal Aid Act, 1974, ch. 4, §§ 13, 14; Legal Aid (General) Regulations, 1980, STAT. INST. Pt. III,
No. 1894, rr. 127-140.
171. ZPO § 123, as revised by Prozesskostenhilfegesetz (litigation cost aid law) of June 30, 1980, 1980
BGBI I 677.
172. Germany § 122(1), no. 2.
173. Under most codes, the attorney of the prevailing legal aid party can demand payment of the full
fee directly from the defeated party. See, e.g., ZPO § 126, 1950 BGBI S. 533.
174. Rowe, The Legal Theoy of Attorney Fee Shifihg: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651.
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desirable litigation behavior. Most of these ideas have also been recognized in
Europe, with the exception of the private attorney general concept.
Theories, however, form only part of the background of the existing pattern of
cost allocation rules. Understanding the theories, even agreeing upon them, does
not help much in understanding why various countries have adopted different
rules or qualified the same basic rule by different exceptions. In this section, there-
fore, an attempt is made to cast some light on the attitudes and sentiments that
may be responsible for the political choices that have been made. In addition, a
few words need to be said about indirect or secondary conflicts-forces that are
directed not against the idea of fee shifting as such but against some of the conse-
quences of its implementation, such as the establishment of standards or schedules
for attorney fees.
B. Theories
True to the traditions of European legal scholarship, much serious thought has
been devoted to the theoretical basis for imposing litigation costs on the defeated
party. A rich literature has developed, which cannot be related here in full
detail. 175
It should be enough to state that at one time or another almost all of the theo-
ries on Professor Rowe's list have been advanced in one country or another. His-
torically, as noted, punishment and deterrence of abuse of the judicial system by
unfounded, frivolous, or vexatious actions were primary motives. 176 Later the gen-
eral principles of liability for damages were carried over to the special procedural
relationship between litigants. 177 While punitive ideas originally and primarily
focused on the prelitigation conduct of the parties, that is, the decision to pursue or
to resist a claim, some of the present European codes also make use of the power to
impose costs to enforce standards of expediency, economy, cooperation, and good
faith in the course of litigation. When this is done, it constitutes an exception to
the general rule that imposes the costs on the defeated party.
The theory that now seems to be most popular in Europe has some similarity
with what Professor Rowe calls the "make-whole" rationale. 7 8 It is not, however,
as rigidly tied to the classic concept of retributive justice, since it does not presup-
pose a legal wrong and its effect is not limited to a return of unlawful gain.
Rather, the idea that this principle, sometimes referred to as the "net-of-cost" prin-
ciple or "full-value" principle, expresses is that a claimant who is forced to resort to
court action to enforce his claim againt a reluctant debtor is entitled to recover the
full value of the claim and should not be expected to be satisfied with a lesser
amount because of the necessity of suing. Likewise, one who successfully defends
himself against an unjustified claim raised by another person should come out of
175. For a recent summary and bibliography, see Vecchione, supra note 6.
176. See W. ENDEMANN, supra note 22, at 505-06.
177. Id. This theory is still the prevailing one in Spain, although it has been challenged and is about
to be abandoned. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
178. Rowe, supra note 174, at 657-59.
[Vol. 47: No. I
EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
the experience without financial loss. This view has long been stressed in Italy 179
and in France 8 0 and also recently has been cited with approval in Germany.' 8 1
The punishment theory can justify imposition of costs only on a litigant who
can somehow be blamed for coming into court with a losing case; the damage
theory suffers from the same weakness if it follows the negligence model. When the
rule is based on a theory of no-fault liability for causation (objective liability), 8 2 or
on the idea of deterrence, it is somewhat easier to defend, but it does raise ques-
tions about the fairness of its effects on "innocent" bona fide litigants.
The net-of-cost principle is not quite as limited in its reach as it focuses on the
situation of the prevailing party, for whom, of course, it does not make any differ-
ence whether the opponent acted in good faith or in bad faith. Still, in cases
involving good faith mutual disagreement, where the outcome is difficult to pre-
dict, the argument in favor of giving the victor all net of cost at the expense of the
loser loses much of its persuasive force.
No one, consequently, seems to be fully satisfied with these theories or to rely
on them exclusively. Rather, alternative explanations are offered, some of them of
a positivistic nature.
It has been said that the obligation to bear litigation costs is a corollary of
giving every one unrestricted access to the courts for the purpose of pursuing
alleged rights against other persons.' 83 In a similar vein, it has been suggested that
the obligation results from the special relationship into which litigants enter and
that they must be deemed to have agreed to the consequences that the law pro-
vides.' 8 4 Others have dismissed the need for any theory and instead declared the
cost obligation a creation of legislation, which itself constitutes sufficient
justification. 8 5
One of the most thoughtful commentators has argued that the cost allocation
rules must be analyzed in the context of the complex system of civil procedure and
are entirely subject to the policies that shape that system. 186
In a broader sense, the imposition of costs on the defeated party has been
referred to as "natural.' 8 7 It has even been said to have become, over the centu-
ries, so much a part of popular perceptions of the law and legal procedures that it
179. See, e.g., V. ANDRIOLI, supra note 74; Vecchione, supra note 6, at 1124-25.
180. L'AssOCIATION NATIONALE DES AVOCATS, supra note 129; Le Maire, supra note 129.
18 1. See Grunsky, Empfehlen ssch btn Interesse etner efktiven Rechtsverwirkbehung /ir a/le Brger 4nderungen
des Systems des Kosten- und Gebiihrenrechts?, in 1 VERHANDLUNGEN DES EINUNDFONFZIGSTEN DEUTSCHEN
JURISTENTAGES A67 (1976); Pawlowski, Zur Funktion der Prozesskosten, 1975 JURISTENZEITUNG 197, 202;
Schima, supra note 3.
182. For an elaborate statement of this theory, see G6rres, Die Ha/?ung./ir den Ersatz von Kosten and
Schiiden nach deutschem Prozessrechte, 35 ZEITSCHRIFT" FOR DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESS 313 (1906), with refer-
ences to parallel developments in the area of civil liability for damages, which G6rres attributes to the
Germanic (as opposed to Roman law) roots of German law.
183. See Baumbach-Lauterbach, ZPO, 40. Auflage, Ubersicht vor § 91 (1982).
184. Id. ; W. ENDEMANN, supra note 22, at 507-08.
185. W. ENDEMANN, supra note 22, at 508. This argument was proposed in the middle of the nine-
teenth century when codified law had just started to replace the customary principles derived from Roman
law.
186. F. KLEIN, DER ZIVILPROZESS OSTERREICHS 159-60 (1927 & reprint 1970).
187. W. ENDEMANN, supra note 22, at 506.
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no longer needs to be justified on ulterior grounds, the long period of practice and
acceptance itself providing sufficient justification. 188
No claim is made that the principle commands universal application; the
German Federal Constitutional Court, for instance, considered and generally
accepted it but refused to grant it the rank and authority of a constitutional
principle. 189
This is a remarkable paradox-a principle that is almost universally recog-
nized in European jurisdictions, formally announced in codes, supported by long-
standing custom and public opinion, and yet not capable of being satisfactorily
justified in terms of legal theory. 190 It seems to require explanation on a different
level, that of sentiments or attitudes, which are difficult to incorporate into legal
theory.
C. Sentiments and Attitudes
It becomes apparent that factors of a psychological nature are involved when
one contrasts the European reliance on custom and nature with the claim on the
other side of the Atlantic that the American rule is grounded on the idea of fair-
ness. The same conclusion is suggested by the strong emotional reactions that
Europeans display when confronted with the American rule. 19 1 Yet, the senti-
ments and attitudes that are active here are rarely discussed. All one encounters in
the literature are occasional inferences.
The line of thinking that eventually leads to psychological factors starts with
the realization that costs are generally an unwelcome element, an evil that unfor-
tunately is an unavoidable by-product of litigation. Traditionally, only three
options were available for dealing with costs: letting each party always bear its
own, imposing them always on the defeated party, and imposing them on the
defeated party under certain circumstances. The third option has always been
regarded as the most appealing one but has presented two serious difficulties.
First, while it is easy to agree that costs should be imposed on the party who
litigates in bad faith or somehow abuses the judicial system but should be borne by
each party for itself in cases involving legitimate doubt or disagreement, it is very
difficult to establish generally applicable criteria by which it can be determined
whether a given case belongs in one or the other class. The problems are com-
pounded by the ambivalent attitude that almost everyone has toward litigation.
188. For references, see Bokelmann, 'Rechtswegsperre' durch Aozesskosten, 1973 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
RECHTSPOLITIK 164, 169. The discussion and reform proposals reported here did not produce any change
in this attitude. See infra text accompanying notes 206-226. Even in 1977, after the issue of costs had been
discussed in the literature for several years, a commission charged with making recommendations for a
revision of the code of civil procedure did not consider it necessary to devote more than two pages to it.
Following a half-page summary of the rules of other countries, the commission recommended retention of
the winner-take-all rule "because it has proven useful in German civil procedure." BERICHT DER KOMMIS-
SION FUR DAS ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 225 (1977) [hereinafter cited as KOMMISSION].
189. 14 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 42 (1962).
190. It is perhaps no accident that the theoretical underpinnings of the American rule are not much
stronger. See Leubsdorf, Toward a Hstoi of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1984, at 9.
191. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 3. The author of this article admits to similar reactions.
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Certain types of cases should not be litigated and should be discouraged; other
types deserve to be encouraged. Which is which often depends on the context in
which the question is asked, in addition to general perceptions of the function of
the courts and their role in dispute settlement or enforcement of rights.
The conflicts and contradictions arising when the goal of better access. to the
courts is pursued at the same time and with equal fervor as the search for alterna-
tive forms of dispute resolution are necessarily reflected in discussions of how to
allocate litigation costs. Attitudes may even be affected by special sympathy for
certain litigants (environmental groups, minorities) or certain causes (consumer
complaints) as compared to others.
Second, to the extent that cases in which cost shifting is justified can be identi-
fied by reference to the state of mind of a party, it is difficult to ascertain whether
the requisite state of mind is present. If this subjective element can be ascertained
at all, it can only be done by the court, after the case has been decided.
This presents new problems. In Spain, where costs generally are imposed only
in cases of bad faith litigation, the experience has been that judges are reluctant to
make such findings. 192 There are indications that American courts are equally
reluctant. 193 Cases in which parties are ordered to reimburse their opponent's
costs and expenses seem to be rare.
If standards were lowered and courts given discretion to distribute costs on a
case-by-case basis depending on whether in their view one or both of the parties
had reasonable grounds to let the case proceed to court, the result could be the
addition of another issue to delay and complicate the disposition of the case. The
system seems to work reasonably well in Norway 194 and Denmark, 195 but was con-
sidered unsuitable for Germany in the middle of the nineteenth century. 196
In addition to concerns about adding fuel to the fire, there are concerns about
uncertainty and unpredictability of judicial decisions, given the lack of binding or
persuasive objective criteria. 9 7 Those concerns were especially strong during the
nineteenth century as part of the general movement away from the theories and
practices of Roman law as they had been passed on and modified over the centu-
ries, toward codifications that were supposed to rest on clear and simple principles
of natural law. Proponents of codification did not favor leaving issues to judicial
discretion or even interpretation. 98 In the permanent philosophical struggle
between certainty and predictability on one side and equity on the other side, the
192. See supra note 39.
193. See Mallor, Punihve Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of thejudcal System, 61 N.C.L. REV. 613, 639 (1983).
194. As in the other countries, there are no statistics showing the proportion of cases in which costs
are imposed on one of the parties. According to an informed estimate, the ratio is about one-half at the
circuit court level. Letter from Judge Trygve Lange-Nielsen to Werner Pfennigstorf (Dec. 18, 1982).
195. Here, too, statistics are not available. It is estimated that the courts deviate from the rule in
about 10% of all cases because of special circumstances, most frequently when the government is the pre-
vailing party.
196. W. ENDEMANN, supra note 22, at 508-09.
197. G. BAUMGARTEL, GLEICHER ZUGANG ZUM RECHT FUR ALLE: EIN GRUNDPROBLEM DES
RECHTSSCHUTZES 153 (1976); W. ENDEMANN, supra note 22, at 509 nn.22-23; Bokelmann, supra note 188,
at 164, 168-69.
198. On the philosophy of codification, see Pound, Sources and Form of Law, 22 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1
(1946).
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balance had definitely shifted in favor of certainty at the time when the major
procedural codes of the nineteenth century were conceived. This is probably the
single most persuasive explanation for the rigid position adopted by some of the
nineteenth century codes.
The persuasive force of the Roman law tradition partially explains why the
drafters of the codes, in removing judicial discretion with its inherent uncertainty,
decided in favor of letting the costs fall on the defeated party rather than letting
each party bear its own. All that had to be changed was to make the traditional
presumption of temerity irrebuttable. This is not, however, the only factor.
When it cannot be determined objectively whether a litigant had reasonable
grounds for asserting or contesting a right in court, and when there are concerns
about letting judges decide case by case, without clearly defined standards, who is
to bear the costs, there remains only one basis for differentiation: the judgment
that puts an end to the principal issue.' 99 It is the whole and sole purpose of civil
litigation to find out, and to make known conclusively by judgment, who is right
and who is wrong. A judgment does not retroactively change a good faith dispute
into a bad faith dispute, but its very existence and inherent authority do create a
new situation and inevitably affect the outlook of both participants and outsiders,
and not only with respect to the narrow substantive issue decided. This effect is
not prescribed by code or supported by legal theory, 20 0 but it is a psychological
reality nevertheless.
In support of the American rule, reference has been made to the chance that
courts can err, reflecting the traditional American sympathy for the underdog. To
this, Goodhart has the following answer: "If New Jersey justice is so much a
matter of luck, it seems hardly worthwhile to have courts and lawyers; it would be
cheaper, and certainly less dilatory, to spin a coin."'20 1
This also fairly expresses European sentiment: To every dispute, there must be
an end, and the judgment of the court on the principal issue is generally accepted
as sufficient authority to carry the cost decision as well.
In this context, it has even been suggested that the ancient notion of a wager,
which, as noted, was evident in some early forms of Roman procedure, is still alive
in popular perceptions of litigation. 20 2 Equally strong as an indicator of popular
perceptions is the use of words suggestive of warfare that one finds frequently in
discussions of litigation. Both the wager and the battle analogies would explain
general acceptance as "natural" of a rule under which "the winner takes all."
D. Implications of Implementation
It has already been noted that even after the issue of judicial discretion as to
199. This connection has been suggested most clearly by Klein. F. KLEIN, supra note 186, at 160.
200. See G. BAUMGXRTEL, supra note 197. It seems fair to say, however, that the same attitudes and
sentiments that are at the base of the legal doctrines of the authority of judgment are also likely to have an
influence on perceptions concerning proper allocation of costs.
201. Goodhart, supra note 2, at 877 (responding to Satterthwaite, Increastog Costs to be Paid by Losing
Party, 46 N.J.L.J. 133 (1923)).
202. F. KLEIN, supra note 186; Bokelmann, supra note 188, at 168.
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good faith losers has been disposed of, the variety of situations is great enough to
make implementation of a fee shifting rule a complex and difficult problem. Espe-
cially when judicial discretion cannot be relied on to achieve equity in individual
cases, it is necessary to modify the general rule to produce equitable results or to
prevent hardship in special situations. This need and the various methods that
have been used to meet it have become apparent in the discussion of existing rules.
What needs to be shown here is that implementation of a cost allocation rule
following the European tradition is subject to its own inherent pressures that deter-
mine how it is eventually applied. 20 3 This can be illustrated by looking at three
special aspects of implementation.
1. Need to Diferentiate. Not only do some procedural situations present special
problems of equity, as in the case of no-fault divorces, but there are also whole
areas of the law that bring with them strong public policies favoring one party
over the other or encouraging or discouraging certain aspects of litigation. In
Europe it is the labor courts or labor matters, and in the United States it is such
areas as civil rights and environmental protection that have required special
treatment.
2. Need to Accommodate General Pohczes of Czvil Procedure. Once a system of cost
allocation is in place, on whatever theoretical, political, or legislative basis, it inevi-
tably becomes subject to other policies that are not relevant to the basic decision
on which party should bear the costs. Thus the power of the courts to impose costs
has been found to be a convenient tool for achieving such general and unrelated
goals as procedural economy, expendiency, and honesty in the course of litigation.
Demands have also been made on the cost system to further the cause of equal
access to justice.
3. Need to Control Costs. One of the most important problems in implementing a
European style cost allocation system is the need to control costs to the extent that
they are to be reimbursed. It is true, as Professor Rowe has pointed oUt, 20 4 that we
need not be too concerned about the amount of reimbursable costs as long as they
are imposed for the purpose of punishing a party for litigating in bad faith or for
some other blameworthy conduct. When, however, as in most European countries,
costs are imposed without regard to bad faith or temerity, it becomes a require-
ment of elementary fairness to protect the defeated party against reimbursement
claims for extravagant and unnecessary measures, exaggerated fees, or unverified
expenses.
Controls are needed both with respect to the necessity of a specific act, or
motion, or service obtained and with respect to the amount of the fee or price
incurred therefor. The control mechanism can involve statutory standards or fee
schedules, evaluation by the court, or some outside evaluation.
Repercussions from control mechanisms can be extensive, not only for attor-
203. This was pointed out by Rowe, supra note 174, at 666-78.
204. Id at 676-78.
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neys, who may see their professional independence threatened, but also and per-
haps even more significantly for the role of the court in monitoring the progress of
a case, and thus some of the basic structural principles of civil procedure. Some of
these implications should have become apparent in the previous description of the
various systems.
E. Counterforces
Each of the various aspects of implementation can generate forces that, while
directly related only to that particular implementation measure, can have a wider
indirect effect on the basic rules of cost allocation. As an example, it will be shown
in the next section, on reform proposals, how concern about equal access to justice
can lead to challenges of the entire cost system.
Another powerful counterforce results from the spirit of independence of the
legal profession, which in some degree has existed everywhere and always, but has
manifested itself in different forms in different jurisdictions and, in particular, has
produced different reactions to the idea of cost allocation and the concomitant
efforts to control costs. There is hardly any jurisdiction where lawyers have been
always and completely happy with the ways in which courts or legislatures have
tried to control their remuneration. Usually, however, the profession has found it
possible to have its position and interests considered and to achieve a workable
solution that provides an acceptable degree of control while not placing unreason-
able strains on its professional independence.
In Belgium and France, the legal profession, while generally accepting the
principle of full cost fee shifting, so abhors the prospect of the consequent regula-
tion of remuneration as an intolerable incursion into professional independence
that it not only concluded that the interests of clients must take second place, but
also succeeded in persuading the legislature to rule accordingly. Among European
jurisdictions, however, this is the exception from the rule.
In this context, the origin of the American rule, as it has been traced most
recently by John Leubsdorf for this symposium, 20 5 appears as an even more
striking case where absence of controls over lawyer remuneration (whether due to
reluctance on the part of the courts or legislatures to impose and enforce such
controls or to resistance on the part of the legal profession) has had the result of
eroding an existing cost shifting system and of preventing the introduction of a
new one.
This is not meant to suggest that the profession's interest in preserving the
freedom of lawyers to determine their remuneration was the only factor, or even
the principal factor, in the acceptance and retention of the American rule. In view
of what little is known about its development, however, the parallel is too obvious
to be ignored.
205. Leubsdorf, supra note 190.
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REFORM PROPOSALS
If some scholars, while generally supporting the European rule, appear to be
somewhat uncomfortable, the reasons must be sought not so much in the alloca-
tion rule itself but rather in a sense of frustration over the fact that there are costs
to begin with and that they must somehow be allocated to one or both of the
parties. There is hardly anyone who would not prefer that justice be completely
free. As long as that is not considered feasible, and costs must be accepted as a
necessary evil, replacing one allocation rule with another only shifts the cost
burden and the resulting hardship from one party to the other.
Consequently, to the extent that the allocation of costs has been the subject of
public policy discussion in recent years in Europe, it has been for the most part in
the context of concerns about access to justice, 20 6 and the emphasis has been on
reducing or eliminating costs generally. The discussion has been particularly
intense in Germany, where it was argued that the imposition of any costs, or the
risk of reimbursing the opponent in the event of defeat, violated the constitutional
guarantee of access to the courts.20 7 This position, which was first presented in
1969 and reflects much of the prevailing sentiment of that time, has not, however,
found universal acceptance. 20 8 Among other things, it has been pointed out that
while the settlement of disputes among private individuals is a public function that
benefits society as a whole (especially as the principal substitute for the outlawed
private enforcement of rights), it also benefits the immediate parties, and that par-
ticularly in cases where litigation serves no other purpose than the enforcement of
undisputed claims, the defaulting party rather than the taxpayers should be
required to bear the costs. 20 9 It was also generally recognized, even by those who
claimed that the imposition of costs was unconstitutional, that while the govern-
ment could absorb the full expense of operating the courts without the danger of
unfavorable side effects, a rule assigning responsibility for attorneys' compensation
to the government would have serious implications and would probably be politi-
cally unacceptable. 210 Nevertheless, a variety of schemes for reducing the cost
burden were suggested and discussed in great detail, including universal compul-
sory legal expense insurance, partial elimination of the requirement of representa-
tion by attorneys, changes in the fee computation rules, and even authorization of
contingent fee arrangements and alternative forms of dispute settlement.
Not surprisingly, the rules concerning cost allocation also came up for critical
reexamination in this context. Viewed as a potential barrier impeding access to
justice, the principal rule was found to be ambivalent: while promising freedom
206. This discussion is, as previously stated, beyond the scope of this article. See supra note 5.
207. D~iubler, Birger ohne Rechtsschutz?, 1969 BETRIEBSBERATER 545; Fechner, Kostenrilko und
Rechtswegsperre--Steht der Rechtsweg ofn.2 , 1969 JURISTENZEITUNG 349.
208. See espectally G. BAUMGR-rEL, supra note 197, at 126-28; V. BUERMEYER, RECHTSSCHUTZ-
GARANTIE UND GERICHTSVERFAHRENSRECHT 181 (1975) (explaining the cost reimbursement rules of the
administrative courts); Grunsky, supra note 181, at A82.
209. Pawlowski, supra note 181, at 198-99.
210. Bokelmann,supra note 188, at 170; Rehbinder, De Kosten der Rechtsverfo/gung als Zugangsbarrzere der
Rechtsptege, 4 JAHRBUCH FUR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE 395, 406 (1976).
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from costs in the event of success, it also threatened imposition of massive costs in
the event of defeat, and the complexity of life and law made it increasingly diffi-
cult for litigants to be confident about the outcome of a case.
2 1 1
To better understand the concerns and the proposals, it seems indispensable to
have a look at some of the cases that triggered the discussion. In a well-publicized
German case in 1964, an automobile manufacturer brought suit for an injunction
and damages in the amount of DM 15,000,000 (about $5,000,000 at the then pre-
vailing exchange rate) against a consumer report magazine for alleged deficiencies
in a test report critical of the manufacturer's products. Because of the large
amount of the claim, the magazine publisher faced legal fees that in the event of
defeat would have bankrupted it.2 12 There were similar cases in which large cor-
porations threatened individual critics with legal action involving huge fees. In
one case, a physician had publicly objected to an advertising campaign conducted
by the sugar industry which proclaimed, in essence, that sugar was good for one's
health. The industry's trade association threatened to bring an action for an
injunction and specifically pointed to the large legal fees that the physician would
have to pay in the event an injunction were granted. 2 13 Much attention was also
given to cases involving disputes between corporations and minority stockholders,
in which, as in the cases just mentioned, the general deterrent effect of the cost
reimbursement rule was compounded by the large amount at which the cases were
usually valued. 214
The remedies suggested for such cases include a split system of fixing case
values for fee calculation, giving the court the power in case of demonstrated eco-
nomic need to let one party pay lawyer and court fees at a lower rate than the
other party. 21 5 This principle, first adopted by the [German] Patent Act of 1937
for infringement actions, was extended in 1965 to actions over infringements of
other industrial property rights, actions based on alleged violations of the unfair
trade practices act, and disputes between corporations and individual stockholders
challenging resolutions passed at stockholder meetings. 21 6 Draft legislation to give
the principle general application in all civil cases was prepared by the Federal
Department of Justice in 1970 but was not introduced after state court administra-
tors expressed concern that the courts would be overwhelmed with petitions for
revaluation. 21 7
Other proposals aim at introducing, expanding, or institutionalizing some of
the exceptions that have traditionally been recognized in some but not all coun-
tries. Specifically, it has been suggested for Germany that courts should have the
power to deviate from the general rule when necessary to avoid hardship, 2 18 and
211. Grunsky, supra note 181, at A10-11.
212. Erdsiek, Beschrinkung der Krilik auf dem Gebiel der Warentests durch hohe Streitwerle?, 1964 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 912. It should be remembered that in Germany legal fees are fixed by
statute and are graduated according to the amount at issue. See Suhr, supra note 122.
213. Fechner, supra note 207; Pawlowski, supra note 181, at 197.
214. Fechner, supra note 207.
215. Daubler, supra note 207; Grunsky, supra note 181.
216. See supra note 167.
217. See Rehbinder, sUpra note 210, at 402-03.
218. G. BAUMGXRTEL, supra note 197, at 157-58.
[Vol. 47: No. 1
EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
that costs should be split among the parties when they disagree in good faith and
the resolution of the dispute benefits both.2 1 9 Some prospals come very close to the
American rule: one suggests adoption of the principle of non-reimbursement of
attorney fees and other expenses as the rule, with an exception for frivolous
actions; 220 another proposal would establish as the general rule that out-of-court
expenses (attorney fees, expert witness fees, and the like) be pooled and appor-
tioned evenly among the parties, win or lose except when the loser, had he exer-
cised due care, could have foreseen that the case would be decided against him.22 1
The authors of these proposals are well-aware of the problems involved in imple-
menting them but consider them preferable to the present state of the law in
Germany.
For appeals, it has been suggested that costs should be allocated separately for
each stage according to the outcome of that stage, giving the losing party credit for
the fact that he cannot be expected to be smarter than the court. 222
In addition, there are proposals that would in at least two types of cases charge
part of the cost to the government rather than to either of the parties. The first is
that of a decision being overruled on appeal on the sole ground that the judge
below made a mistake in applying a rule of procedural law. In such a case it can
be said that neither party can be blamed for having caused the additional costs of
the appeal; rather, it seems proper for the consequences of judges' mistakes to be
borne by the government. 22 3
The other type is a second appeal whose primary purpose is to preserve the
unity of the law by resolving conflicts between decisions handed down by different
courts of appeal. In such a case, it has been argued that it is really the public
interest that is being served, rather than the interests of the individual parties, and
therefore the entire costs of the appeal, including attorney fees, should be absorbed
by the government. 224
These are persuasive proposals, well worth considering. In general, however,
the multitude and variety of possible litigation situations and the complexity of
public policies which favor litigation in certain situations but abhor it in others
have frustrated the search for general rules that would offer acceptable alternatives
to the traditional rule. Even those who most forcefully argue that the existing rules
are constitutionally deficient have had to admit that they are not able to offer a
totally satisfactory alternative. 225
219. Ehrig, supra note 30, at 253; see also Grunsky, supra note 181, at A66-69.
220. Bokelmann, supra note 188, at 169-70.
221. Grunsky, supra note 181, at A66-73. Of all the proposals, this one offers the most elaborate
discussion, though not the most convincing arguments. One of Grunsky's arguments is that the winner,
moved by the elation and satisfaction of having won, would be in a magnanimous mood and not mind
sharing the costs with the unfortunate loser. Grunsky rejects the idea of letting the courts assign costs
according to equity as too vague; he concedes that the fault standard he proposes is not much more precise
and is not an ideal solution, but he still considers it preferable to the existing rule, and he expects the courts
to develop appropriate guidelines.
222. Seetzen, Prozesskosten undsozialer Rechtsslaal, 1971 ZEITSCHRII-V FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 35.
223. Grunsky, supra note 181, at A52-53.
224. Id at A55-58; Pawlowski, supra note 181, at 200.
225. Bokelmann, supra note 158, at 168; Pawlowski, supra note 181, at 197.
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Most significantly, no one has yet found a formula for distinguishing on the
basis of objective, easily verifiable criteria between "good" and "bad" litigation-
that is, between actions or defenses that are necessary, useful, or desirable for
society and therefore are to be encouraged, and those that are a nuisance to be
discouraged or suppressed, not to mention the large grey area in between, con-
sisting of cases in which society has no stake either way.226 Not everyone seems to
be comfortable with the idea of leaving the decision to the court, to be made indi-
vidually for each case as it comes up for judgment without any standards to guide
it. In view of the lack of practical alternatives, the majority, even among those
who are not enthusiastic about the traditional rule, seem resigned to the need for
keeping it, subject to the old and newly proposed exceptions mentioned.
Even the modest proposals for modification were eventually rejected when the
German code of civil procedure was revised in 1977. Specifically rejected were
proposals to order or permit the court to deviate from the rule in cases where: the
issue concerned a doubtful question of law; the decision answers a question of law
that had intentionally been left open by the legislature; the prevailing party had
failed to prepare a necessary document in time, or completely, or clearly; the pre-
vailing party had caused evidence to be admitted unnecessarily; and a party
prevails on appeal solely because of an intervening legislative change. 22 7
VI
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The question that an American audience may now ask is whether the rules
actually make a difference in the real world of litigation practice, court congestion,
and delay. More precisely, have the European cost reimbursement rules to a sig-
nificant extent discouraged potential litigants from going to court with meritless
claims or defenses, and have they, on the other hand, encouraged those who have
good claims or good defenses to enter into litigation?
The difficulties of trying to answer this question are evident, especially since
the answer would be meaningful only in comparison with the answer to the corre-
sponding question posed with respect to the American rule. The principal
problem is that if the actual impact of the rule is to be considered at all, it becomes
necessary to distinguish between "good" and "bad" litigation-a distinction for
which, as this article has suggested, it is very difficult to develop objective stan-
dards and which, therefore, will always be highly subjective and unreliable for
research purposes.
Some Europeans seem to need no "hard" evidence beyond that provided by
casual observation to conclude that there exists a causal relation between the
American Rule and the (perceived) high volume of litigation in the United
States.228 Serious researchers are not as easily convinced. Even if one were to
226. This view has been expressed most clearly by Pawlowski, supra note 181, at 199.
227. See KOMMISSION, supra note 188, at 226.
228. See Davis, Legal Fees in the USA., LAW Soc'N' GAZETE, Feb. 3, 1982, at 1. The implied notion
that the volume of litigation is higher in the United States than in England or in the rest of Europe and
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disregard the crucial distinction between good and bad litigation and were satis-
fied with just a comparison of general litigation levels, the task would be of
gigantic dimensions and mind-boggling difficulty, considering the number of dif-
ferent jurisdictions to be measured on both sides of the Atlantic and the need to
consider differences accounted for by other factors.
It should be remembered also that deterrence of frivolous or unnecessary litiga-
tion is not the only and not even the principal objective of the European cost
allocation rules. One cannot, therefore, expect Europeans to make special efforts
to test the actual effect of the rules on litigants or potential litigants. Moreover,
since the American rule has never been seriously considered as an alternative, no
one has bothered to compare the actual effect of traditional European rules with
the hypothetical effect of a rule following the American model. Practically all the
concern about frivolous and meritless litigation has been expressed in the context
of programs or proposals offering essentially free litigation. In that context, opin-
ions about the seriousness of the problem have been divided, and several studies
have been undertaken to provide the data necessary to determine whether these
concerns are valid.
First, however, it seems useful to point out that the prospect of recouping all
expense upon successful completion of a lawsuit has not had the effect of making
people completely unconcerned about costs. One could hypothesize, for instance,
that an average citizen, expecting to become engaged in litigation only with a
good case and a strong prospect of success, would not feel deterred by any costs
under the European system. Surveys have shown, however, that respondents were
indeed influenced by the potential costs when asked hypothetically whether they
would consider litigation in certain situations. As one might have expected, per-
sons in upper income brackets showed less reluctance to become engaged in litiga-
tion than those with lower incomes.2 29 It must be noted that the studies did not
ask whether the respondents were aware of the cost reimbursement rule, nor did
they distinguish between cases about which the respondents felt very confident and
those about which they were doubtful. Thus, the results can be explained in dif-
ferent ways: ignorance of the rule, consideration of the cost risk remaining even
under the rule, lack of confidence in the case, or lack of confidence in the courts.
Other studies have concentrated on the effect of legal expense insurance cov-
erage on the behavior of prospective and active litigants. The coverage provided
by legal expense insurance relieves the insured of the cost burden in all respects:
court costs and expenses that must be advanced, the fees of the insured's own
attorney, and, in the event of defeat, the reimbursable expenses of the opposing
party. 230 With the cost risk thus removed, one could expect these insureds to be
less inhibited in asserting or defending their rights and consequently to be more
frequently involved in litigation than similarly situated uninsured persons. This is
indeed the promise of legal expense insurance as a means to promote access to
that the higher volume has something to do with cost rules is not easy to prove or disprove. Such an
undertaking would require a separate study.
229. G. BAUMG'I.RTEL,Supra note 197, at 118-19.
230. See Pfennigstorf, supra note 157, at 534-56.
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justice, and is a result to be welcomed--f the access is used prudently in matters
that have merit and cannot be resolved without litigation. There is also a tempta-
tion, however, to engage in groundless or frivolous litigation.
Concerns that the ready availability of legal services and representation might
lead to increased litigation and overcrowding of the courts have been expressed in
the United States ever since the idea of legal expense insurance (or prepaid legal
services) was first suggested. 23 1 So far, however, it has been impossible either to
confirm or to dispel these concerns empirically because the actual volume of legal
expense insurance coverage in the population has not reached a level where it
could have a measurable impact on total litigation and the workload of the courts.
In Europe, on the other hand, legal expense insurance was introduced more
than sixty years ago and has long been accepted as a standard and popular type of
insurance coverage. Its state of development is highest and its market penetration
deepest in Austria, Switzerland, and Germany, where about forty percent of all
households are covered by some form of legal expense insurance. The most pop-
ular form of insurance is that limited to automobile-related legal risks. Holders of
such policies file claims in by far the greatest numbers and for the largest amounts.
There are many other differences between legal expense insurance as practiced in
Europe and the various types of legal services plans established in the United
States during the past twenty years. They cannot be discussed here in detail. 232
What matters is that legal expense insurance has been well enough established in
Europe to provide a sufficiently broad base for empirical studies.
One study, undertaken in 1974 on a relatively small scale in the state of North
Rhine-Westphalia in Germany, was based in part on written questionnaires
mailed to 117 civil court judges, 43 criminal court judges, and 90 attorneys, in part
on oral interviews (based on written questionnaires) with 60 persons covered by
legal expense insurance, and in part on the responses of one major legal expense
insurance company to written questions. The results of the study suggest that the
elimination of the cost risk through insurance coverage was indeed a strong factor
in the decision of insureds to seek the advice of an attorney, to bring suit, to state a
claim against a third party at an amount higher than the loss actually incurred, or
to appeal from an adverse decision. 233
A much broader and much more ambitious study was commissioned by the
German Federal Department of Justice and undertaken in 1979 by a research
231. See Pfennigstorf & Kimball, Regulation of Legal Service Plans, in LEGAL SERVICE PLANS, supra note
157, at 87, 157-60. The implication that any increase in the volume of litigation brought about by legal
expense insurance or legal service plans would be necessarily bad must be rejected. More litigation is to be
expected and welcomed if it is necessary and not frivolous. Court congestion by unnecessary or frivolous
litigation is a problem that needs to be addressed generally and fairly, whether the litigants are rich or poor
and whether they are supported by legal service plans or finance their lawsuits themselves.
232. See Pfennigstorf & Kimball, Aspects of Legal Expense Insurance. A Review of Four New Publcations,
1983 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 251; see also supra note 157. Americans who are not familiar with the
European concept of legal expense insurance sometimes think that contingent fee arrangements (for plain-
tiffs) and the defense provided by liability insurers (for defendants) provide equivalent protection. It is true
that these devices offer some protection in some cases, but it is not equivalent to the protection offered by
legal expense insurance, as a cursory look at the above references will show.
233. M. Pfingsten, Der Einfluss der Rechtsschutzversicherung auf die Rechtsverwirklichung (1975)
(doctoral dissertation, University of Freiburg).
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team of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin under the direction of Professor Erhard
Blankenburg. 234 To test the hypothesis that legal expense insurance coverage
works as an incentive for increased litigation activity, the research team used a
two-pronged approach. First, it conducted a survey among 853 residents of West
Berlin, asking for data relating to insurance coverages, claims experience, and gen-
eral behavior with respect to legal problems and dispute-settling procedures, in
addition to the usual demographic characteristics. Second, the team analyzed
about 3000 claim files of the Berlin offices of five legal expense insurers.
From their own survey, the researchers found that those respondents who were
covered by legal expense insurance had consistently higher rates of seeking the
advice of a lawyer or going to court in a variety of problem situations than those
who did not have insurance coverage. But they also found that the insured respon-
dents resorted more often to alternative sources of assistance, which were not cov-
ered by insurance, such as public or union legal aid bureaus or various consumer
organizations. From this the authors concluded that the data supported the
"recruitment thesis" rather than the "inducement thesis," meaning that the
increased tendency to litigate was not the result of legal expense insurance cov-
erage but that persons who by reason of their personality, education, or occupation
were more inclined to litigate were also more likely than others to purchase
insurance. 235
The study of insurance claim files first focused on the activities of attorneys.
Among other things, it appeared that of all the cases in which insureds had con-
tacted an attorney about private law controversies, about thirty percent actually
resulted in litigation. In matters concerning enforcement of damage claims after
automobile accidents (which contitutes the largest class of legal expense insurance
claims), about twenty percent of the cases handled by attorneys ended in litiga-
tion.2 3 6 The other cases were for the most part settled by negotiation or were
abandoned by the insureds after consultation. The authors of the study admit that
there may be more cases in which actions are filed in court but are subsequently
withdrawn upon receipt of a settlement offer from the defendant's liability insurer.
In such cases, the plaintiff's attorney fees customarily are paid by the defendant's
insurer and therefore are not billed to the legal expense insurer and may not
appear in the claims files. This part of the study also suffers from lack of compara-
tive data on cases involving uninsured clients. Without such data, one cannot say
whether attorneys treat claims differently depending on whether the client is
insured or not.
Another phase of the study tested the relative persistence of insured and unin-
sured litigants by comparing the frequency of settlement in lawsuits involving per-
sons covered by legal expense insurance with the frequency appearing in general
court statistics. The results were inconclusive except for traffic accident cases,
234. E. BLANKENBURG & J. FIEDLER, DIE RECHTSSCHUTZVERSICHERUNGEN UND DER STEIGENDE
GESCHXFTSANFALL DER GERIGHTE (1981). For an English summary, see Blankenburg, Legal Insurance,
Litigant Decisions, and the Rising Caseloads of Courts: A West German Study, 16 LAW & Soc'y REV. 601 (1981-
82).
235. E. BLANKENBURG & J. FIEDLER, supra note 234, at 46.
236. Id at 85.
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where insured parties were found to settle somewhat less frequently than the
average. 237
Professor Blankenburg and his associates also tested the hypothesis that
someone who by virtue of insurance coverage is relieved of the cost risk may him-
self be inclined to take greater risks in litigation and that attorneys advising
insured clients may be more likely to recommend litigation, or an appeal from an
adverse decision, even in cases of questionable or no merit. If that were true,
insured litigants would show a higher failure rate, and a higher appeal rate, than
litigants generally. The researchers found, on the contrary, that success rates were
significantly higher, and appeal rates significantly lower, for most insured litigants
in most areas, the only notable exception being the relatively small group of
insureds operating a business and maintaining the insurance for their business-
related legal matters.2 38
There is only one class of cases where the study found a strong correlation
between the existence of legal expense insurance and the incidence of legal
activity: petitions for review of traffic tickets. This class accounted for about
twenty-eight percent of the total claims volume in the sample studied. Most of
these reviews involved accidents, where the alleged traffic violation, if left unchal-
lenged, could have an adverse effect on the outcome of liability issues or on insur-
ance coverage. Other cases involved moving violations, which, if accumulated,
could lead to suspension of driving privileges. In eight percent of the traffic ticket
cases, however, the alleged offense was no more than a parking violation carrying a
fine of less than $15.00 and no other consequences. The authors suggest that a
large portion of these petitions would not have been filed if the petitioners had had
to bear the costs themselves. 239 Indeed, the growing volume of petitions for review
of traffic tickets, which constitute almost one-half of the caseload of the criminal
divisions of municipal courts,24 0 has worried court officials and insurers for some
time. Some insurers have started to impose limitations on this coverage. 24'
As their general conclusion, the authors state that "[llegal expense insurance
does not cause legal costs any more than accident insurance causes accidents. ' '242
Elaborating on this intentionally oversimplified statement, the authors interpret
their findings as confirming a thesis advanced by the principal author of the study
in other publications, that social inhibitions and "social costs" (meaning disadvan-
tages and discomfort resulting from the disruption of social relationships) are
much more powerful motivating forces than financial costs in determining
whether a person will take legal action against another. 243 In the view of the
237. Id. at 96-100.
238. Id. at 100-13.
239. Id at 61-70.
240. Id at 68-70.
241. Some insurers now exclude coverage for reviews of tickets for nonmoving violations and cover
other minor traffic offenses subject to a deductible. See 32 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN DES BUNDESAUF-
SICHTSAMTES FUR DAS VERSICHERUNGSWESEN 346 (Oct. 31, 1983).
242. Blankenburg, supra note 234, at 622-23 (English summary).
243. E. BLANKENBURG, U. REIFNER, I. GORGES & F. TIEMANN, RECHTSBERATUNG: SOZIALE DEFINI-
TION VON RECHTSPROBLEMEN DURCH RECHTSBERATUNGS-ANGEBOTE (1982); Blankenburg, Mobi/zserung
von Recht, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE (1980).
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authors, the study suggests, on the one hand, that legal expense insurance cannot
generally be held responsible for increased or more intense litigation activity, and
that in those areas where a strong correlation between insurance and litigation
activity was found (in civil and criminal traffic cases), the proper response would
not be restrictions on the availability of insurance or access to the courts but rather
a review of the substantive and procedural rules that give rise to the disputes in
question. 244 On the other hand, the authors believe the study suggests caution in
expectations with respect to government-sponsored legal expense insurance pro-
grams as a means of providing easier access to the courts. 245
The authors may be a shade too confident in interpreting the results of their
study since they concede that due to the traditional prevalence of traffic-related
coverages, traffic-related claims were vastly overrepresented in their sample while
all other matters occurred in small numbers of questionable statistical
significaqce. 246
Even more caution would seem to be in order in extrapolating the findings.
The study looked only at matters and disputes covered under standard German
legal expense policies, which are carefully designed to apply only to truly fortui-
tous events. If the cost risk were removed for other types of disputes, especially
disputes not involving the close relationships cited as inhibiting factors by Pro-
fessor Blankenburg, the results might be quite different. The legal expense insur-
ance contract itself may be one of those inhibiting factors; if freedom from costs
were provided on a broader and anonymous basis, more persons might be tempted
to test their ideas in court.
Finally, one may readily agree with Professor Blankenburg that average, rea-
sonable citizens generally have no inclination to go to court unless it is absolutely
necessary to protect their rights. His sample was mostly composed of such average,
reasonable citizens. Since the study was limited to persons and matters covered by
legal expense insurance, he had no reason to explore specifically the attitude of
lawyers, except in their dealings with persons carrying legal expense insurance.
Lawyers, of course, are subject to inhibitions and incentives different from those of
average citizens. And there are others, not only isolated individuals but whole
groups, that do not share the inhibitions of the average.
In other words, Blankenburg's study does not preclude the possibility that
under other circumstances the elimination of cost risks might encourage some per-
sons to go to court with unnecessary and undesirable actions. There are indeed
indications that this is more than a theoretical possibility. Apart from the prolifer-
ation of petitions for review of traffic tickets, already .mentioned, there have been
complaints about abuses of the free legal procedures in social security matters.247
Further, there has been considerable concern about abuses in the area of unfair
trade practices, where a consumer-minded legislature several years ago gave
standing to organizations to petition the court for injunctions against instances of
244. E. BLANKENBURG &J. FIEDLER,supra note 234, at 113-14.
245. Id. at 124-29.
246. Id at 76-79, 114.
247. Pfeiffer, Knappe Ressource Rechl, 1981 ZEITSCHRIr FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 121, 125.
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unfair or misleading advertising. Instead of the consumer organizations and fair
trade associations for which it was intended, however, the opportunity has been
seized by enterprising lawyers who, behind the cover of specially created corporate
fronts bearing a noble-sounding name, employ dozens of researchers combing
through newspapers and magazines in search of advertisements containing some
offensive matter that can be construed as misleading or otherwise in violation of
the fair trade practices law. The offending advertiser is then put on notice,
requested to cease and desist, and asked to pay to the complainant the applicable
statutory attorney fees-which are the only objective of the operation and, in an
office staffed with skilled employees handling a large volume of publications, gen-
erate substantial profits for the owners. 248
Despite heroic efforts, the courts have been unable to stop these abuses perma-
nently, due to the difficulty of finding satisfactory criteria for clearly distinguishing
in advance between bona fide consumer organizations and the commercial fee-
generating machines.249
This experience shows what can happen if access to the courts is opened liber-
ally without adequate controls to prevent enterprising lawyers from exploiting the
system as a source of easy fees. It should serve as a warning.
VII
SUMMARY
The history and present state of European rules on cost shifting, as well as
recent proposals for their reform, reflect the dilemma, not unknown to Americans,
posed by a variety of conflicting notions and attitudes:
(1) Costs generally are viewed as blemishes. Ideally, courts should be fully
accessible to everyone free of cost.
(2) While the costs of maintaining and operating the courts themselves can,
without too much difficulty, be absorbed by the government, attorneys-whose
services are indispensable in most matters-must also be paid somehow, and
shifting that burden to the government would create not only economic problems,
but also problems with respect to attorneys' independence.
(3) There must be safeguards to prevent the system of civil procedure from
being abused by debtors whose only aim is to delay or avoid paying an undisputed
obligation; by persons who pursue unfounded or exaggerated claims for personal
gain, for harassment, or to satisfy a distorted view of justice; or finally by lawyers
whose only objective is to generate fees.
(4) It is difficult, if not impossible, to devise objective criteria for distinguishing
between good faith litigation, which is to be encouraged, and bad faith litigation,
which is to be discouraged.
248. See, e.g., Ungern-Sternberg, Verbandsklagebefugnts fir Abmahnverene?, 1981 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 2328.
249. Id. (providing references to cases and proposed remedial legislation); see also Schmidt, Wettbe-
werbsrechthche und vereinsrechiliche Instrumente gegen die 72tzgkeit der Abmahnverelne, 36 NEVE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 1520 (1983).
[Vol. 47: No. I
EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
(5) If bad faith is not found and the costs cannot be shifted to the government,
there are only the two parties between which they can be allocated.
It is in the handling of the standard case, where bad faith is not evident, that
the European practice deviates from that in the United States. The practice
reflects in part the rationale that victory is not complete if it leaves substantial
expenses uncovered. It also developed in part out of a deeply ingrained respect for
the finality and dispositive authority of the judgment.
Thus emerges the general rule that the defeated must reimburse the victor for
his expenses. Letting each party bear its own expenses is the exception. In special
cases the victor may even be ordered to reimburse the defeated for all or part of his
expenses.
It is in the nature and range of the exceptions and qualifications that there is
the most variety among existing rules in the various European countries, as well as
among proposals for their reform. Some exceptions were established by statute;
some have been developed by the courts in the exercise of their discretion to
deviate from the basic rule. One class of exceptions focuses on the conduct or state
of mind of the victor. Another class recognizes special situations in which the
defeated party's good faith seems to deserve special recognition, such as justified
doubts about the interpretation of contract terms, or intervening changes in the
law, or, in some recent proposals, conflicting decisions by different courts. A third
class of exceptions gives recognition to differences in the economic position of the
parties and seeks to prevent economic hardship. This last class has emerged most
recently and is the one for which the pressure for further expansion has been
greatest, as a result of general concerns about removing cost barriers impeding
equal access to justice.
If costs are to be reimbursed by defeated parties even if they did not act in bad
faith, there must be some kind of control over those costs. Although the control
affects directly only the reimbursable part of the costs, it inevitably has a farther
reaching effect both on the way in which lawyers conduct cases and bill their cli-
ents and on the way in which courts watch over the necessity and economy of
procedures.
The intense discussion about access to justice has included a thorough reap-
praisal of the traditional rule of cost allocation. While the rule is not regarded as
ideal (given that it does not eliminate costs), no acceptable alternative has been
found. It can thus be safely predicted that the rule, subject perhaps to an
expanding array of exceptions, will continue to dominate the European codes for
the foreseeable future.
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RELEVANT PROVISIONS FROM CODES AND REGULATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Just as the article itself could not cover the entire law of costs, so it is obviously
impossible to supply the text of all the provisions that affect the allocation of costs
and the size of the cost burden. This Appendix, rather, is meant to serve two very
limited purposes: first, it brings together in one place those provisions that are
referred to most frequently in the text, relieving the footnotes of bulky and repeti-
tious quotations from the codes; and second, the compilation of the central provi-
sions on cost allocation from twelve countries should give readers a vivid
impression of the similarities and dissimilarities not only in the substance of what
is provided but also in legislative style and general approach to the subject.
The selection of the texts has been based on very crude standards. The mate-
rial has been taken almost exclusively from the codes of civil procedure. There is,
of course, no uniformity among the different countries with respect to the matters
that they choose to regulate in their codes. Consequently, some of the details of
cost allocation that are regulated in the code of civil procedure of one country may
be dealt with in some other statute in another country. No attempt has been made
to achieve complete parallelism by including such relevant provisions from other
statutes. Moreover, some of the matters on which some countries have express
statutory provisions are the subject of case law in other countries. Thus if certain
provisions are found in this Appendix for some countries only, that should not be
taken to mean that in the other countries the matter is unregulated.
The author has provided official or private translations where available. The
remainder he has translated himself. A citation to the original language source,
along with the dates of first enactment and latest revision, is included for each
translation. All the translations suffer from the fact that the translated texts are
taken out of the context of large codes. They employ terms of art that cannot
simply be translated but must be explained in the context of the respective system
of procedure. For the limited purposes for which the translations are used here,
however, it seems possible to dispense with extensive annotations. The basic thrust
of the provisions should be evident even though some of the details and some of
the references to special procedures or institutions may remain obscure.
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LAW CONCERNING PROCEDURE IN CIVIL LITIGATION (CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE) OF AUGUST 1, 1895
First Part: General Provisions
First Division: Parties
Fifth Title: Litigation Costs
Section 40.
(1) Initially, each party is responsible for the payment of the costs caused by
its procedural acts. The costs of judicial acts initiated jointly by the parties or
performed by the court in the interest of both parties, whether on request or on the
court's own motion, are to be paid jointly by both parties.
(2) To what extent the parties have a claim for reimbursement of the costs
incurred by them is to be determined in accordance with the provisions of this title
except where this code specifies otherwise.
Section 41.
(1) The party that loses completely in the litigation must reimburse the oppo-
nent, as well as the party intervening on the latter's side, for all costs that were
caused by the litigation and were necessary for appropriate prosecution or defense.
Which costs are to be regarded as necessary is to be determined by the court when
specifying the amount of the costs, without allowing the presentation of evidence,
in its discretion guided by careful consideration of all circumstances.
(2) So far as the remuneration of the attorney or the amount of the costs is
regulated by schedules, the assessment of the amount of the costs is to be based on
these schedules.
(3) The provisions of the first paragraph apply especially with respect to the
costs caused by employing an attorney who does not reside where the court or the
judge is located. The costs caused by employing several attorneys for the same
party are in any event reimbursable only to the extent that they do not exceed the
costs of employing one attorney or that a change of attorneys was necessary.
Section 42.
(1) In determining the litigation costs the party and intervening party cannot
claim compensation for personal efforts. If their personal appearance before the
court was necessary, and especially if the party in a proceeding before a district
court appears without an attorney, compensation is to be paid for loss of time and
travel expenses.
(2) If a party is represented by persons who are not attorneys at law or nota-
ries, the losing opponent is only to be ordered to reimburse court fees, copy fees,
and other official fees and the necessary cash expenses caused by the litigation.
* Source: Zivilprozessgesetze (R. Stohanzl ed. 1980). Translated by Werner Pfennigstorf.
Page 37: Winter 1984]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
AUSTRIA
This provision does not apply, however, for cost reimbursement claims of parties
represented by the Finanzprokura/ur; in that case there is no difference whether the
Fnanzprokuratur acts directly or is in turn represented by administrative agencies or
offices.
Section 43.
(1) If each party prevails in part and loses in part, the costs are to be set off
against one another or are to be apportioned proportionally. The portion to be
reimbursed may be specified in an amount or in proportion to the total costs.
(2) The court may, however, even in the event of such outcome impose on
one party the duty to reimburse all costs incurred by the opponent and the parties
intervening on the opponent's side if the opponent succumbed only with respect to
a relatively minor part of his claim, the prosecution of which, moreover, has not
caused any special costs, or if the amount of the opponent's claim was dependent
on determination by judicial discretion, or assessment by experts, or on mutual
calculation.
Section 44.
(1) If allegations of facts or items of evidence are presented under circum-
stances from which the court is convinced that the party could have presented
them earlier, and if admission of such material delays the disposition of the case,
the court may, on request or on its own motion, impose reimbursement of all or
part of the litigation costs on the party that has presented the material, even if it
prevails.
(2) This applies in particular to allegations and evidence that should have
been presented in one of the prevailing party's preparatory briefs and the delayed
presentation of which has caused a delay of the trial or of the deposition of the
case.
Section 45.
If the defendant has not, through his conduct, provoked the action and has
immediately, in the first hearing, acknowledged the claim pursued in the action,
the litigation costs are at the charge of the plaintiff. The plaintiff must also reim-
burse the defendant for the costs caused by the court proceedings.
Section 45a.
(1) If divorce or dissolution of the marriage is ordered or if the marriage is
annulled without the succumbing party being at fault, the costs are to be set off
against one another.
(2) If the divorce is ordered under § 55 of the Marriage Act, and if the
divorce order contains a statement concerning who is to blame for the breakdown
of the marriage, the spouse who is at fault has to reimburse the other spouse for the
costs.
[Vol. 47: No. I
EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
AUSTRIA
Section 47.
(1) The costs of a settlement are to be deemed to be set off against one
another unless otherwise agreed. The same applies to the costs of the litigation
resolved by the settlement, to the extent that they have not yet been imposed on
one of the parties by an order that is not subject to appeal.
(2) If settlement negotiations are unsuccessful, the duty to reimburse the costs
relating thereto depends on the disposition of the principal issue.
Section 48.
(1) If costs are caused to a party by the fact that the opponent negligently
delays the presentation of allegations of fact or evidence, or as a result of incidents
occurring in the course of the proceedings through the opponent's fault or acciden-
tally by the opponent, the court may on request or on its own motion award the
party reimbursement of those costs regardless of the outcome of the case.
(2) The party to whom reimbursement of such costs has already been
awarded during the course of the litigation is not obligated to refund them even if
it is ordered to reimburse the litigation costs in the principal issue.
Section 49.
(1) Legal representatives, attorneys-at-law, and other representatives may be
ordered by the court, on request or the court's own motion, to bear or reimburse
those costs that they have caused by gross negligence.
(2) This applies in particular to extra costs caused through gross negligence
either by inclusion of nonmaterial factual allegations in the briefs or by super-
fluous verbosity in the briefs.
(3) If the decision is not included in the judgment on the principal issue, it is
made in the form of an order. Prior to the decision the representative or attorney
involved is to be heard. Upon becoming final, the order authorizes execution into
the assets of these persons.
Section 50.
The provisions of §§ 40 to 49 also apply to appeal proceedings and to the deci-
sions to be made by the courts of the second and third instances causing the costs
of the appeal, as well as, if a lower court decision is changed, concerning the costs
of the entire previous proceedings. The fact that a party has been sustained by the
lower courts is irrelevant for the question of cosi reimbursement.
Section 51.
(1) If proceedings are reversed or annulled on appeal or on the court's own
motion and if at the same time one of the parties can be blamed for the fact that
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the proceedings were commenced or continued despite the existing grounds for
reversal or annulment, or if the fault of one of the parties constitutes the ground
for the reversal, that party may, on request or on the court's own motion, be
ordered to reimburse the costs of the reversed proceedings, as well as of the appeal
proceedings, if any.
(2) If the existing ground for reversal or annulment was disregarded due to
obvious gross negligence on the part of the court, or if obvious gross negligence of
the court has caused the reversal of the proceedings, reimbursement of the costs of
the reversed proceedings and, if applicable, the appeal proceedings, may on
request or on the court's own motion, be imposed on the court.
(3) Except for these costs, the costs are to be set off against one another.
Section 52.
(1) Every judgment and all orders that dispose completely of an issue for a
stage in the proceedings, must also contain a decision concerning the reimburse-
ment of costs. Other orders may contain cost reimbursement decisions only to the
extent that the obligation is independent of the outcome of the princpal issue.
(2) If in issuing a partial judgment the court is unable to decide on the costs
relating to the resolved claim or partial claim, it also is to be indicated in the
judgment to what extent such decision is reserved for a later judgment.
(3) The decision concerning cost reimbursement is to be made without party
motion, provided the statement of costs (§ 54) was submitted in time.
Section 53.
(1) When deciding on the obligation to reimburse costs, the court shall at the
same time specify the amount of the reimbursable costs, insofar as costs are not set
off against one another.
(2) When orally announcing the judgment or an order imposing an obliga-
tion to reimburse costs, however, the court may, in all cases where the judgment or
order is still to be executed in writing, reserve the specification of the amount of
the costs for the written copy.
Section 54.
(1) The party claiming reimbursement for costs must, to avoid forfeiture of
the reimbursement claim, submit the statement of the costs together with sup-
porting documents to the court prior to the closing of the trial immediately pre-
ceding the decision on the cost reimbursement claim (§ 52) or, if the decision is to
be made without prior trial, at the hearing or together with its petition for
decision.
(2) If a party incurs further reimbursable costs after the time at which
according to paragraph 1 the cost statement must be submitted, it may request a
supplement to the decision concerning the amount of reimbursable costs. The
court decides by order without hearing.
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Section 55.
The decision on costs contained in a judgment of a trial court is only subject to
recourse unless the decision on the principal issue is also appealed.
BELGIUM*
JUDICIARY CODE, LAW OF OCTOBER 10, 1976
Fourth Part: Civil Procedure
Book II: Trial Courts
Title IV: Costs and Expenses
Article 1017.
All final judgments shall announce, on the court's own motion, the imposition
of the costs on the defeated party, except as provided otherwise by special law, and
leaving unaffected agreements among the parties as documented in the judgment.
The costs shall, however, except in case of a temerarious or vexatious claim,
always be imposed on the agency or organization charged with the administration
of the laws and regulations referred to in articles 580, 581, and 582 (nos. 1 and 2)
with respect to claims made by or against beneficiaries.
The costs may be apportioned at a ratio specified by the judge either if both
parties are defeated on some point or among spouses, ascendants, brothers and
sisters or persons who are related by marriage to the same degree.
All interim judgments shall reserve the decision on the costs.
Article 1018.
The costs include:
1. The stamp, office, and registration fees;
2. the costs, emoluments, and salaries relating to judicial acts;
3. the costs of preparing a copy of the judgment;
4. the expenses of all fact-finding measures, notably the compensation of wit-
nesses and experts;
5. the travel and lodging expenses of judges, clerks and parties if the travel
has been ordered by the judge and the costs of documents if they have been
prepared solely for the purpose of the litigation;
6. the amounts provided for in art. 1022.
Article 1021.
The parties may submit a detailed statement of their respective costs, including
the compensation for expenses and procedure provided for in art. 1022. In that
case, the judgment shall contain the assessment of these costs.
* Source: Codes Larcier, Tome I (1980). Translated by Werner Pfennigstorf.
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If the costs are not assessed in the judgment, or are assessed only in part, the
part not assessed is deemed reserved. In that case, the assessment is made, on the
petition of the first party to do so, by the deciding judge, provided his decision has
not been appealed: the proceedings are resumed and continued in accordance
with articles 750 et seq.
Article 1022.
The King establishes, with the advice of the Council of the National Associa-
tion of Advocates, a schedule of amounts of reimbursable costs, justified by the
performance of certain pertinent actions.
Article 1023.
Any contractual provision purporting to increase the amount owed on account
of its collection by legal action is deemed not written.
Article 1024.
The costs of execution are at the charge of the party against which execution is
made.
DENMARK*
JUDICIAL CODE, REVISED VERSION OF JANUARY 2, 1980
Third Book: Civil Procedure
First Division: General Provisions
Chapter 30: Litigation Costs and Procedural Penalties
Section 311.
(1) Each party has to pay the costs caused by procedural acts that it has
requested or put in motion, subject, however, to the right to have them reimbursed
by the opposing party in accordance with the following provisions.
(2) Costs of procedural acts required by the court may be required to be
advanced either by the party in whose interest the court deems the act to be or by
both parties in proportion specified by the court, subject, however, to § 284(2).
Section 312.
(1) The losing party is obligated to reimburse the opposing party for the costs
caused by the litigation, except insofar as the parties have agreed otherwise, or the
court for special circumstances finds it equitable to deviate from the rule.
* Source: Dansk Lovsamling (H. Topsoe-Jensen ed. 1980). Translated by Werner Pfennigstorf.
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(2) Expenses that were not necessary for the proper conduct of the litigation
are not to be reimbursed. The court decides in its discretion which expenses were
necessary in the given case. Expenses for the employment of a court stenographer
are to be reimbursed if in the court's discretion the employment in the given case
was justified. The amount shall be assessed as an aggregate sum, with an appro-
priate amount to be reimbursed for attorney fees and the other expenses to be
reimbursed in full so far as possible. Reimbursement incurred after the statement
or generally in any other way than in form of a fixed amount specified in the
judgment is not possible, even if there is an agreement between the parties.
(3) The fact that some points of an action or defense are rejected or that some
of the evidence offered is regarded as not material for the case, shall not by itself
necessarily preclude reimbursement of the expenses therefor.
(4) If a case becomes moot, the court may according to the circumstances
order one party to reimburse the other party for all or part of its costs, or it may
order that each of the parties shall bear its own costs (set-off of costs).
(5) If the defendant has lawfully offered to the plaintiff what the latter can
claim, the plaintiff must reimburse the defendant for the latter's expenses for the
subsequent part of the litigation.
Section 313.
If the action is dismissed entirely, it is with respect to the costs deemed to be
lost by the plaintiff.
Section 316.
(1) If each party prevails in part and loses in part, the costs are either to be
paid partially by one of the parties or to be set off.
(2) However, the court may order one party to reimburse the opposing party
for its costs if the amount of the latter's claim deviates only to a minor degree from
that awarded by the court and if the difference has not caused special costs or
expenses.
Section 317.
A party who by appeal does not obtain a modification of the appealed decision
is deemed defeated in this respect and therefore as a rule has to reimburse the
opposing party for its costs in the appeal.
Section 318.
If the judgment or order is modified on appeal, the decision on the costs of the
appeal, as well as the costs of the previous proceeding, is made in accordance with
the rules given in §§ 312-16, and the costs are either imposed on the opposing
party or are set off or divided.
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Section 319.
The party who through imputable fault or negligence has caused wasted
hearing dates, unnecessary postponements, useless taking of evidence, or other
superfluous or irrelevant procedural acts, is obligated, even if it prevails on the
case, to reimburse the opposing party for the expenses caused thereby.
Section 320.
(1) With respect to the costs of individual procedural acts or stages of proce-
dure, the court may decide immediately by order if that decision, as in the case
dealt with in the preceding section, is independent of the outcome of the principal
issue. If a separate decision is not made earlier, a provision in the final judgment is
necessary with respect to such individual acts or stages of procedure.
(2) Expenses for the preparation of extracts for use in the documentation of
cases appealed to the Supreme Court are to be paid to the government treasury by
the appealing party, upon statement by the clerk of the Supreme Court, unless the
procedure is free with respect to the party. The expenses are taken into account in
the assessment of litigation costs in the judgment.
Section 321.
Advocates or other representatives in litigation may, upon the request of the
opposing party, be ordered to bear the costs that they have caused by conduct in
violation of their duties. A party that submits such a request shall see to it that the
advocate or representative is given an opportunity to respond to it.
Section 322.
The provisions of the preceding section apply also to judges of lower courts if a
case is appealed to a higher court, provided that the judge whose order is appealed
shall be given notice when the summons for the appeal is announced to the
opposing party. The judge has the right to be heard by the higher court and to
defend himself. In the case of an appeal from an order it is sufficient that the
request concerning the judge is contained in the written appeal or in the entry in
the court records that takes its place.
ENGLAND AND WALES
(a) Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 16.
Part II. Jurisdiction
General Provisions
Costs
Section 51.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this or any other Act and to rules of court, the
costs of and incidental to all proceedings in the civil division of the Court of
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Appeal and in the High Court, including the administration of estates and trusts,
shall be in the discretion of the court, and the court shall have full power to deter-
mine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid.
(b) Rules of the Supreme Court*
Order 62: Costs
ENTITLEMENT TO COSTS
When costs to follow the event (0. 62, r. 3).
3. (1) Subject to the following provisions of this Order, no party shall be enti-
tled to recover any costs of or incidental to any proceedings from any other party
to the proceedings except under an order of the Court.
(2) If the Court in the exercise of its discretion sees fit to make any order as to
the costs of or incidental to any proceedings, the Court shall, subject to this Order,
order the costs to follow the event, except when it appears to the Court that in the
circumstances of the case some other order should be made as to the whole or any
part of the costs.
(3) The costs of and occasioned by any amendment made without leave in
the writ of summons or any pleading shall be borne by the party making the
amendment, unless the Court otherwise orders.
(4) The costs of and occasioned by any application to extend the time fixed
by these rules, or any direction or order thereunder, for serving or filing any docu-
ment or doing any other act (including the costs of any order made on the applica-
tion) shall be borne by the party making the application, unless the Court
otherwise orders.
(5) If a party on whom a notice to admit facts is served under Order 27, rule
2, refuses or neglects to admit the facts within 7 days after the service on him of the
notice or such longer time as may be allowed by the Court, the costs of proving the
facts shall be paid by him, unless the Court otherwise orders.
(6) If a party-
(a) on whom a list of documents is served in pursuance of any provision of
Order 24, or
(b) on whom a notice to admit documents is served under Order 27, rule 5,
gives notice of non-admission of any of the documents in accordance with Order
27, rule 4(2) or 5(2), as the case may be, the costs of proving that document shall
be paid by him, unless the Court otherwise orders.
(7) Where a defendant by notice in writing and without leave discontinues
his counterclaim against any party or withdraws any particular claim made by
him therein against any party, that party shall, unless the Court otherwise directs,
be entitled to his costs of the counterclaim or his costs occasioned by the claim
* Source: I THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 1982, at 972, 1007-24, 1051-1071.
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withdrawn, as the case may be, incurred to the time of receipt of the notice of
discontinuance or withdrawal.
(8) Where a plaintiff accepts money paid into Court by a defendant who
counterclaimed against him, then, if the notice of payment given by that
defendant stated that he had taken into account and satisfied the cause of action
or, as the case may be, all the causes of action in respect of which he counter-
claimed, that defendant shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be entitled to his
costs of the counterclaim incurred to the time of receipt of the notice of acceptance
by the plaintiff of the money paid into court.
(9) Where any person claiming to be a creditor-
(a) seeks to establish his claim to a debt under any judgment or order in
accordance with Order 44, or
(b) comes in to prove his title, debt or claim in relation to a company in
pursuance of any such notice as is mentioned in Order 102, rule 13
he shall, if his claim succeeds, be entitled to his costs incurred in establishing it,
unless the Court otherwise directs, and, if his claim or any part of it fails, may be
ordered to pay the costs of any person incurred in opposing it.
(10) Where a claimant is entitled to costs under paragraph (9), the amount of
the costs shall be fixed by the Court unless it thinks fit to direct taxation and the
amount fixed or allowed shall be added to the claimant's debt.
(11) Where a claimant (other than a person claiming to be a creditor) having
established a claim to be entitled under a judgment or order in accordance with
Order 44 has been served with notice of the judgment or order pursuant to rule 3
or 15 of that Order, he shall, if he enters an appearance, be entitled as part of his
costs of action (if allowed) to costs incurred in establishing his claim, unless the
Court otherwise directs; and where such a claimant fails to establish his claim or
any part of it he may be ordered to pay the costs of any person incurred in
opposing it.
(12) Where an application is made in accordance with Order 24, rule 7A, or
Order 29, rule 7A, for an order under section 33 or 34 of the Act, the person
against whom the order is sought shall be entitled, unless the Court otherwise
directs, to his costs of and incidental to the application and of complying with any
order made thereon and he may, after giving the applicant 7 days' notice of his
intention to do so, tax such costs and, if they are not paid within 4 days after
taxation, sign judgment for them.
Special matters to be taken into account in exercising discretion (0. 62, r. 5).
5. The Court in exercising its discretion as to costs shall, to such extent, if any,
as may be appropriate in the circumstances, take into account-
(a) any such offer of contribution as is mentioned in Order 16, rule 10,
which is brought to its attention in pursuance of a reserved right to do
so;
'-(b) any payment of money into court and the amount of such payment.
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Restriction of discretion to order costs (0. 62, r. 6).
6. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Order or in section 51 of the Act,-
(a) no order shall be made directing one party to pay to the other any costs
of or incidental to an appeal or application for leave to appeal under
section 6(2) of the Pensions Appeal Tribunals Act 1943;
(b) no order shall be made for costs to be paid by or to any person (other
than the registration officer) who is respondent to an appeal to the
Court of Appeal from the decision of a county court on the hearing of
an appeal from the registration officer under section 45 of the Represen-
tation of the People Act, 1949, unless that person appears in support of
the decision of the county court;
(c) unless the Court is of opinion that there was no reasonable ground for
opposing the will, no order shall be made for the costs of the other side
to be paid by the party opposing a will in a probate action who has
given notice with his defence to the party setting up the will that he
merely insists upon the will being proved in solemn form of law and
only intends to cross-examine the witnesses produced in support of the
will;
(d) except in special circumstances, no order shall be made giving more
than one set of costs among all the opponents of a petition or originating
summons for extension of the term of a patent under section 23, 24 or 25
of the Patents Act, 1949, if the Court refuses the prayer of the petition
or the relief sought by the summons.
(2) Where a person is or has been a party to any proceedings in the capacity
of trustee, personal representative or mortgagee, he shall, unless the Court other-
wise orders, be entitled to the costs of those proceedings, in so far as they are not
recovered from or paid by any other person, out of the fund held by the trustee or
personal representative or the mortgaged property, as the case may be; and the
Court may otherwise order only on the ground that the trustee, personal represen-
tative or mortgagee has acted unreasonably or, in the case of a trustee or personal
representative, has in substance acted for his own benefit rather than for the ben-
efit of the fund.
Costs arising from misconduct or neglect (0. 62, r. 7).
7. (1) Where in any cause or matter any thing-is done or omission is made
improperly or unnecessarily by or on behalf of a party, the Court may direct that
any costs to that party in respect of it shall not be allowed to him and that any
costs occasioned by it to other parties shall be paid by him to them.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1) the Court shall for
the purpose of that paragraph have regard in particular to the following matters,
that is to say-
(a) the omission to do any thing the doing of which would have been calcu-
lated to save costs;
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(b) the doing of any thing calculated to occasion, or in a manner or at a
time calculated to occasion, unnecessary costs;
(c) any unnecessary delay in the proceedings.
(3) The Court may, instead of giving a direction under paragraph (1) of this
rule in relation to any thing done or omission made, direct the taxing officer to
inquire into it and, if it appears to him that such a direction as aforesaid should
have been given in relation to it, to act as if the appropriate direction had been
given.
(4) The taxing officer shall, in relation to any thing done or omission made in
the course of taxation and in relation to any failure to procure taxation, have the
same power to disallow or to award costs as the Court has under paragraph (1) to
direct that costs shall be disallowed to or paid by any party.
(5) Where a party entitled to costs fails to procure or fails to proceed with
taxation, the taxing officer in order to prevent any other parties being prejudiced
by that failure, may allow the party so entitled a nominal or other sum for costs or
may certify the failure and the costs of the other parties.
(6) In this rule "taxing officer" means a taxing master, a registrar of the Prin-
cipal Probate Registry, the Admiralty registrar or the registrar of a district
registry.
Personal liability of solicitor for costs (0. 62, r. 8).
8. (1) Subject to the following provisions of this rule, where in any proceed-
ings costs are incurred improperly or without reasonable cause or are wasted by
undue delay or by any other misconduct or default, the Court may make against
any solicitor whom it considers to be responsible (whether personally or through a
servant or agent) an order-
(a) disallowing the costs as between solicitor and his client; and
(b) directing the solicitor to repay to his client costs which the client has
been ordered to pay to other parties to the proceedings; or
(c) directing the solicitor personally to indemnify such other parties against
costs payable by them.
Fractional or gross sum in place of taxed costs (0. 62, r. 9).
9. (1) Subject to this Order, where by or under these rules or any order or
direction of the Court costs are to be paid to any person, that person shall be
entitled to his taxed costs.
(4) The Court in awarding costs to any person may direct that, instead of
taxed costs, that person shall be entitled-
(a) to a proportion specified in the direction of the taxed costs or to the
taxed costs from or up to a stage of the proceedings so specified; or
(b) to a gross sum so specified in lieu of taxed costs.
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Provisions as to taxation proceedings (0. 62, r. 26).
26. (1) If any party entitled to be heard in any taxation proceedings
does not attend within a reasonable time after the time appointed for the
taxation, the taxing officer, if satisfied by affidavit or otherwise that the party
had due notice of the time appointed, may proceed with the taxation.
(2) The taxing officer by whom any taxation proceedings are being con-
ducted may, if he thinks it necessary to do so, adjourn those proceedings from
time to time.
Powers of taxing officer taxing costs payable out of fund (0. 62, r. 27).
27. (1) Where any costs are to be paid out of a fund the taxing officer
may give directions as to the parties who are entitled to attend on the taxation
of those costs and may disallow the costs of attendance of any party not enti-
tled to attend by virtue of the directions and whose attendance he considers
unnecessary.
(2) Where the Court has directed that a bill of costs be taxed for the
purposes of being paid out of a fund the taxing officer by whom the bill is
being taxed may, if he thinks fit, adjourn the taxation for a reasonable period
and direct the party whose bill it is to send to any person having an interest in
the fund a copy of the bill, or of any part thereof, free of charge together with
a letter containing the following information, that is to say-
(a) that the bill of costs, a copy of which or of part of which is sent with the
letter, has been referred to a taxing officer for taxation;
(b) the name of the taxing officer and the address of the office at which the
taxation is proceeding;
(c) the time appointed by the taxing officer at which the taxation will be
continued; and
(d) such other information, if any, as the taxing officer may direct.
ASSESSMENT OF COSTS
Costs payable to one party by another or out of a fund (0. 62, r. 28).
28. (1) This rule applies to costs which by or under these rules or any order
or direction of the Court are to be paid to a party to any proceedings either by
another party to those proceedings or out of any fund (other than a fund which the
party to whom the costs are to be paid holds as trustee or personal representative).
(2) Subject to the following provisions of this rule, costs to which this rule
applies shall be taxed on the party and party basis, and on a taxation on that basis
there shall be allowed all such costs as were necessary or proper for the attainment
of justice or for enforcing or defending the rights of the party whose costs are being
taxed.
(3) The Court in awarding costs to which this rule applies may in any case in
which it thinks fit to do so order or direct that the costs shall be taxed on the
common fund basis.
(4) On a taxation on the common fund basis, being a more generous basis
than that provided for by paragraph (2), there shall be allowed a reasonable
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amount in respect of all costs reasonably incurred, and paragraph (2) shall not
apply; and accordingly in all cases where costs are to be taxed on the common
fund basis the ordinary rules applicable on a taxation as between solicitor and
client where the costs are to be paid out of a common fund in which the client and
others are interested shall be applied, whether or not the costs are in fact to be so
paid.
(5) The Court in awarding costs to which this rule applies to any person may
if it thinks fit and if-
(a) the costs are to be paid out of a fund; or
(b) the person to whom the costs are to be paid is or was a party to the
proceedings in the capacity of trustee or personal representative,
order or direct that the costs shall be taxed as if that person were a trustee of the
fund or as if the costs were to be paid out of a fund held by that person, as the case
may be, and where the Court so orders or directs rule 31(2) shall have effect in
relation to the taxation in substitution for paragraph (2) of this rule.
Costs of a litigant in person (0. 62, r. 28A).
28A. (1) On a taxation of the costs of a litigant in person there may, subject
to the provisions of this rule, be allowed such costs as would have been allowed if
the work and disbursements to which the costs relate had been done or made by a
solicitor on the litigant's behalf.
Costs payable to a solicitor by his own client (0. 62, r. 29).
29. (1) On the taxation of a solicitor's bill to his own client (except a bill to
be paid out of the legal aid fund under the Legal Aid Act 1949, or a bill with
respect to non-contentious business) all costs shall be allowed except in so far as
they are of an unreasonable amount or have been unreasonably incurred.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1), all costs incurred with the express or
implied approval of the client shall, subject to paragraph (3), be conclusively pre-
sumed to have been reasonably incurred and, where the amount thereof has been
expressly or impliedly approved by the client, to have been reasonable in amount.
(3) For the purpose of paragraph (1), any costs which in the circumstances of
the case are of an unusual nature and such that they would not be allowed on a
taxation of costs in a case to which rule 28 (2) applies shall, unless the solicitor
expressly informed his client before they were incurred that they might not be so
allowed, be presumed, until the contrary is shown, to have been unreasonably
incurred.
(4) In paragraphs (2) and (3), the references to the client shall be construed-
(a) if the client was at the material time incapable by reason of mental
disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1959, of man-
aging and administering his property and affairs and represented by a
person acting as guardian ad litem or next friend, as references to that
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person acting, where necessary, with the authority of the authority
having jurisdiction under Part VIII of that Act.
(b) If the client was at the material time an infant and represented by a
person acting as guardian ad litem or next friend, as references to that
person.
(5) Section 118(2) and (3) of the Mental Health Act 1959, shall have effect in
relation to paragraph (4) as if that paragraph were an enactment and the reference
in that paragraph to the authority having jurisdiction under Part VIII of that Act
shall be construed accordingly.
Costs payable to solicitor where money recovered by or on behalf of infant, etc.
(0. 62, r. 30).
30. (1) This rule applies to-
(a) any proceedings in which money is claimed or recovered by or on behalf
of, or adjudged or ordered or agreed to be paid to, or for the benefit of, a
person who is an infant or incapable by reason of mental disorder
within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1959, of managing and
administering his property and affairs or in which money paid into
Court is accepted by or on behalf of such a person, and
(b) any proceedings under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, in which money is
recovered by or on behalf of, or adjudged or ordered or agreed to be
paid to, or for the benefit of, the widow of the person whose death gave
rise to the proceedings in satisfaction of a claim under the said Act or in
which money paid into Court is accepted by her or on her behalf in
satisfaction of such a claim, if the proceedings were for the benefit also
of a person who, when the money is recovered, or adjudged or ordered
or agreed to be paid, or accepted, is an infant, and
(c) any proceedings in the Court of Appeal on an application or appeal
made in connection with any proceedings to which this rule applies by
virtue of the foregoing provisions of this paragraph.
(2) Unless the court otherwise directs the costs payable to his solicitor by any
plaintiff in any proceedings to which this rule applies by virtue of paragraph 1(a)
or (b), being the costs of those proceedings or incident to the claim therein or
consequent thereon, shall be taxed under rule 29; and no costs shall be payable to
the solicitor of any plaintiff in respect of those proceedings except such amount of
costs as may be certified in accordance with this rule on the taxation under rule 29
of the solicitor's bill to that plaintiff.
(3) On the taxation under rule 29 of a solicitor's bill to any plaintiff in any
proceedings to which this rule applies by virtue of paragraph 1 (a) or (b) who is
his own client, the taxing officer shall also tax any costs payable to that plaintiff in
those proceedings and shall certify-
(a) the amount allowed on the taxation under rule 29, the amount allowed
on the taxation of any costs payable to that plaintiff in those proceed-
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ings and the amount (if any) by which the first mentioned amount
exceeds the other, and
(b) where necessary, the proportion of the amount of the excess payable
respectively by, or out of money belonging to, any party to the proceed-
ings who is an infant or incapable, by reason of mental disorder within
the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1959, of managing and adminis-
tering his property and affairs or the widow of the man whose death
gave rise to the proceedings and any other party.
(4) Paragraphs (2) and (3) shall apply in relation to any proceedings to which
this rule applies by virtue of paragraph (1)(c) as if for references to a plaintiff
there were substituted references to the party, whether appellant or respondent,
who was the plaintiff in the proceedings which gave rise to the first-mentioned
proceedings.
(5) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this rule shall prejudice a solicitor's
lien for costs.
(6) Where in any proceedings to which this rule applies directions given by
the Court under Order 80, rule 12 provide for the transfer or payment of money to
or into a county court and for the payment to the solicitor of any plaintiff in the
proceedings of an amount in respect of costs out of the money so transferred or
paid, the taxing officer by whom those costs are taxed shall send a copy of his
certificate to the registrar of the county court.
(7) The foregoing provisions of this rule shall apply in relation to-
(a) a counterclaim by or on behalf of a person who is an infant or incapable
by reason of mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health
Act 1959, of managing and administering his property and affairs and a
counterclaim consisting of or including a claim under the Fatal Acci-
dents Act 1976, by or on behalf of the widow of the man whose death
gave rise to the claim, and
(b) a claim made by or on behalf of a person who is an infant or incapable
as aforesaid in an action by any other person for relief under section 504
of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, and a claim consisting of or
including a claim under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, made by or on
behalf of that widow in such an action.
if for references to a plaintiff there were substituted references to a defendant.
Costs payable to a trustee out of the trust fund, etc. (0. 62, r. 31).
31. (1) This rule applies to every taxation of the costs which a person who is
or has been a party to any proceedings in the capacity of trustee or personal repre-
sentative is entitled to be paid out of any fund which he holds in that capacity.
(2) On any taxation to which this rule applies, no costs shall be disallowed,
except in so far as those costs or any part of their amount should not, in accord-
ance with the duty of the trustee or personal representative as such, have been
incurred or paid, and should for that reason be borne by him personally.
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Scales of costs (0. 62, r. 32).
32. (1) Subject to the foregoing rules and the following provisions of this rule,
the scale of costs contained in Appendix 2 to this Order, together with the notes
and general provisions contained in that Appendix, shall apply to the taxation of
all costs incurred in relation to contentious business done on or after January 1,
1960.
(2) On a taxation in relation to which rule 29 or rule 31 (2) has effect and in
other special cases costs may at the discretion of the taxing officer be allowed-
(a) in relation to items not mentioned in the said scale; or
(b) of an amount higher than that prescribed by the said scale.
(3) Where the amount of a solicitor's remuneration in respect of non-conten-
tious business connected with sales, purchases, leases, mortgages and other matters
of conveyancing or in respect of any other non-contentious business is regulated (in
the absence of agreement to the contrary) by any general orders for the time being
in force under the Solicitors Act 1974, the amount of the costs to be allowed on
taxation in respect of the like contentious business shall be the same, notwith-
standing anything in the scale contained in Appendix 2 to this Order.
(4) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) costs shall, unless the Court otherwise
orders, be allowed in the cases to which Appendix 3 to this Order applies in
accordance with the provisions of that Appendix.
FRANCE*
NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY DECRET OF DECEMBER 5,
1975
Book I: Provisions Common to All Courts
Title XVIII: Expenses and Costs
Chapter I
The Burden of the Costs
Article 695
The costs relating to proceedings, documents, and execution procedures
include:
1. The fees, taxes, or government royalties, or emoluments levied by the
clerks of the courts or by the tax administration, with the exception of fees,
taxes, and penalties which may be due on documentary evidence produced
in support of the claims of the parties.
2. The expenses of transporting judges and clerks of court.
3. Compensation of witnesses.
4. Experts' fees.
* Source: NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE, BOOK 1: AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
FRANCOISE GRIVART DE KERSTRAT AND WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD (1978). Copyright © 1978 by Oceana
Publications, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Oceana.
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5. Tariffed disbursements.
6. Emoluments of public or ministerial officials.
7. Avocals' fees insofar as they are regulated.
Article 696.
Costs are assessed against the losing party unless the judge assesses the whole or
a part of the burden against the other party, in a decision with reasons given.
Article 697.
Avocats, avouis and sheriffs "may be held" personally liable for the costs relating
to proceedings, documents, and execution procedures instituted outside the scope
of their mandate. (D. 76-14, July 29, 1976)
Article 698.
The costs relating to "unjustified" proceedings, documents, and execution pro-
cedures are borne by the legal officials (aux'zaires dejus'ce) who carried them out,
without prejudice to the damages which might be claimed. The same applies to
costs relating to proceedings, documents and execution procedures which are null
as a result of the fault of those officials. (D. 76-714, July 29, 1976)
Article 699.
Avocats and avouks may, in the matters where their representation is required,
request that the assessment of costs carry with it, to their benefit, their right to
recover directly against the party against whom costs have been assessed, the
expenses which they advanced without having received a retainer.
The party against whom the recovery is pursued may, however, deduct, by
legal set-off, the amount of the costs to his credit.
Article 700.
When it appears inequitable to leave on one party the burden of the "sums
spent by the latter and" not included in the costs, the judge may order the other
party to pay the first one a sum which the judge determines. (D. 76-714, July 29,
1976)
Chapter III
The Recovery of Costs Against an Opponent
Article 704
The parties may, in case of difficulty, without formality request the clerk of the
court which gave the ruling, to verify the amount of the costs.
The same applies to the legal official who wishes to recover costs; his request is
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then accompanied by a detailed account which he is bound to deliver to the par-
ties in accordance with the tariff regulations. This account sets forth the retainer
received.
Article 705.
The clerk of the court verifies the amount of the costs after having made, where
appropriate, the necessary corrections in order to make the account conform to the
tariffs. He delivers or sends by ordinary mail a certificate of verification to the
interested person.
The moving party gives notice of the verified account to the opponent, who has
a delay of one month to contest it. The notification carries with it the moving
party's acceptance of the verified account.
It must set forth the delay and the formalities for contesting the account.
Article 707.
In the absence of a contesting by the opponent within the delay, the moving
party may request the verifying clerk of the court to mention this on the certificate
of verification. This note gives it executory force.
Article 708.
The person who wishes to contest the verification may always himself submit a
request for an assessment order; he may also do it through his representative.
The request is made orally or in writing to the clerk of the court who verified
the account. It must be accompanied by the certificate of verification.
Article 710.
The judge rules on the assessment request as well as on the other requests
relating to the recovery of costs.
Article 711.
The judge makes, sua sponte, all the corrections necessary to make the account
conform to the tariffs. He mentions, where appropriate, the sums already collected
by way of retainer.
Article 712.
The judge has the power to refer the request as it stands to a court hearing on
the date which he fixes.
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LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF OCTOBER 13, 1920
First Part: Adversary Proceedings
Title XI: Costs
Article 122.
(1) All judgments, including those on incidental issues, shall impose the costs
on the defeated party.
(2) However, a part of the costs may be imposed on the prevailing party if it
has incurred unnecessary expenses or if claims were exaggerated, leaving unaf-
fected the penalties that may be imposed on the parties.
Article 123.
If costs are imposed on several parties, they are apportioned among the parties
by heads or according to their respective interests in the litigation.
Article 125.
If both parties are defeated on some point respectively, the costs are appor-
tioned among them at a proportion specified by the judges.
Article 126.
The judges may always apportion the costs among spouses, ascendants and
descendants, brothers and sisters, persons related by marriage in the same degree,
and partners, as required by equity.
Article 127.
Guardians, custodians and other administrators who in a litigated case have
harmed the interests administered by them may be ordered to pay the costs, per-
sonally and excluding reimbursement.
Article 128.
The judges may authorize direct collection of costs by advocates who at the
announcement of the judgment affirm that they are entitled to those costs.
Article 129.
The costs include:
(a) taxes, including registration tax on documents submitted;
* Source: L6gislation Genevoise, Tome 4, Livre E (1978) (Procedure civile). Translated by Werner
Pfennigstorf.
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(b) fees due the office of the court, the advocates, and the bailiffs, assessed
according to schedule;
(c) a court fee assessed according to the advocates' fee schedule, taking into
consideration the importance of the matter and the amount of work
required by it;
(d) compensation for witnesses and experts;
(e) travel and lodging expenses of the parties if the travel was made exclu-
sively for the litigation;
() travel expenses to a court outside the canton;
(g) an equitable compensation, specified by the court, to contribute to the
advocate's honorarium.
Article 130.
(1) Each party shall submit to the office of the court with its brief for the
judgment, a statement of costs, prepared and signed by the advocate.
(2) The amounts pertaining to each item of the preceding article are to be set
out separately, and detailed accounts are to be provided for each item.
(3) Supporting documents are to be attached to the statement where
applicable.
Article 131.
Where no advocate has been employed, the statement of costs is prepared by
the office of the court.
Article 132.
(1) The statement of costs at the charge of one or the other party shall be
examined and approved by the judges before whom the case is pending. The
statement shall be attached to the original judgment, and it shall be incorporated
in copies of the judgment for execution.
Article 133.
From the said statement, the following shall be rejected:
(a) all wasteful acts and all superfluous writings;
(b) all items whose cost is not indicated in detail.
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CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF JANUARY 30, 1877.
First Book: General Provisions
Second Division: Parties
Fifth Title: Litigation Costs
Section 91.
[Principles and extent of duty to bear costs]t
(1) The losing party must bear the costs of the litigation, and must in partic-
ular reimburse the costs incurred by the opponent insofar as they were necessary
for appropriate assertion or defense of rights. Reimbursement of costs includes
compensation for the loss of time caused to the opponent by necessary travels or by
necessary presence at hearings; the provisions concerning compensation of wit-
nesses apply as appropriate.
(2) The statutory fees and expenses of the attorney of the prevailing party
must be reimbursed in all proceedings; however, travel expenses of an attorney
who is not admitted to practice before the court nor resides where the court is
located are to be reimbursed only to the extent that retaining that attorney was
necessary for appropriate enforcement or defense of rights. The prevailing party is
not entitled to reimbursement of extra costs caused by the fact that the attorney
admitted to practice before the court does not have his residence or his office where
the court or an external department of the court is located. The costs of several
attorneys are to be reimbursed only to the extent that they do not exceed the costs
of a single attorney or that a change of attorneys was necessary. An attorney
pleading his own case is entitled to reimbursement for the fees and expenses that
he could claim as fees and expenses of a retained attorney.
(3) The costs of litigation referred to in paragraphs I and 2 include the fees
incurred in a conciliation proceeding before a conciliation office established or
recognized by the state court administration; this does not apply if more than one
year has elapsed between the conclusion of the conciliation proceeding and the
institution of the action.
Section 91a.
[Costs if case is declared moot]
(1) If the parties have declared the case moot with respect to the principal
issue, the court decides on the costs in equitable discretion, taking into considera-
tion the current state of the facts and the arguments. This decision is made in form
of an order.
* Source: DEUTSCHE GESETZE: SAMMLUNG DES ZIVIL-, STRAF-, UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS 29
(1977). Translated by Werner Pfennigstorf.
t The headings in brackets are not part of the official text.
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(2) The order is subject to immediate appeal. Before deciding on the appeal,
the opponent must be heard.
Section 92.
[Division of costs in case of partial success]
(1) If each party prevails in part and loses in part, the costs are to be set off
against one another or to be apportioned proportionally. If the costs are set off
against one another, one-half of the court costs is imposed on each party.
(2) The court may impose the total litigation costs on one party if the excess
of the other party's claim was relatively minor and did not cause extra costs or if
the amount of the other party's claim was dependent on determination by judicial
discretion, on assessment by experts, or on mutual calculation.
Section 93.
[Costs in case of immediate acknowledgement]
If the defendant has not, through his conduct, provoked the action, the litiga-
tion costs are imposed on the plaintiff if the defendant immediately acknowledges
the claim.
Section 93a.
[Costs in marital matters]
(1) If the dissolution of a marriage is ordered, the costs of the divorce pro-
ceedings and the consequential issues decided simultaneously or decided previ-
ously under § 627(1) are to be set off against one another if that issue is decided
separately as a result of separation under § 628(1), sentence 1. The court may in
equitable discretion allocate the costs differently if allocation under sentence 1
would unreasonably impair the lifestyle of one of the spouses or if that allocation
of costs appears inequitable in view of the fact that one of the spouses has lost
wholly or partially on consequential issues of the kind specified in § 62 1(1) nos. 4,
5, 8. If the parties have made an agreement concerning the costs, the court may
base its decision on it in whole or in part.
(2) If a petition for divorce is denied, the petitioner also has to bear the costs
of the consequential issues rendered moot by the denial; this includes the costs of
consequential issues to be decided separately as a result of separation under
§ 623(1), sentence 2 or § 628(1), sentence 1. The court may allocate the costs differ-
ently if allocation under sentence 1 appears to be inequitable in view of the current
state of the facts and arguments in consequential issues of the kind specified in
§ 621(1) nos. 4, 5, 8.
(3) If a marriage is dissolved or annulled, the litigation costs are set off
against one another. The court may in equitable discretion allocate the costs dif-
ferently if allocation under sentence 1 would unreasonably impair the lifestyle of
one of the spouses or if that allocation of costs appears inequitable in view of the
fact that only one of the spouses had knowledge of the dissolvability or nullity of
Page 37: Winter 1984]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
GERMANY
the marriage or if one spouse had been induced to agree to the marriage by fraud
or illegal threats committed by the other spouse or with the other spouse's knowl-
edge at the time of the marriage in the cases of §§ 30-32 of the Marriage Act.
(4) Paragraph 3 does not apply if a marriage is annulled on the petition of
the state attorney or in the case of § 20 of the Marriage Act on the petition of the
former spouse.
Section 93b.
[Costs in action for vacation]
(1) If an action for vacation of a dwelling is sustained on the ground that the
defendant's demand to continue the lease is not justified under §§ 556a-b of the
Civil Code because of the lawful interests of the plaintiff, the court may impose all
or part of the costs on the plaintiff if the defendant had given reasons for his
demand to continue the lease and
1. the plaintiff prevails on grounds that have only arisen subsequently
(§ 556a(l) sentence 3 of the Civil Code), or
2. the plaintiff, in the cases of § 556b of the Civil Code, has not informed
the defendant of his lawful interests without delay. This applies as appro-
priate in litigation over continuation of a lease after an action has been
dismissed.
(2) If an action for vacation of a dwelling is dismissed in view of the fact that
on the demand of the defendant the continuation of the lease is ordered under
§§ 556a-b of the Civil Code, the court may impose all or part of the costs on the
defendant if he has not, immediately upon the request of the plaintiff, specified the
grounds for his objections. This applies as appropriate in litigation over continua-
tion of a lease if the action is sustained.
(3) If the defendant immediately acknowledges the demand to vacate but is
granted a period of grace for vacating, the court may impose all or part of the costs
on the plaintiff if the defendant had already prior to the bringing of the action
unsuccessfully requested the plaintiff, with specified reasons, to grant a continua-
tion of the lease or a reasonable period for vacating.
Section 93c.
[Costs in actions challenging legitimacy]
If an action to have a child declared illegitimate, or an action brought by the
man who has acknowledged paternity, or his parents, or the child, to have the
acknowledgement of paternity declared void, succeeds, the costs are to be set off
against one another. Section 96 applies as appropriate.
Section 93d.
[Costs in actions for support of illegitimate children].
(1) In proceedings concerning claims of an illegitimate child against his
father for support, the fact that a petition of the father to extend payments or to
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waive past due support payments is granted does not constitute sufficient ground
for imposing a part of the costs on the father's opponents. If the father requests a
decision in accordance with § 642f, he has to bear the costs of the proceedings.
(2) The court may impose all or part of the costs on the father's opponent if
for special reasons that is equitable.
Section 94.
[Costs of transferred claims]
If the plaintiff pursues a claim acquired by transfer without having first, before
commencing the action, given the defendant notice, and, if requested, proof of the
transfer, he is liable for the litigation costs to the extent that they result from the
fact that failure to give notice or proof have caused the defendant to contest the
claim.
Section 95.
[Costs in case of default or fault]
The party that misses a hearing date or a deadline or that negligently causes
postponement of a hearing date, adjournment of a trial, setting of a new date for
continuation of the trial, or extension of a deadline has to bear the costs caused
thereby.
Section 96.
[Costs of unsuccessful means of offense or defense]
The costs of an unsuccessful means of offense or defense may be imposed on the
party relying on it even if that party prevails on the principal issue.
Section 97.
[Costs of appeals]
(1) The costs of an unsuccessful appeal are imposed on the party that filed
the appeal.
(2) The costs of the appeal proceedings are to be imposed in whole or in part
on the prevailing party if it prevails on the basis of new facts that could have been
presented in a lower court.
(3) Paragraphs 1 and 2 apply as appropriate in family matters of the kind
specified in § 621(1) nos. 1-3, 6, 9 that are consequential issues of a divorce case.
Section 98.
[Settlement costs]
The costs of a settlement are deemed to be set off against one another unless the
parties have agreed otherwise. The same applies with respect to the costs of the
litigation resolved by the settlement to the extent that no final decision has been
made on them.
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Section 99.
[Appeal of cost decisions]
(1) The decision on the costs is not subject to appeal except where an appeal is
filed against the decision on the principal issue.
(2) If the principal issue is resolved by judgment based on acknowledgement,
the decision on the costs is subject to immediate appeal. Prior to the decision on
the appeal, the opponent is to be heard.
Section 103.
[Determination of costs; principle; petition]
(1) The claim for reimbursement of litigation costs can only be enforced on the
basis of an execution order.
(2) The petition to determine the reimbursable amount is to be filed with the
office of the trial court. It may be accompanied by the statement of the costs, a
coliy thereof for the opponent, and the documents supporting the individual cost
items.
ITALY*
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF OCTOBER 28, 1940.
First Book: General Provisions
Title III: Parties and Attorneys
Chapter IV: Parties' Liability for Litigation Costs and Damages
Article 90 (Cost burden).
Except as provided otherwise by the provisions concerning legal aid, each
party in the course of litigation must provide for the costs of the acts performed
and requested, and must advance them if that is required by statute or by the
judge.
Article 91 (Order to bear costs).
In the judgment concluding the proceeding before him, the judge shall order
the defeated party to reimburse the other party for the costs, and shall also assess
the amount of the costs, as well as that of the honorarium of the attorneys. The
same order shall be made by the judge who decides whether the court has
jurisdiction.
The costs of the judgment are specified by the court clerk in a note on the
margin of the judgment; the costs of notification of the judgment, of issuing an
* Source: I Quattro Codici (1980). Translated by Werner Pfennigstorf.
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extension order, and of the summons are specified by the office of the court by note
on the margin of the original and the copy notified.
Article 92 (Order to bear costs for individual acts; compensation).
In announcing the order referred to in the preceding article, the judge may
exclude reimbursement of costs incurred by the prevailing party if he considers
them excessive or superfluous, and he may, irrespective of the outcome, order one
party to reimburse those costs, including those that generally are unreimbursable,
that it has caused to the other party by violating the duty referred to in art. 88.
If both parties are defeated reciprocally, or if other equitable grounds are
present, the judge may set off all or part of the costs among the parties.
If the parties have settled the case, the costs are deemed to be set off except if
the parties have provided otherwise in the written settlement.
Article 93 (Subtraction of costs).
The authorized attorney may request that the judge, in the judgment by which
he orders payment of the costs, subtract in his and the other attorneys' favor the
unpaid honorarium and any costs that he has advanced.
Article 94 (Costs to be paid by representatives or curators).
Privileged heirs, guardians, curators, and in general all those who represent or
assist the party in court may, on serious grounds, which the judge must specify in
the judgment, be ordered to pay personally the costs of the entire litigation or of
individual costs, either alone or jointly and severally with the party they repre-
sented or assisted.
Article 96 (Aggravated liability).
If it appears that the defeated party has acted or resisted in court in bad faith
or gross fault, the judge may, on the request of the other- party, order the defeated
party, to pay, in addition to the costs, damages to be specified, at the court's own
motion, in the judgment.
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NETHERLANDS*
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF SEPTEMBER 16, 1896.
First Book: Procedure before the canton courts, the arrondissement courts, the
courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court
First Title: General provisions
Fourth Division: Judgments in general
Article 56.
(1) Anyone who is defeated by judgment shall have the costs imposed on him.
However, all or part of the costs may be apportioned among spouses, persons
related by blood in direct line, brothers and sisters, or persons related by marriage
in the same degree, and also if both parties are mutually defeated on some points.
Also, the judge may leave the costs that were unnecessarily incurred or caused at
the charge of the party that had incurred or caused them.
(2) In provisional, preparatory, or interlocutory judgments, the decision on
the costs may be reserved for the final judgment.
(3) The amount of the costs imposed on the defeated party shall be specified
by the judgment, insofar as these costs have been incurred prior to the decision
and not as a consequence of it.
(4) In matters where the law requires or permits acts to be performed by
advocates or procureurs, statements of the costs are to be submitted to the judge by
the procureur or, in appeals to the Supreme Court, by the advocate immediately
after the presentation or pleading of the case or after submission of the petition by
the state's attorney. If this is not done, the amount of the costs shall be assessed
exclusively according to the judge's estimate.
Article 57.
(1) In the matters referred to in the next to the last clause of the last pre-
ceding article, the judgment may impose on the defeated party no other costs of
the opposing party than the remuneration and expenses of the procureur of the
opposing party, if no one but a procureur had acted for it.
(2) If the matter has also been handled by an advocate, his remuneration
shall be included in the costs specified in the first paragraph, provided that in no
case greater costs may be imposed on the defeated party on account of the han-
dling of the case by an advocate than if only a procureur had been employed to
handle the case.
(3) With respect to appeals before the Supreme Court, the costs to be
imposed on the defeated party comprise the remuneration and expenses of one
* Source: De Nederlandse Wetboeken (J. Fruin ed. 1982). Translated by Werner Pfennigstorf. The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Dr. Willem Brakel in translating this text.
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advocate instead of the remuneration and expenses of the procureur, leaving unaf-
fected the provision of the second paragraph of art. 418.
(4) For the rest, each party bears its own costs.
(5) The remunerations shall be assessed in accordance with schedules estab-
lished by law.
Article 57a.
(1) In cases tried before the canton judge, the costs to be imposed on the
defeated party also include an amount to be assessed by the canton judge for nec-
essary travel and lodging expenses of the opposing party.
(2) If the case has been handled by or with the assistance of a representative,
the costs include an amount to be assessed by the canton judge for the remunera-
tion and necessary expenses of the representative, unless the canton judge, for rea-
sons to be expressed in the judgment, decides otherwise.
Article 58.
Advocates, procureurs, and bailiffs who in providing their services exceed their
authority, and all who neglect the interests whose administration is entrusted to
them may be ordered to pay personally and from their own funds, all or part of the
costs, and even to pay damages if there are reasons therefor, without being able to
recover them from their principals.
NORWAY*
LAW ON JUDICIAL PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES OF AUGUST 13, 1915.
First Part: General provisions
Chapter XIII: Processual costs
Section 169.
The costs which according to law are involved in a processual act shall be paid
by the party requesting the act, or in whose interest the court decides to perform it.
If a processual act is performed at the request of both parties, or according to
decision of the court in the interest of both, they are liable jointly and separately.
The King may decide to what extent expenses for use of court interpreters shall
be born [sic] by the Treasury.
Section 170.
The costs mentioned in § 169 shall be paid by the parties before the processual
act is performed, unless otherwise provided by statute. If the costs cannot be cal-
* Source: Norwegian Laws (1980). Official translation.
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culated in advance, the parties shall deposit with the court a sum which according
to the court's estimate will be sufficient.
If an insufficient advance payment has been deposited at the time when the
declaration of a processual act is presented, the court shall stipulate a short time-
limit for the payment. If the payment is not made before the expiry of said time-
limit, the declaration shall be considered as not having been received, unless the
rules of the third paragraph of this section are applicable. If payment is made
before the expiry of the time-limit, the fact that it is made after the presentation of
the declaration shall not affect the decision in the question as to when such presen-
tation took place.
If the court deems that the party having requested a processual act is unable to
make immediate payment, and that he would suffer loss or major inconvenience if
he is unable to have the processual act performed, the court can nevertheless allow
it to be performed. If a respite has been granted under § 4, second paragraph, of
the State Fees Act, or if such respite can be expected, the court shall allow the
performance of the processual act. If said processual act necessitates disburse-
ments, the money can temporarily be defrayed by the Treasury.
When a processual act as mentioned in the preceding paragraph has been per-
formed, the court shall stipulate a time-limit for the payment. Until payment has
been made or the time-limit has expired, the court shall only perform such steps in
the case as it deems necessary. If payment is not made before the expiry of the
time-limit, the case shall be rejected.
If a party who has requested a processual act fails to pay for such transactions
as necessarily accompany the request, the case shall be rejected unless a respite is
granted.
The public claim under this section can be collected by distraint according to
the court's statement.
Section 171.
When a processual act has been performed at the request of both parties or
according to decision of the court in the interest of both parties, the costs which
according to law are connected therewith shall finally rest on each of the parties in
an equal amount, unless it is enjoined on the one party to pay the costs of the case
to the opposing party.
Section 172.
If the one party loses the case entirely, he shall be ordered to pay the opposing
party his processual costs.
An exception shall be made, however, if the case was so doubtful that there was
satisfactory ground for the losing party to allow it to come before the court, or the
circumstances on which the result rested have without his fault become known to
him only during the main hearing, or if blame can be placed wholly or partially on
the winning party for the fact that the dispute has resulted in a court action.
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Section 173.
If a suit is instituted without the defendant by his conduct having given reason-
able ground for it, and he without unnecessary delay accepts the claim and offers
the performance which is demanded, it shall be enjoined on the plaintiff to defray
his processual costs.
Section 174.
When a suit is partially won and partially lost, each of the parties shall bear his
costs.
The court can, however, enjoin on one of the parties to indemnify the other a
portion of his processual costs or even enjoin on him to pay the costs of the case as
a whole. This holds good in particular when it is only in points of dispute of little
significance he has won the case, or when he has not won more than he would have
obtained by accepting an offer of compromise, which the other party has put for-
ward, or when it appears from the circumstances that the court action or the chief
part of the costs have been caused by the points of dispute in which he has lost.
Section 175.
If the suit is dismissed, or if it ends in other respects without a judgment, the
plaintiff shall be ordered to pay the defendant's cost, unless the outcome is due to
circumstances for which he cannot be blamed, or the court on account of the
doubtfulness of the legal question concerned finds ground to absolve him from the
duty of indemnification.
If the suit is dismissed because the liability has ceased to exist by subsequent
circumstances, the plaintiff can be awarded indemnification for costs from the
defendant.
If the suit is settled by a compromise, each of the parties shall bear his costs,
unless otherwise provided by the compromise.
To guide the court, a counsel who demands payment of costs by the opponent
shall state the total amount he will be charging to the account of his party for the
case concerned, and each party shall furnish a statement of the amount he seeks to
recover from the opponent, divided into payment for work which he or the counsel
has performed on the case, and other costs. It is not necessary to provide state-
ments pursuant to this paragraph in cases decided without oral proceedings.
For the guidance of the court, an attorney who demands processual costs of the
opposing party shall give an account of what he charges his party in the respective
case, and each party shall submit a statement of what he demands reimbursed of
the opposing party, divided into compensation for work that he or his attorney has
done on the case, and other costs. Statements complying with this provision need
not be submitted in cases that are decided without a hearing.
Section 176.
When indemnification for costs of the case is to be awarded to a party, the
indemnification shall cover all the costs he has had in connection with the case, in
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so far as, according to the opinion of the court, they were required for a proper
handling of the case. If a party has conducted the case against better judgment, he
may be ordered to pay all the costs of the opposing party, irrespective of whether
they were necessary.
Section 177.
If one party has by unlawful conduct during the action or by negligence caused
the other party expenses, the court may order him to pay these, irrespective of the
outcome of the case.
If a party has unduly protracted the action or made it -unduly complicated, he
can in the same manner be ordered to pay indemnification to the other party for
the injury and inconvenience which is presumed to have been caused.
Section 178.
If there are several parties to a case or, besides the parties, there are also
assisting interveners, the rules laid down above shall apply correspondingly.
The court shall apportion the costs when several parties are to defray them,
and decide whether they shall be liable jointly and separately. Such liability shall
be enjoined when they are liable jointly and separately with respect to the subject
matter of the dispute, and can in any case be enjoined with respect to costs which
do not exceed what the individual party would have had to defray if there had
been no processual associations or assisting intervention.
The costs according to § 177 shall be enjoined only on the party who has
caused them.
Section 179.
The matter of costs shall be decided by the court in the judgment or in the
ruling which concludes the case. In this decision the court shall specify the
amount awarded for work performed by the party or his counsel, and the amount
awarded for the coverage of other costs. If the judgement or ruling applies only to
part of the case, and the court finds that it cannot decide the question of costs
separately for this part, the decision, may be postponed until the judgement or
ruling which concludes the whole case.
Costs shall be awarded only when the party submits a statement of the costs
which he is seeking to recover. However, this does not apply in cases decided
without oral proceedings. Where the court so desires, it may obtain a statement to
be used at the taxing of the litigation costs.
Section 180.
A person who has appealed or challenged in vain shall be ordered to pay the
costs of the proceedings before a superior instance, unless the court on account of
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special circumstances finds that it ought to absolve him from the duty of
indemnification.
The rules which are laid down above in this chapter shall apply in a superior
instance to all costs which have accrued in the action or in that part of the action
which is decided by the superior instance.
Section 181.
The question of imposing and stipulating processual costs can only be tried by
a superior instance if the case itself is brought before it.
But the decision may be challenged on the basis that the question of costs has
been decided at variance with law. If the case has been decided by judgment, the
superior instance is bound by the lower court's appraisal of the evidence in the
case.
The attorney is entitled to have what is due to him for his outlays and work on
the case covered out of the costs which are awarded to his party. Such portion of
the costs as is necessary for this cannot be impounded by the other creditors of the
party, and the attorney may claim to have it paid directly to him.
SPAIN*
(A) LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF FEBRUARY 3, 1881.
First Book: Common provisions for contentious and voluntary proceedings
Title I: Appearance before the court
Division 2: Legal aid
Article 31.
(1) If legal aid is denied, the costs of the first instance shall be imposed on the
applicant.
(2) In case of an appeal, those of the second instance shall be imposed on the
appropriate party according to law.
Title V: Disqualification
Division 2: Disqualification of judges
Article 211.
If the recusation is denied, the costs shall always be imposed on the party that
had requested it.
Division 3: Disqualification of municipal judges
Article 227.
If the order affirms, the costs shall be imposed on the appellant.
* Source: ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVIL (1976). Translated by Werner Pfennigstorf.
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Article 228.
If the recusation is denied, the costs shall be imposed on the party that had
requested it, and in addition a fine of 100 pesetas shall be imposed, subject to the
provisions of the second paragraph of art. 212 and of art. 213.
Division 4: Disqualification of court officials
Article 245.
(1) If it is decided that recusation shall take place, the costs of the proceeding
shall be imposed on the recused official if he had denied the truth or the merits of
the alleged ground.
(2) If recusation is denied, the costs shall be imposed on the party that had
requested it, in addition to the payment of the emoluments provided for in art.
247.
Title IX: Appeals against judicial decisions and their effects
Division 1: Appeals against decisions of trial judges
Article 396.
If the trial court dismisses the aforementioned claim, the costs of this pro-
ceeding shall be imposed on the appellant . ...
Second Book: Contentious proceedings
Title II: Proceedings for judgment
Chapter III: Cases for small amounts
Article 710.
(4) The judgment that confirms or adds to that of the first instance shall
impose the costs on the appellant.
Title VI: Appeals
Division 1: General provisions
Article 842.
(1) In all cases where the appeal is declared abandoned, the appeal costs shall
be imposed on the appellant . . ..
Title VIII: Execution of judgments
Division 1: Judgments announced by Spanish courts or Judges
Article 950.
(1) The costs caused by measures for execution are at the charge of the party
condemned in the judgment for which execution is sought.
Title XXI: Appeals for annulment
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Division 5: Processing and decision of appeals admitted for violation of law or
legal theory
Article 1748.
In the judgments deciding that the appeal is not admissible, the appellant shall
be ordered to pay all the costs and to forfeit the deposit ....
Division 6: Filing, admission, and processing of appeals for procedural error
Article 1767.
If it is decided that the appeal is not admissible, the appellant shall be ordered
to pay all the costs and to forfeit the deposit.
Title XXII: Appeal for revision
Division 4: Judgments announced on appeal for revision
Article 1809.
If the appeal for revision is declared unfounded, the party that pursued the
appeal shall be ordered to pay all the costs of the litigation and to forfeit the
deposit.
(B) REGULATION OF NOVEMBER 21, 1952, FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
TENTH PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW OF JULY 19, 1944, CONCERNING
PROCEDURAL RULES APPLICABLE TO MUNICIPAL COURTS.
Article 60.
In the decisions that terminate the litigation, there shall be a decision on the
payment of costs, which shall be imposed on the party whose claims have been
completely rejected. If the claim has been partially approved or denied, each
party shall pay the costs caused by it, and the common costs, at one-half.
SWEDEN*
CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE OF JULY 18, 1942.
Part 2: Proceedings in General
I: Proceedings in Civil Cases
Chapter 18: Litigation Costs
Section 1.
The losing party shall reimburse his adversary for litigation expenses if nothing
to the contrary is provided.
* Source: THE SWEDISH CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE Rev. Ed. (A. Bruzelius & K. Thelin trans.
1979). Copyright © 1979 by New York University. Reprinted by permission of New York University and
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Section 2.
In an action concerning a matter that by law may not be resolved finally
without judicial confirmation, the court may direct that each party shall bear his
own expenses.
Section 3.
If the winning party is found to have initiated the action without provocation
from his adversary, or otherwise to have deliberately or negligently caused unnec-
essary litigation, he shall reimburse his adversary for the latter's litigation
expenses, or, if the circumstances so justify, each party shall bear his own expenses.
If the losing party neither knew nor should have known of the outcome deter-
minative circumstances prior to the commencement of the action, the court may
direct that each party shall bear his own expenses.
Section 4.
If in a multi-claim action each party is both winner and loser, either each party
shall be required to bear his own expenses, or one of the parties shall be awarded
an adjusted compensation for his expenses, or, to the extent that the expenses
attributable to different parts of the action are severable, the liability to compen-
sate for expenses shall be determined by the outcome of each part. However, if the
portion of the case which the party has lost is of only minor importance, he may
receive full compensation for his expenses.
If only a part of a party's claim is granted, the preceding paragraph shall corre-
spondingly apply.
Section 5.
A party whose claim is dismissed without reaching the merits is deemed the
loser.
A party who withdraws his claim or whose claim is written off by reason of his
failure to appear shall reimburse the adverse party for his expenses, unless special
circumstances indicate that a different resolution is appropriate.
If the parties settle the action by private agreement, in the absence of a con-
trary provision in the settlement agreement, each party shall bear his own
expenses.
Section 6.
If a party's failure to appear or to comply with a court direction, or presenta-
tion of a claim or defense that he knew or should have known to be without merit,
or carelessness or oversight in other respects has occasioned adjournment of the
proceedings or has otherwise caused expenses for the adverse party, that party
Fred B. Rothman & Co. The text reproduced here reflects later amendments to § 8 (SFS 1981:741) and
§ 14 (SFS 1982:1123).
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must reimburse the adverse party for such expenses, regardless of how costs in
general are to be distributed.
Section 7.
If, pursuant to this chapter, a party must provide compensation for the adverse
party's litigation expenses, in whole or in part, and it is found that the party's legal
representative, attorney or assistant has caused the expenses by conduct described
in section 3, paragraph 1, or by such carelessness or oversight as is referred in
section 6, the court, even if not requested to do so, may impose joint liability for
costs upon the party and his representative, attorney or assistant.
Section 8.
Compensation for litigation expenses shall fully cover the expenses of prepara-
tion and presentation of the action including counsel fees to the extent that the
expenses were reasonably incurred for the protection of the party's interest. Com-
pensation shall also be paid for the time and effort expended by the party by
reason of the action. Negotiations aimed at settling an issue in dispute which bear
directly upon the outcome of a party's claim are deemed measures for the prepara-
tion of the action.
Compensation for litigation expenses shall also include interest at six percent
from the date of the adjudication of the action until payment is made.
Section 9.
If compensation for litigation expenses is to be furnished by several parties
joined on the same side, such parties are jointly and severally liable for the
expenses. However, to the extent that items of expense are chargeable to a portion
of the action involving only one of the co-parties, or that one of the co-parties has
occasioned items of expense by such carelessness and oversight as is described in
section 6, only the co-party who occasioned the expenses shall be charged.
When, pursuant to section 7, a person is obliged to reimburse litigation
expenses together with a party, he and the party are liable for the expenses jointly
and severally.
Section 10.
When party substitution occurs on the plaintiffis side pursuant to chapter 13,
section 7, the original plaintiff and his successor are jointly and severally liable for
expenses incurred prior to the substitution; after substitution the successor bears
sole responsibility.
The successor of an original defendant is solely liable for the litigation
expenses.
Page 37: Winter 1984]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
SWEDEN
Section 11.
When two or more persons are jointly and severally liable for litigation costs,
on request of one of them, the court, based upon the particular circumstances, may
specify the portion of the expenses that each should ultimately bear, or authorize
complete indemnification of one or more by the other.
Section 12.
As to the liability of an intervenor who lacks party standing to furnish compen-
sation for litigation expenses, and the right of such an intervenor to be compen-
sated for his expenses, the provisions in this chapter concerning parties shall
correspondingly apply; however, the intervenor shall be solely liable for the special
expenses occasioned by his intervention. Nor may the party supported by the
intervenor be directed to furnish compensation for such expenses.
Section 13.
As to disbursements for evidence or for any other measure which in the course
of the action the court has ordered to be paid out of public funds, or has charged
to the parties jointly and severally, the provisions in this chapter concerning the
liability to provide reimbursement for litigation expenses shall apply. If each
party shall bear his own expenses, such disbursements may be apportioned equally
between the parties. Expenses out of public funds for bringing a party to court in
custody shall always be charged to that party.
Concerning liability to compensate the Crown for expenses on behalf of a party
granted public legal aid, special provisions have been enacted.
Section 14.
A party desiring to be reimbursed for litigation expenses shall make a demand
for, and make a statement of, his expenses to the court before the termination of
the proceedings. If he fails to do this, he forfeits his right to be reimbursed for
expenses incurred in that court; however, despite the absence of a demand, the
winning party is entitled to interest referred to in section 8, paragraph 2, and to a
copy of the judgment or final order at his adversary's expense.
When finally disposing of an action, the court shall simultaneously rule upon
the litigation costs and upon the issues mentioned in section 13, paragraph 1. If
counsel fees are to be reimbursed, the amount of the fees shall be separately stated.
Section 15.
The determination concerning liability to provide compensation for litigation
costs incurred in an appellate court in an appeal from a court below shall be based
upon the outcome of the action in that court.
As to liability for expenses incurred in a higher court when the proceeding
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concerns an issue separately appealed to that court, the provisions in this chapter
as to actions instituted in lower courts shall correspondingly apply.
If an action is referred back to a court below, the issue of expenses incurred in
the higher court shall be determined by the court below when it rehears the case.
ZURICH*
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF JUNE 13, 1976
I Part: General Provisions
Division 4: Litigation Costs
A: Court Costs and Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses
Section 64.
The amount of the court costs is determined as provided by the Act on Court
Organization.
They are as a rule imposed on the defeated party. If neither party prevails
fully, the costs are apportioned proportionally.
The court may deviate from this rule especially if the defeated party believed
in good faith to have a ground for litigation or if the plaintiff could not reasonably
be expected to specify the precise amount of his claim and his complaint was sus-
tained in principle.
Section 65.
If the case is rendered moot or if the plaintiff ceases to have a lawful interest in
the action, the court decides on the costs according to its discretion.
In the case of a settlement the costs are, as a rule, imposed one-half on each of
the parties, unless the parties have agreed otherwise. Such agreements are not
binding for the court if they have an adverse financial effect on the court.
Section 66.
If a party has caused costs unnecessarily, such costs are imposed on the party
irrespective of the outcome of the litigation.
Costs that have not been caused by either party are as a rule assumed by the
court.
Costs may be imposed on witnesses or other third persons to the extent that
they have negligently caused such costs.
Section 68.
As a rule, a party must reimburse the opposing party for out-of-court costs and
Source: Zarcher Gesetzsamnlung, Band 46 (1976-78). Translated by Werner Pfennigstorf.
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expenses, including costs of advice, in the same proportion as it has costs imposed
on it. This applies as appropriate to third persons on whom costs are imposed
according to § 66(3).
In the case of a settlement, no reimbursement of costs is ordered unless the
parties have agreed otherwise.
Section 69.
The reimbursement is assessed at the discretion of the court.
prior to the decision submit their statements to the court.
The parties may
